Real-World Electronic Voting: Design, Analysis and Deployment captures all major developments in electronic voting since 2003 in a real-world setting. It covers three broad categories: e-voting protocols, attacks reported on e-voting and new developments on the use of e-voting. This book explores recent innovations in both poll-site and remote voting systems and their application throughout the world. The requirements of elections are analysed, the available tools and technologies are described, and a variety of modern systems are presented in detail together with discussions of deployments. This is an invaluable resource for election professionals, researchers and policy makers alike. Key Features: Reviews both technical and social aspects of e-voting Covers e-voting protocols, attacks reported on e-voting and new developments on the use of e-voting Designed for government election practitioners and policy makers who want to understand the threats and opportunities in e-voting and assess its suitability for future elections

Secure Electronic Voting is an edited volume, which includes chapters authored by leading experts in the field of security and voting systems. The chapters identify and describe the given capabilities and the strong limitations, as well as the current trends and future perspectives of electronic voting technologies, with emphasis in security and privacy. Secure Electronic Voting includes state-of-the-art material on existing and emerging electronic and Internet voting technologies, which may eventually lead to the development of adequately secure e-voting systems. This book also includes an overview of the legal framework with respect to voting, a description of the user requirements for the development of a secure e-voting system, and a discussion on the relevant technical and social concerns. Secure Electronic Voting includes, also, three case studies on the use and evaluation of e-voting systems in three different real world environments.

Democracy has never been more vulnerable. The problem is right here in America. How to Sabotage an Election Become an election judge and carry a refrigerator magnet in your pocket Program every fifth vote to automatically record for your candidate Bury your hacked code Avi Rubin, a computer scientist at Johns Hopkins and a specialist in systems security knows something the rest of us don’t. Maybe we suspected it, maybe we’ve thought it, but we didn’t have proof. Until now. The electronic voting machines being used in 37 states are vulnerable to tampering, and because the manufacturers are not required to reveal—even to the government—how they operate, voters will never know if their votes are recorded accurately. Follow Rubin on his quest to wake America up to the fact that the irregularities in the 2004 elections might not have been accidents; that there are simple solutions that election commissions are willfully ignoring; that if you voted on an electronic machine, there’s a chance you didn’t vote the way you wanted to. Learn what you can do the next time you vote to make sure that your vote is counted. Imagine for a moment that you live in a country where nobody is sure how most of the votes are counted, and there’s no reliable record for performing a recount. Imagine that machines count the votes, but nobody knows how they work. Now imagine if somebody found out that the machines were vulnerable to attack, but the agencies that operate them won’t take the steps to make them safe. If you live in America, you don’t need to imagine anything. This is the reality of electronic voting in our country. Avi Rubin is a computer scientist at Johns Hopkins University and a specialist in systems security. He and a team of researchers studied the code that operates the machines now used in 37 states and discovered the following terrifying facts: The companies hired to test the election equipment for federal certification did not study the code that operates the machines and the election commissions employed no computer security analysts. All votes are recorded on a single removable card similar to the one in a digital camera. There is no way to determine if the card or the code that operates the machine has been tampered with. It’s very easy to program a machine to change votes. There’s no way to determine if that has happened. There were enough irregularities with the electronic voting machines used throughout the 2004 election to make anyone think twice about using them again. Avi Rubin has testified at Congressional hearings trying to alert the government that it has put our democracy at risk by relying so heavily on voting machines without taking the proper precautions. As he has waged this battle, he has been attacked, undermined, and defamed by a prominent manufacturer. His job has been threatened, but he won’t give up until every citizen understands that at this moment, our democracy hangs in the balance. There are simple solutions and, before you vote in the next election, Rubin wants you to know your rights. If you don’t know them and you use an electronic voting machine, you may not be voting at all.

Electronic Voting Design, Analysis and Deployment captures all major developments in electronic voting since 2003 in a real-world setting. It covers three broad categories: e-voting protocols, attacks reported on e-voting and new developments on the use of e-voting. This book explores recent innovations in both poll-site and remote voting systems and their application throughout the world. The requirements of elections are analysed, the available tools and technologies are described, and a variety of modern systems are presented in detail together with discussions of deployments. This is an invaluable resource for election professionals, researchers and policy makers alike. Key Features: Reviews both technical and social aspects of e-voting Covers e-voting protocols, attacks reported on e-voting and new developments on the use of e-voting Designed for government election practitioners and policy makers who want to understand the threats and opportunities in e-voting and assess its suitability for future elections

Electronic voting is often seen as a tool for making the electoral process more efficient and for increasing trust in its management. Properly implemented, e-voting solutions can increase the security of the ballot, speed up the processing of results and make voting easier. However, the challenges are considerable. If not carefully planned and designed, e-voting can undermine the confidence in the whole electoral process. Technology upgrades in elections are always challenging projects that require careful deliberation and planning. Introducing e-voting is probably the most difficult upgrade as this technology touches the core of the entire electoral process—the casting and counting of the votes. E-voting greatly reduces direct human control and influence in this process. This provides an opportunity for solving some old electoral problems, but also introduces a whole range of new concerns. Consequently, e-voting usually triggers more criticism and opposition and is more disputed than any other information technology application in elections. This Policy Paper outlines contextual factors that can influence the success of e-voting solutions and highlights the importance of considering these factors before choosing to introduce new voting technologies.

There are serious issues, however, regarding computer security and voter fraud, unequal Internet access across socioeconomic lines (the "digital divide"), and the civic consequences of moving elections away from schools and other polling places and into private homes and offices. After all, showing up to vote is the most public civic activity many Americans engage in, and it is often their only overt participation in the democratic process."

During the 2016 presidential election, America's election infrastructure was targeted by actors sponsored by the Russian government. Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy examines the challenges arising out of the 2016 federal election, assesses current technology and standards for voting, and recommends steps that the federal government, state and local governments, election administrators, and vendors of voting technology should take to improve the security of election infrastructure. In doing so, the report provides a vision of voting that is more secure, accessible, reliable, and verifiable.