W.V. Quine, a champion of philosophical naturalism and pioneer of mathematical logic, was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Contemporary thought in ontology, epistemology, and the philosophy of logic and language owes much to his influence, yet recent work in these areas has become increasingly dismissive of his views. This is often because of mistaken or overly simplified conceptions of his philosophy which overlook the development of his views over time, in particular the growing importance of a kind of structuralism to his system as it evolved. This volume provides a fuller, richer picture of Quine's views and their development. With contributions from leading philosophers in a range of subfields including philosophical logic, philosophy of language, history of philosophy, mathematics, philosophy of time, and set theory, it is the first to investigate Quine's views on structure and how it permeates and shapes his attitude to a range of philosophical questions.

From the contents: Naturalistic epistemology, murder and suicide? But what about the promises! (Ton Derksen). - Naturalism and rationality (Christopher Hookway). - Quine's hypothetical theory of language learning: a comparison of different conceptualschemes of their logic (Mia Gosselin). - Quine and innate similarity spaces (Jaap van Brakel). - Quine and Davidson on the structure of empirical knowledge (Dirk Koppelberg). - Empathy and charity (Eva Picardi). - Quine: indeterminacy, 'robust realism', and truth (Sandra Laugier). - Quine and Putnam on conceptual relativity and reference: theft or honest toil? (Roger Vergauwen).

W.V. Quine, a champion of philosophical naturalism and pioneer of mathematical logic, was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century. Contemporary thought in ontology, epistemology, and the philosophy of logic and language owes much to his influence, yet recent work in these areas has become increasingly dismissive of his views. This is often because of mistaken or overly simplified conceptions of his philosophy which overlook the development of his views over time, in particular the growing importance of a kind of structuralism to his system as it evolved. This volume provides a fuller, richer picture of Quine's views and their development. With contributions from leading philosophers in a range of subfields including philosophical logic, philosophy of language, history of philosophy, mathematics, philosophy of time, and set theory, it is the first to investigate Quine's views on structure and how it permeates and shapes his attitude to a range of philosophical questions.

Willard VanOrman Quine has probably been the most influential th American philosopher of the 20 century. His work spans over seven decades, and covers many domains in philosophy. He has made major contributions to the fields of logic and set theory, philosophy of logic and mathematics, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, epistemology and metaphysics. Quine's first work in philosophy was in the field of logic. His major contributions are the two set-theoretic systems NF (1936) and ML (1940). 1 These systems were alternatives to the type theory of Principia Mathematica or Zermelo's set theory, and are still being studied by 2 mathematicians. An indirect contribution to the field of logic is his strong resistance to moda110gic. Quine's objectIons to the notions of necessity and analyticity have influenced the development of moda110gic? Quine has had an enormous influence on philosophy of mathematics. When Quine entered philosophy there was a discussion on the foundations of mathematics between the schools of intuitionism, formalism, and conventionalism. Quine soon took issue with Carnap's conventionalism in "Truth by convention,,4 (1936). Quine has never joined one of the other schools, but has added new elements that are the basic ones of the 5 contemporary schools of nominalism, platonism, and structuralism. Quine has long been in the shadow of Benacerraf and Putnam in this field. At the moment there seems to be a renewed interest in Quine's work, and most philosophers explicitly refer to Quine's work.

During the past few decades, a radical shift has occurred in how philosophers conceive of the relation between science and philosophy. A great number of analytic philosophers have adopted what is commonly called a "naturalistic" approach, arguing that their inquiries ought to be in some sense continuous with science. Where early analytic philosophers often relied on a sharp distinction between science and philosophy--the former an empirical discipline concerned with fact, the latter an a priori discipline concerned with meaning--philosophers today largely follow Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000) in his seminal rejection of this distinction. Sander Verhaegh here offers a comprehensive study of Quine's groundbreaking naturalism. Building on Quine's published corpus as well as a wealth of unpublished letters, notes, lectures, papers, proposals, and annotations from the Quine archives, Verhaegh aims to reconstruct both the nature and the development of his naturalism. As such, Working from Within aims to contribute to the rapidly developing historiography of analytic philosophy, and to provide a better, historically informed, understanding of what is philosophically at stake in the contemporary naturalistic turn. Transcriptions of five unpublished papers, letters, and notes are included in the appendix.

Do numbers, sets, and so forth, exist? What do mathematical statements mean? Are they literally true or false, or do they lack truth values altogether? Addressing questions that have attracted lively debate in recent years, Stewart Shapiro contends that standard realist and antirealist accounts of mathematics are both problematic. As Benacerraf first noted, we are confronted with the following powerful dilemma. The desired continuity between mathematical and, say, scientific language suggests realism, but realism in this context suggests seemingly intractable epistemic problems. As a way out of this dilemma, Shapiro articulates a structuralist approach. On this view, the subject matter of arithmetic, for example, is not a fixed domain of numbers independent of each other, but rather is the natural number structure, the pattern common to any system of objects that has an initial object and successor relation satisfying the induction principle. Using this framework, realism in mathematics can be preserved without troublesome epistemic consequences. Shapiro concludes by showing how a structuralist approach can be applied to wider philosophical questions such as the nature of an "object" and the Quinean nature of ontological commitment. Clear, compelling, and tautly argued, Shapiro's work, noteworthy both in its attempt to develop a full-length structuralist approach to mathematics and to trace its emergence in the history of mathematics, will be of deep interest to both philosophers and mathematicians.

Ontology and Metaontology: A Contemporary Guide is a clear and accessible survey of ontology, focusing on the most recent trends in the discipline. Divided into parts, the first half characterizes metaontology: the discourse on the methodology of ontological inquiry, covering the main concepts, tools, and methods of the discipline, exploring the notions of being and existence, ontological commitment, paraphrase strategies, fictionalist strategies, and other metaontological questions. The second half considers a series of case studies, introducing and familiarizing the reader with concrete examples of the latest research in the field. The basic sub-fields of ontology are covered here via an accessible and captivating exposition: events, properties, universals, abstract objects, possible worlds, material beings, mereology, fictional objects. The guide's modular structure allows for a flexible approach to the subject, making it suitable for both undergraduates and postgraduates looking to better understand and apply the exciting developments and debates taking place in ontology today.