Explores what it was like to argue and to live as a practitioner of Pyrrhonist skepticism.

Throughout the history of philosophy, skepticism has posed one of the central challenges of epistemology. Opponents of skepticism--including externalists, contextualists, foundationalists, and coherentists--have focussed largely on one particular variety of skepticism, often called Cartesian or Academic skepticism, which makes the radical claim that nobody can know anything. However, this version of skepticism is something of a straw man, since virtually no philosopher endorses this radical skeptical claim. The only skeptical view that has been truly held--by Sextus, Montaigne, Hume, Wittgenstein, and, most recently, Robert Fogelin--has been Pyrrohnian skepticism. Pyrrhonian skeptics do not assert Cartesian skepticism, but neither do they deny it. The Pyrrhonian skeptics' doubts run so deep that they suspend belief even about Cartesian skepticism and its denial. Nonetheless, some Pyrrhonians argue that they can still hold "common beliefs of everyday life" and can even claim to know some truths in an everyday way. This edited volume presents previously unpublished articles on this subject by a strikingly impressive group of philosophers, who engage with both historical and contemporary versions of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Among them are Gisela Striker, Janet Broughton, Don Garrett, Ken Winkler, Hans Sluga, Ernest Sosa, Michael Williams, Barry Stroud, Robert Fogelin, and Roy Sorensen. This volume is thematically unified and will interest a broad spectrum of scholars in epistemology and the history of philosophy.

Casey Perin presents a new interpretation of key ideas and arguments in Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism, a founding text of the Sceptical tradition in philosophy. Perin examines Sextus' commitment to the search for truth and to certain principles of rationality, the scope of his scepticism, and its consequences for action and agency.

This work presents a portrait of Nietzsche as the skeptic par excellence in the modern period, by demonstrating how a careful and informed understanding of ancient Pyrrhonism illuminates his reflections on truth, knowledge and morality, as well as the very nature and value of philosophic inquiry.

In Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Hegel's Theory of Judgement Ioannis Trisokkas offers a systematic analysis of the dialectic of the judgement in Hegel's Science of Logic in the context of the problem of Pyrrhonian scepticism.

This volume offers the first bilingual edition of a major text in the history of epistemology, Diogenes Laertius's report on Pyrrho and Timon in his Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Leading experts contribute a philosophical introduction, translation, commentary, and scholarly essays on the nature of Diogenes's report as well as core questions in recent research on skepticism.

Five Modes of Scepticism examines the argument forms that lie at the heart of Pyrrhonian scepticism as expressed in the writings of Sextus Empiricus. These are the Agrippan modes of disagreement, hypothesis, infinite regression, reciprocity and relativity; modes which are supposed to bring about that quintessentially sceptical mental state of suspended judgement. Stefan Sienkiewicz analyses how the modes are supposed to do this, both individually and collectively, and from two perspectives. On the one hand there is the perspective of the sceptic's dogmatic opponent and on the other there is the perspective of the sceptic himself. Epistemically speaking, the dogmatist and the sceptic are two different creatures with two different viewpoints. The book elucidates the corresponding differences in the argumentative structure of the modes depending on which of these perspectives is adopted. Previous treatments of the modes have interpreted them from a dogmatic perspective; one of the tasks of the present work is to reorient the way in which scholars have traditionally engaged with the modes. Sienkiewicz advocates moving away from the perspective of the sceptic's opponent - the dogmatist - towards the perspective of the sceptic and trying to make sense of how the sceptic can come to suspend judgement on the basis of the Agrippan modes.