Public choice is the study of behavior at the intersection of economics and political science. Since the pioneering work of Duncan Black in the 1940s, public choice has developed a rich literature, drawing from such related perspectives as history, philosophy, law, and sociology, to analyze political decision making (by citizen-voters, elected officials, bureaucratic administrators, lobbyists, and other "rational" actors) in social and economic context, with an emphasis on identifying differences between individual goals and collective outcomes. Constitutional political economy provides important insights into the relationship between effective constitutions and the behavior of ordinary political markets. In Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider have assembled an international array of leading authors to present a comprehensive and accessible overview of the field and its applications. Covering a wide array of topics, including regulation and antitrust, taxation, trade liberalization, political corruption, interest group behavior, dictatorship, and environmental issues, and featuring biographies of the founding fathers of the field, this volume will be essential reading for scholars and students, policymakers, economists, sociologists, and non-specialist readers interested in the dynamics of political economy.

Five of the papers were originally developed at a symposium on government, the economy, and the constitution sponsored by the Policy Sciences Program of Florida State University in March 1986 and subsequently published in the Cato journal, fall 1987. Includes bibliographies and indexes.

Five of the papers were originally developed at a symposium on government, the economy, and the constitution sponsored by the Policy Sciences Program of Florida State University in March 1986 and subsequently published in the Cato journal, fall 1987. Includes bibliographies and indexes.

This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field. The expert contributions are underpinned by the notion of moving economic thinking away from the analysis of the logic of a situation given a set of well-established and well-enforced Ôrules of the gameÕ towards a deeper analysis of the logic behind the selection of the rules of the game themselves. Within this context, the theme of choice between rules (as well as the more conventional analysis within rules) across historical time and place, and in various thought experiments and conceptual situations, is explored in detail. Extensive case studies back theory with empirical evidence, and topics discussed include: the foundations of constitutional economics; constitutional political economy; political competition and voting; public choice and public policy; and extensions to public choice theory. This stimulating book will prove a thought-provoking read for academics and both under- and post-graduate students in the fields of economics (particularly public choice and Austrian economics), public policy and political science.

In 1962, economists James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock published The Calculus of Consent, in which they developed the principles of public choice theory. In the fifty years since its publication, the book has defined the field and set the standard for research and analysis. To celebrate a half-century of scholarship in public choice, Dwight Lee has assembled distinguished academics from around the world to reflect on the influence of this monumental publication, and, more broadly, the legacy of its legendary authors. Their essays cover a broad spectrum of topics and approaches, from the impact of public choice theory on foreign policy analysis to personal remembrances of learning from and collaborating with Buchanan and Tullock. The result is a unique collection of insights that celebrate public choice and its visionary proponents, while considering its future directions. ​

Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact and to the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. This book makes the case for an approach to constitutional political economy that is grounded in consistent, hard-nosed public choice analysis. Effective institutional design is simply not feasible unless the designers build their structures to withstand rational choice pressures from the political market place. If mean, sensual man is here to stay, then let us, in our better moments, incorporate that knowledge into the institutions that must govern his behavior. A distinguished list of public choice scholars pursue this approach against a varying backcloth of constitutional issues relevant to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the transition economies and the third world.

Discusses voting, tax policy, government regulation, redistribution of wealth, and international negotiation in a new approach to government