This volume, the third in this Springer series, contains selected papers from the four workshops organized by the ESF Research Networking Programme "The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective" (PSE) in 2010: Pluralism in the Foundations of Statistics Points of Contact between the Philosophy of Physics and the Philosophy of Biology The Debate on Mathematical Modeling in the Social Sciences Historical Debates about Logic, Probability and Statistics The volume is accordingly divided in four sections, each of them containing papers coming from the workshop focussing on one of these themes. While the programme's core topic for the year 2010 was probability and statistics, the organizers of the workshops embraced the opportunity of building bridges to more or less closely connected issues in general philosophy of science, philosophy of physics and philosophy of the special sciences. However, papers that analyze the concept of probability for various philosophical purposes are clearly a major theme in this volume, as it was in the previous volumes of the same series. This reflects the impressive productivity of probabilistic approaches in the philosophy of science, which form an important part of what has become known as formal epistemology - although, of course, there are non-probabilistic approaches in formal epistemology as well. It is probably fair to say that Europe has been particularly strong in this area of philosophy in recent years.​

When as a practicing lawyer I published my ?rst article on statistical evidence in 1966, the editors of the Harvard Law Review told me that a mathematical equa- 1 tion had never before appeared in the review. This hardly seems possible - but if they meant a serious mathematical equation, perhaps they were right. Today all that has changed in legal academia. Whole journals are devoted to scienti?c methods in law or empirical studies of legal institutions. Much of this work involves statistics. Columbia Law School, where I teach, has a professor of law and epidemiology and other law schools have similar “law and” professorships. Many offer courses on statistics (I teach one) or, more broadly, on law and social science. The same is true of practice. Where there are data to parse in a litigation, stat- ticians and other experts using statistical tools now frequently testify. And judges must understand them. In 1993, in its landmark Daubert decision, the Supreme Court commanded federal judges to penetrate scienti?c evidence and ?nd it “re- 2 liable” before allowing it in evidence. It is emblematic of the rise of statistics in the law that the evidence at issue in that much-cited case included a series of epidemiological studies. The Supreme Court’s new requirement made the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scienti?c Evidence, which appeared at about the same time, a best seller. It has several important chapters on statistics.

This systematic approach covers semi-groups, groups, linear vector spaces, and algebra. It states and studies fundamental probabilistic problems for these spaces, focusing on concrete results. 1963 edition.

This volume presents results from an AMS Special Session held on the topic in Gainesville (FL). Papers included are written by an international group of well-known specialists who offer an important cross-section of current work in the field. In addition there are two expository papers that provide an avenue for non-specialists to comprehend problems in this area. The breadth of research in this area is evident by the variety of articles presented in the volume. Results concern probability on Lie groups and general locally compact groups. Generalizations of groups appear as hypergroups, abstract semigroups, and semigroups of matrices. Work on symmetric cones is included. Lastly, there are a number of articles on the current progress in constructing stochastic processes on quantum groups.

The book is a collection of papers of experts in the fields of information and complexity. Information is a basic structure of the world, while complexity is a fundamental property of systems and processes. There are intrinsic relations between information and complexity. The research in information theory, the theory of complexity and their interrelations is very active. The book will expand knowledge on information, complexity and their relations representing the most recent and advanced studies and achievements in this area. The goal of the book is to present the topic from different perspectives — mathematical, informational, philosophical, methodological, etc.

This volume presents state-of-the-art papers on new topics related to neutrosophic theories, such as neutrosophic algebraic structures, neutrosophic triplet algebraic structures, neutrosophic extended triplet algebraic structures, neutrosophic algebraic hyperstructures, neutrosophic triplet algebraic hyperstructures, neutrosophic n-ary algebraic structures, neutrosophic n-ary algebraic hyperstructures, refined neutrosophic algebraic structures, refined neutrosophic algebraic hyperstructures, quadruple neutrosophic algebraic structures, refined quadruple neutrosophic algebraic structures, neutrosophic image processing, neutrosophic image classification, neutrosophic computer vision, neutrosophic machine learning, neutrosophic artificial intelligence, neutrosophic data analytics, neutrosophic deep learning, and neutrosophic symmetry, as well as their applications in the real world.

Tychomancy—meaning “the divination of chances”—presents a set of rules for inferring the physical probabilities of outcomes from the causal or dynamic properties of the systems that produce them. Probabilities revealed by the rules are wide-ranging: they include the probability of getting a 5 on a die roll, the probability distributions found in statistical physics, and the probabilities that underlie many prima facie judgments about fitness in evolutionary biology. Michael Strevens makes three claims about the rules. First, they are reliable. Second, they are known, though not fully consciously, to all human beings: they constitute a key part of the physical intuition that allows us to navigate around the world safely in the absence of formal scientific knowledge. Third, they have played a crucial but unrecognized role in several major scientific innovations. A large part of Tychomancy is devoted to this historical role for probability inference rules. Strevens first analyzes James Clerk Maxwell’s extraordinary, apparently a priori, deduction of the molecular velocity distribution in gases, which launched statistical physics. Maxwell did not derive his distribution from logic alone, Strevens proposes, but rather from probabilistic knowledge common to all human beings, even infants as young as six months old. Strevens then turns to Darwin’s theory of natural selection, the statistics of measurement, and the creation of models of complex systems, contending in each case that these elements of science could not have emerged when or how they did without the ability to “eyeball” the values of physical probabilities.