What do Hammurabi, Solomon, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. have in common? They all presided as judges, relying on a precise understanding of the law to mete out justice. Today’s judges, too, have a significant opportunity to intelligently resolve disputes and artfully change lives, but they also face many other daily challenges. Unfortunately, there is no real handbook for a practicing judge—or there wasn’t, until now. Written by Judge James P. Gray, Wearing the Robe explores the day-to-day realities of being a judge, from faithfully applying the law in court to sharing knowledge outside the courthouse. The author addresses a range of important topics, examining how judges can obtain and refine their skills, preside effectively over judicial calendars, healthfully manage the restrictions placed on their private lives, and more. Throughout, personal insights and practical tips add to the firm foundation of knowledge.

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.

Much attention has been given to how cognitive illusions - both heuristics and cognitive biases - affect decision making by juries. Less, albeit increasing, attention has been given to how cognitive illusions affect decision making by judges. Almost no attention, however, has been given to how cognitive illusions might affect decision making by arbitrators. This article extends the behavioral analysis of the legal system to private judging, and considers the implications of that analysis for the debate on pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses. Empirical evidence on the effect of cognitive illusions in arbitral decision making is extremely limited. Further complicating the analysis of private judging are structural differences between arbitration hearings and jury trials, which may heighten or dampen the effect of cognitive illusions on decision making in the real world. If arbitrators are assumed to be more like judges than jurors in their decision making - a seemingly reasonable assumption - studies comparing the effect of cognitive illusions on judges and jurors provide at least a starting point for making predictions about arbitral decision making. On this view, the article reaches the very tentative conclusion that arbitrators, like judges, may be less susceptible to at least some cognitive illusions than jurors. If subsequent research bears out this tentative conclusion, it would have important implications for the ongoing debate over consumer arbitration. If arbitral decision making is less subject than jury decision making to the effects of cognitive illusions, then the use of arbitration may improve the accuracy of dispute resolution, reducing the risk of overcompensation (rather than resulting in undercompensation). This is not to suggest that such utilitarian arguments should be used to override constitutional protections, or that the jury might not serve other functions than simply dispute resolution. Instead, the point simply is that when Congress (or another policy maker) is considering whether to restrict the enforceability of consumer arbitration agreements, it should not assume that juries necessarily make "better" decisions than arbitrators. To the contrary, restricting the availability of arbitration may reduce the accuracy of dispute resolution, thereby imposing real costs on the parties to consumer contracts.

In the layman's mind, our civil justice system takes too long and costs too much. ADR systems (Arbitration, Mediation and 'Private Judging') were designed to address these concerns [easing judicial bottlenecks, expeditiously resolving disputes, and making justice affordable]. Arbitration and Mediation are well established - 'Private Judging' remains an under-utilized ADR alternative. Private judging is a unique ADR process that provides the benefits of resolution by arbitration - yet unlike arbitration, preserves appellate review. This book explores the statute Ohio adopted in 1984 that permits 'Private Judging' - a unique ADR alternative.