This book explains the historical significance and introduction of the presumption of innocence into common law legal systems. It explains that the presumption should be seen as reflecting notions of moral comfort around judgment of others. Specifically, when one is asked to make a judgment about the guilt or otherwise of a person accused of wrongdoing, the default position should be to do nothing. This reflects the very serious consequences of what we do when we decide someone is guilty of wrongdoing and is not a step to be taken lightly. Traditionally, decision makers have only taken it when they are morally comfortable with that decision. It then documents how legislators in a range of common law jurisdictions have undermined the presumption of innocence, through measures such as reverse onus provisions, allowing or requiring inferences to be made against an accused, redefining offenses and defenses in novel ways to minimize the burden on the prosecutor, and by dressing proceedings as civil when they are in substance criminal. Courts have too easily acceded to such measures, in the process permitting accused persons to be convicted although there is reasonable doubt as to their guilt, and where they are not guilty of sufficiently blameworthy conduct to attract criminal sanction. It finds that the courts must be prepared to re-assert the prime importance of the presumption of innocence, only permitting criminal sanctions to be imposed where they are morally certain that the accused did that of which they have been accused, and morally comfortable that the conduct being addressed is worthy of the kind of criminal sanction which prosecutors seek to impose. Courts must be morally comfortable about the finding of guilt, and the imposition of the criminal penalty in a given case. They have lost sight of this moral underpinning to criminal law process and substance, and it must be regained.

This book considers how legislatures have undermined the presumption of innocence and how courts have largely accepted it. It argues criminal law needs to return to notions of moral comfort as the basis for determining whether a person is guilty, and only impose criminal sanctions when there is sufficient, moral blame.

Taming the Presumption of Innocence provides a comprehensive account of the presumption of innocence in criminal law and procedure. It maintains that the presumption is a vital component of the proof structure of criminal trials.

The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty has been described as the 'golden thread' running through the web of English criminal law and a "fundamental postulate" of Irish criminal law which enjoys constitutional protection. Reflecting on the bail laws in the O'Callaghan case, Walsh J. described the presumption as a 'very real thing and not simply a procedural rule taking effect only at the trial'. The purpose of this book is to consider whether the reality matches the rhetoric surrounding this central precept of our criminal law and to consider its efficacy in the light of recent or proposed legislative innovations. Considerable space is devoted to the anti-crime package introduced by the government in the period of heightened concern about crime which followed the murder of journalist Veronica Guerin. Described by the Bar Council as "the most radical single package of alterations to Irish criminal law and procedure ever put together, " the effect of the package was an amendment of the bail laws and the introduction of preventative detention; a curtailment of the right to silence for those charged with serious drugs offences and the introduction of a novel civil forfeiture process to facilitate the seizure of the proceeds of crime, a development which arguably circumvents the presumption. Given these developments, the question posed in the book is whether we can lay claim to a presumption that is more than merely theoretical or illusory.

This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the presumption of innocence from both a practical and theoretical point of view. Throughout the book a framework for the presumption of innocence is developed. The book approaches the right to presumption of innocence from an international human rights perspective using specific examples drawn from international criminal law. The result is a framework for understanding the right that is grounded in human rights law. This framework can then be applied across different national and international systems. When applied, it can help determine when the presumption of innocence is being infringed upon, eroded, violated, and ensure that the presumption of innocence is protected. The book is an essential resource for students, academics and practitioners working in the areas of human rights, criminal law, international criminal law, and evidence. The themes also have a more general application to national jurisdictions and legal theory.

Release. Crimes of specific intent.