By virtually any means of measurement, postwar Iraq has become a more bloodied and embattled settlement than ever envisaged. But were the seeds of these problems sown long before military force had been committed? This lucid and detailed examination of US foreign policy evaluates the continuity and divergence in the strategies of the Bush, Clinton and Bush Jr administrations and their efforts to respond to the Iraqi threat, and how those strategies have bequeathed a legacy of problems to those trying to rebuild a postwar Iraq. Offering the most comprehensive analysis of the dynamics that paved the way for renewed conflict in Iraq, the book provides a descriptive account of attempts to confront a host of political pressures, from the need for international cooperation in postwar Iraq, to dealing with the influx of foreign fighters and their quest to force American withdrawal. This essential volume provides analysts, observers and policy makers with guidelines and prescriptions about the future of postwar Iraq and detailed analysis of lessons learned both during and after the military and reconstruction phases.

The Road to War examines how presidential commitments can lead to the use of American military force, and to war. Marvin Kalb notes that since World War II, "presidents have relied more on commitments, public and private, than they have on declarations of war, even though the U.S. Constitution declares rather unambiguously that Congress has the responsibility to "declare" war.

By virtually any means of measurement, postwar Iraq has become a more bloodied and embattled settlement than ever envisaged. But were the seeds of these problems sown long before military force had been committed? This lucid and detailed examination of US foreign policy evaluates the continuity and divergence in the strategies of the Bush, Clinton and Bush Jr administrations and their efforts to respond to the Iraqi threat, and how those strategies have bequeathed a legacy of problems to those trying to rebuild a postwar Iraq. Offering the most comprehensive analysis of the dynamics that paved the way for renewed conflict in Iraq, the book provides a descriptive account of attempts to confront a host of political pressures, from the need for international cooperation in postwar Iraq, to dealing with the influx of foreign fighters and their quest to force American withdrawal. This essential volume provides analysts, observers and policy makers with guidelines and prescriptions about the future of postwar Iraq and detailed analysis of lessons learned both during and after the military and reconstruction phases.

As the insurgency continues to plague Iraq and coalition forces struggle to maintain control, this book seeks to answer the question of how the Iraq War came about.

“Essential . . . one for the ages . . . a must read for all who care about presidential power.” —The Washington Post “Authoritative . . . The most comprehensive account yet of that smoldering wreck of foreign policy, one that haunts us today.” —LA Times One of BookPage's Best Books of 2020 To Start a War paints a vivid and indelible picture of a decision-making process that was fatally compromised by a combination of post-9/11 fear and paranoia, rank naïveté, craven groupthink, and a set of actors with idées fixes who gamed the process relentlessly. Everything was believed; nothing was true. Robert Draper’s fair-mindedness and deep understanding of the principal actors suffuse his account, as does a storytelling genius that is close to sorcery. There are no cheap shots here, which makes the ultimate conclusion all the more damning. In the spirit of Barbara W. Tuchman’s The Guns of August and Marc Bloch’s Strange Defeat, To Start A War will stand as the definitive account of a collective scurrying for evidence that would prove to be not just dubious but entirely false—evidence that was then used to justify a verdict that led to hundreds of thousands of deaths and a flood tide of chaos in the Middle East that shows no signs of ebbing.

Presents the findings of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which was formed in 2006 to examine the situation in Iraq and offer suggestions for the American military's future involvement in the region.

This is the real story of how George W. Bush came to double-down on Iraq in the highest stakes gamble of his entire presidency. Drawing on extensive interviews with nearly thirty senior officials, including President Bush himself, The Last Card offers an unprecedented look into the process by which Bush overruled much of the military leadership and many of his trusted advisors, and authorized the deployment of roughly 30,000 additional troops to the warzone in a bid to save Iraq from collapse in 2007. The adoption of a new counterinsurgency strategy and surge of new troops into Iraq altered the American posture in the Middle East for a decade to come. In The Last Card we have access to the deliberations among the decision-makers on Bush's national security team as they embarked on that course. In their own words, President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and others, recount the debates and disputes that informed the process as President Bush weighed the historical lessons of Vietnam against the perceived strategic imperatives in the Middle East. For a president who had earlier vowed never to dictate military strategy to generals, the deliberations in the Oval Office and Situation Room in 2006 constituted a trying and fateful moment. Even a president at war is bound by rules of consensus and limited by the risk of constitutional crisis. What is to be achieved in the warzone must also be possible in Washington, D.C. Bush risked losing public esteem and courted political ruin by refusing to disengage from the costly war in Iraq. The Last Card is a portrait of leadership—firm and daring if flawed—in the Bush White House. The personal perspectives from men and women who served at the White House, Foggy Bottom, the Pentagon, and in Baghdad, are complemented by critical assessments written by leading scholars in the field of international security. Taken together, the candid interviews and probing essays are a first draft of the history of the surge and new chapter in the history of the American presidency.