The story of "three great national epics" enacted along the banks of the Powder river: the epic of grass and the future of the great grazing lands; the story of the Sioux Indians; and the northwestern cattle business.

Account of the Wyoming range war of the Johnson County Stock Growers Association against homesteading cowboys and small ranchers.

The Great Sioux War of 1876–77 began at daybreak on March 17, 1876, when Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds and six cavalry companies struck a village of Northern Cheyennes—Sioux allies—thereby propelling the Northern Plains tribes into war. The ensuing last stand of the Sioux against Anglo-American settlement of their homeland spanned some eighteen months, playing out across more than twenty battle and skirmish sites and costing hundreds of lives on both sides and many millions of dollars. And it all began at Powder River. Powder River: Disastrous Opening of the Great Sioux War recounts the wintertime Big Horn Expedition and its singular great battle, along with the stories of the Northern Cheyennes and their elusive leader Old Bear. Historian Paul Hedren tracks both sides of the conflict through a rich array of primary source material, including the transcripts of Reynolds’s court-martial and Indian recollections. The disarray and incompetence of the war’s beginnings—officers who failed to take proper positions, disregard of orders to save provisions, failure to cooperate, and abandonment of the dead and a wounded soldier—in many ways anticipated the catastrophe that later occurred at the Little Big Horn. Forty photographs, many previously unpublished, and five new maps detail the action from start to ignominious conclusion. Hedren’s comprehensive account takes Powder River out of the shadow of the Little Big Horn and reveals how much this critical battle tells us about the army’s policy and performance in the West, and about the debacle soon to follow.

From a recognized authority on the High Plains Indians wars comes this narrative history blending both American Indian and U.S. Army perspectives on the attack that destroyed the village of Northern Cheyenne chief Morning Star. Of momentous significance for the Cheyennes as well as the army, this November 1876 encounter, coming exactly six months to the day after the Custer debacle at the Little Bighorn, was part of the Powder River Expedition waged by Brigadier General George Crook against the Indians. Vital to the larger context of the Great Sioux War, the attack on Morning Star’s village encouraged the eventual surrender of Crazy Horse and his Sioux followers. Unbiased in its delivery, Morning Star Dawn offers the most thorough modern scholarly assessment of the Powder River Expedition. It incorporates previously unsynthesized data from the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, and other repositories, and provides an examination of all facets of the campaign leading to and following the destruction of Morning Star’s village.

Monnett takes a closer look at the struggle between the mining interests of the United States and the Lakota and Cheyenne nations in 1866 that climaxed with the Fetterman Massacre.

The entry for September 8, 1865, is terse: “We marched and fought over 15 miles today.” With these few words civilian military engineer Lyman G. Bennett characterized the experience of the 1,400 men of the Powder River Expedition’s Eastern Division as they trudged through largely unexplored territory and faced off with American Indians determined to keep their hunting grounds. David E. Wagner’s Powder River Odyssey: Nelson Cole’s Western Campaign of 1865 tells the story of a largely forgotten campaign at the pivotal moment when the Civil War ended and the Indian wars captured national attention. The expedition’s mission seemed simple: punish the bands of Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho that had attacked white emigrants and commercial traffic moving west along the Oregon Trail. But the army’s western command failed to appreciate either the resolve of their enemies or the difficulties of the terrain. Cole’s men, ill-provisioned from the outset, began to die of scurvy two months into the campaign and contemplated mutiny. Bennett’s previously unpublished journal and other primary sources clarify and correct previous accounts of the expedition. Fifteen detailed maps reflect the author’s intimate knowledge of the topography along the expedition’s route. Wagner’s documentary account reveals in stark detail the difficulties inherent in the army’s attempt to pacify the American West.