Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centersâ€"the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1997-03 edition. Excerpt: ...The historical evidence is clear that conventional weapons, including the potential availability of chemical or biological weapons, have not deterred all-out world wars; conversely, nuclear weapons also have not deterred the hundred or so localized nonnuclear conflicts which have taken a larger toll during the nuclear age than that inflicted by the nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Whether the ascendance of nuclear weapons has deterred, and thereby prevented, all-out large-scale war between the end of World War II and today will remain a subject of debate with happily no physical evidence to support either side. There is, however, no question that what has been called "existential deterrence" by nuclear weapons has been a major military factor since World War II. Although the Cold War consumed enormous resources and threatened a major holocaust, the superpowers actually conducted foreign policy and military operations with a great deal of caution. Direct contact between U.S. and Soviet forces was largely avoided, with essentially all actual military hostilities restricted to client states of the two powers. There were indeed tense moments, such as the Cuban missile crisis and the bombardment of Russian ships at Haiphong during the Vietnam War, but these crises were in effect settled by the preponderance of conventional power, with nuclear threat only as backdrop. The nuclear deterrent concepts during the Cold War evolved from "massive retaliation," which threatened the Soviet Union with nuclear reprisals in case of unacceptable conduct, be it nuclear or nonnuclear, to the doctrine designated as "flexible response" and then "extended deterrence." In essence flexible response provided that the United States would use nuclear...

“This is a brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in stereotypes and moral attitudinizing.”—Gordon A. Craig, New York Times Book Review Originally published more than fifty years ago, this landmark book explores the ways in which military capabilities—real or imagined—are used, skillfully or clumsily, as bargaining power. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s new introduction to the work shows how Schelling’s framework—conceived of in a time of superpowers and mutually assured destruction—still applies to our multipolar world, where wars are fought as much online as on the ground.

When the Stakes Are High is based on the premise that powers have continually played a decisive role in international conflicts. Consequently, one of the key questions concerns the conditions that are likely to trigger or abate dispute escalation into major power conflicts. In this book, Vesna Danilovic provides a rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis of these conditions. Since the most precarious and common form of dispute between major powers arises over third nations, the author's primary focus is on so-called extended deterrence. In this type of deterrence, one side attempts to prevent another side from initiating or escalating conflict with a third nation. When the Stakes Are High addresses such questions as: When is extended deterrence likely to be effective? What happens if deterrence fails? In what circumstances is war likely to result from a deterrence failure? The author's main argument is that a major power's national interests, which shape the inherent credibility of threats and which are shaped by various regional stakes, set the limits to the relevance of other factors, which have received greater scholarly attention in the past. Strongly supported by the empirical findings, the arguments in this work draw important implications for conflict theory and deterrence policy in the post-Cold War era. This book will appeal to the reader interested in international relations, in general, and in theories of international conflict, deterrence, causes of wars, great power behavior, and geopolitics, in particular. Vesna Danilovic is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University.

This is a text on the traditional questions of nuclear deterrence and the unconventional answers suggested by the emerging new world order. These widely-ranging essays by scholars, policymakers and moral philosophers present rival ideas about the morality of alternative means for preserving mutual security as the world moves beyond the Cold War.

Military Strategy: A Very Short Introduction adapts Clausewitz's framework to highlight the dynamic relationship between the main elements of strategy: purpose, method, and means. Drawing on historical examples, Antulio J. Echevarria discusses the major types of military strategy and how emerging technologies are affecting them. This second edition has been updated to include an expanded chapter on manipulation through cyberwarfare and new further reading.