Concern and hostility towards populism has become a distinctive feature of contemporary political culture. In Europe such concerns are frequently directed at Eurosceptics, whose opposition to the European Union is often portrayed as a cultural crime. Ancient anti-democratic claims about the gullibility, ignorance and irrationality of the masses are frequently recycled through the anti-populist condemnation of people who vote the wrong way. This book argues that the current outburst of anti-populist anxiety is symptomatic of a loss of faith in democracy and in the ability of the demos to assume the role of responsible citizens. Distrust of the people and of parliamentary sovereignty is reinforced by the concern that, on its own, liberal democracy lacks the normative foundation to inspire the loyalty and affection of ordinary citizens. Through focusing on the conflict between the European Union’s Commission and the Government of Hungary, this book explores contrasting attitudes towards national sovereignty, popular sovereignty and the question of tradition and the past as the main drivers of the culture war in Europe.

This book aims to understand the European political debate about contentious issues, framed in terms of religious values by religious and/or secular actors in 21st century. It specifically focuses on the Italian case, which, due to its peculiar history and contemporary political landscape, is a paradigmatic case for the study of the relationships between religion and politics. In recent years, a number of controversies related to religious issues have characterised the European public debate at both the EU and the national level. The ‘affaire du foulard’ in France, the referendum on abortion in Portugal, the recognition of same-sex marriages in many Western European States, the debate over bioethics and the regulation of euthanasia are only a few examples of contentious issues involving religion. This book aims to shed light on the interrelation between these different debates, as well as their broader meaning, through the analysis of the paradigmatic case of Italy. Italy summarizes and sometimes exasperates wider European trends, both because of the peculiar role traditionally played by the Vatican in Italian politics and for the rise, since the 1990s, of new political entrepreneurs eager to exploit ethical and civilizational issues. This work will be of great interest to scholars and students of a number of fields within the disciplines of political science, sociology and law, and will be useful for courses on religion and politics, political parties, social movements and civil society.

“This ambitious and provocative work . . . delves into white anxiety about the demographic decline of white populations in Western nations” (Publishers Weekly). “Whiteshift” is defined as the turbulent journey from a world of racially homogeneous white majorities to one of racially hybrid majorities. In this dada-driven study, political scientist Eric Kaufmann explores how these demographic changes across Western societies are transforming their politics. The early stages of this transformation have led to a populist disruption, tearing a path through the usual politics of left and right. If we want to avoid more radical political divisions, Kaufmann argues, we have to enable white conservatives as well as cosmopolitans to view whiteshift as a positive development. Kaufmann examines the evidence to explore ethnic change in North American and Western Europe. Tracing four ways of dealing with this transformation—fight, repress, flight, and join—he makes a persuasive call to move beyond empty talk about national identity. Deeply thought provoking, enriched with illustrative stories, and drawing on detailed and extraordinary survey, demographic, and electoral data, Whiteshift will redefine the way we discuss race in the twenty-first century.

First Published in 2004. This book provides a novel understanding of current thought and enquiry in the study of popular culture and communications media. The populist sentiments and impulses underlying cultural studies and its postmodernist variants are explored and criticized sympathetically. An exclusively consumptionist trend of analysis is identified and shown to be an unsatisfactory means of accounting for the complex material conditions and mediations that shape ordinary people’s pleasures and opportunities for personal and political expression. Through detailed consideration of the work of Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall and ‘the Birmingham School’, John Fiske, youth subcultural analysis, popular television study, and issues generally concerned with public communication (including advertising, arts and broadcasting policies, children’s television, tabloid journalism, feminism and pornography, the Rushdie affair, and the collapse of communism), Jim McGuigan sets out a distinctive case for recovering critical analysis of popular culture in a rapidly changing, conflict-ridden world. The book is an accessible introduction to past and present debates for undergraduate students, and it poses some challenging theses for postgraduate students, researchers and lecturers.

For those studying the Russian political regime, it has become difficult not to see the name of the Russian thinker Ivan Ilyin (1883-1954) being increasingly mentioned as an influence on the Kremlin's worldview. How has such a relatively obscure Russian émigré philosopher gained such apparent prominence? What is the exact place of the émigré thinker in the Kremlin's ideological makeup?Anyone who might attempt to dig deeper to answer these questions would be challenged by the paucity of available resources. It is therefore time to delve seriously into the topic of Ivan Ilyin-his biography, his thinking, and his post-mortem rehabilitation-to offer readers an analytical view of this key but largely unstudied member of Russia's ideological pantheonThe "Ilyinist" faction at the Kremlin does not dominate the whole state structure. Neither has it been able to promote Ilyin to a broader audience, nor to make his works part of the new indoctrination mechanisms put in place since February 24, 2022. Rather, it is aimed mostly at speaking to the elites, not to the Russian population at large. But it has succeeded at making a Russian fascist sympathizer calling for a just war against enemies of the White cause a central figure of the Russian state pantheon.

A new theoretical analysis of the rise of Donald Trump, Marine le Pen, Nigel Farage, Geert Wilders, Silvio Berlusconi, and Viktor Orbán.