When a populist movement elected Thaksin Shinawatra as prime minister of Thailand in 2001, many of the country’s urban elite dismissed the outcome as just another symptom of rural corruption, a traditional patronage system dominated by local strongmen pressuring their neighbors through political bullying and vote-buying. In Thailand’s Political Peasants, however, Andrew Walker argues that the emergence of an entirely new socioeconomic dynamic has dramatically changed the relations of Thai peasants with the state, making them a political force to be reckoned with. Whereas their ancestors focused on subsistence, this generation of middle-income peasants seeks productive relationships with sources of state power, produces cash crops, and derives additional income through non-agricultural work. In the increasingly decentralized, disaggregated country, rural villagers and farmers have themselves become entrepreneurs and agents of the state at the local level, while the state has changed from an extractor of taxes to a supplier of subsidies and a patron of development projects. Thailand’s Political Peasants provides an original, provocative analysis that encourages an ethnographic rethinking of rural politics in rapidly developing countries. Drawing on six years of fieldwork in Ban Tiam, a rural village in northern Thailand, Walker shows how analyses of peasant politics that focus primarily on rebellion, resistance, and evasion are becoming less useful for understanding emergent forms of political society.

The powerful Thai politician Banharn Silpa-archa has been disparaged as a corrupt operator who for years channeled excessive state funds into developing his own rural province. This book reinterprets Banharm's career and offers a detailed portrait of the voters who support him. Relying on extensive interviews, the author shows how Banharm's constituents have developed a strong provincial identity based on their pride in his advancement of their province, Suphanburi, which many now call "Banharm-buri," the place of Banharm. Yoshinori Nishizaki's analysis challenges simplistic perceptions of rural Thai voters and raises vital questions about contemporary democracy in Thailand. Yoshinori Nishizaki's close and thorough examination of the numerous public construction projects sponsored and even personally funded by Banharn clearly illustrates this politician's canny abilities and tireless, meticulous oversight of his domain. Banharn's constituents are aware that Suphanburi was long considered a "backward" province by other Thais--notably the Bangkok elite. Suphanburians hold the neglectful central government responsible for their province's former sorry condition and humiliating reputation. Banharn has successfully identified himself as the antithesis to the inefficient central state by promoting rapid "development" and advertising his own role in that development through well-publicized donations, public ceremonies, and visits to the sites of new buildings and highways. Much standard literature on rural politics and society in Thailand and other democratizing countries in Southeast Asia would categorize this politician as a typical "strongman," the boss of a semiviolent patronage network that squeezes votes out of the people. That standard analysis would utterly fail to recognize and understand the grassroots realities of Suphanburi that Nishizaki has captured in his study. This compassionate, well-grounded analysis challenges simplistic perceptions of rural Thai voters and raises vital questions about contemporary democracy in Thailand.

The coup in Thailand of 22 May 2014, led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha, ended the country's latest attempt to establish a democratic political order. This coup was but the latest intervention by the Thai military dating at least to the 1950s to prevent any true democratic system developing in Thailand. Instead of a democratic order, the military in alliance with the monarchy, the bureaucracy, and many of the most influential business interests have preferred a system of despotic paternalism first introduced in the late 1950s by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat.Thai society is not, however, the same as it was in the 1950s. Democratic movements have emerged among both the urban middle class and the upcountry cosmopolitan villagers and from the mid-1990s to the early 21st century it seemed as though Thailand was developing a strong democratic system.The rise of the populist Thaksin Shinawatra engendered increasing opposition not only from the urban middle class, whose political party was less successful in elections than Thaksin's party, but especially from military, royalist, bureaucratic and many in the business elite. The 2014 coup was intended to ensure, as a previous coup in 2006 had not succeeded in doing, that the populist challenge to despotic paternalism was ended once and for all. The strong criticisms of the proposed new constitution that would ensure the perpetuation of authoritarian rule may make such rule untenable, but perhaps may also lead to more political turmoil in the kingdom of no longer smiling Thai.

This introductory book on Thai politics and the rule of law explains why chronically unstable Thailand struggles to mediate and adjudicate its political disputes. It focuses on the continuities between the pre-1932 and post-1932 periods. Since the shift to constitutional monarchy in 1932, the power of the monarch and military has endured, the legislature, electorate and, until recently, judiciary have been comparatively powerless, and constitutions and laws have been comparatively unimportant. Historical continuities are also evident in the persistence of hierarchical thinking and ethno-nationalism, both of which have inhibited open debates about governance. And the rule of law does not always apply, owing to different principles underlying western and traditional Siamese law and the emergence of a distinctively Thai legal culture and consciousness. Thailand’s governance was re-cast ambitiously in the 1890s, 1932 and 1997. Since 1997, governing Thailand and developing Thailand’s economy have become harder. So political disputes have become more acute and the absence of a national consensus on dispute settlement mechanisms more obvious. Until governance is again re-cast, Thailand’s political instability and cycle of coups will continue.

The powerful Thai politician Banharn Silpa-archa has been disparaged as a corrupt operator who for years channeled excessive state funds into developing his own rural province. This book reinterprets Banharm's career and offers a detailed portrait of the voters who support him. Relying on extensive interviews, the author shows how Banharm's constituents have developed a strong provincial identity based on their pride in his advancement of their province, Suphanburi, which many now call "Banharm-buri," the place of Banharm. Yoshinori Nishizaki's analysis challenges simplistic perceptions of rural Thai voters and raises vital questions about contemporary democracy in Thailand. Yoshinori Nishizaki's close and thorough examination of the numerous public construction projects sponsored and even personally funded by Banharn clearly illustrates this politician’s canny abilities and tireless, meticulous oversight of his domain. Banharn’s constituents are aware that Suphanburi was long considered a "backward" province by other Thais—notably the Bangkok elite. Suphanburians hold the neglectful central government responsible for their province’s former sorry condition and humiliating reputation. Banharn has successfully identified himself as the antithesis to the inefficient central state by promoting rapid "development" and advertising his own role in that development through well-publicized donations, public ceremonies, and visits to the sites of new buildings and highways. Much standard literature on rural politics and society in Thailand and other democratizing countries in Southeast Asia would categorize this politician as a typical "strongman," the boss of a semiviolent patronage network that squeezes votes out of the people. That standard analysis would utterly fail to recognize and understand the grassroots realities of Suphanburi that Nishizaki has captured in his study. This compassionate, well-grounded analysis challenges simplistic perceptions of rural Thai voters and raises vital questions about contemporary democracy in Thailand.

This book is open access under a CC BY-NC-ND license. This volume analyzes the economic, social, and political challenges that emerging states confront today. Notwithstanding the growing importance of the ‘emerging states’ in global affairs and governance, many problems requiring immediate solutions have emerged at home largely as a consequence of the rapid economic development and associated sociopolitical changes. The middle-income trap is a major economic challenge faced by emerging states. This volume regards interest coordination for technological upgrading as crucial to avoid the trap and examines how various emerging states are grappling with this challenge by fostering public-private cooperation, voluntary associations of market players, and/or social networks. Social disparity is another serious problem. It is deeply rooted in history in the emerging states such as South Africa and many Latin American countries. However, income distribution is recently deteriorating even in East Asia that was once praised for its high economic growth with equity. Increasing pressure for political opening is another challenge for emerging states. This volume argues that the economic, social, and political problems are interwoven in the sense that the emerging states need to build political consensus in order to tackle the economic and social difficulties. Democratic institutions have not always been successful in this respect.