In this book, Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible. (Philosophy)

In this highly absorbing work, Balaguer demonstrates that no good arguments exist either for or against mathematical platonism-for example, the view that abstract mathematical objects do exist and that mathematical theories are descriptions of such objects. Balaguer does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are justifiable views. Introducing a form of platonism, called "full-blooded platonism," that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks-most notably the Quine-Putnam indispensability attack. He concludes by arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good arguments for or against platonism but that we could never have such an argument. This lucid and accessible book breaks new ground in its area of engagement and makes vital reading for both specialists and all those intrigued by the philosophy of mathematics, or metaphysics in general.

In this highly absorbing work, Balaguer demonstrates that no good arguments exist either for or against mathematical platonism-for example, the view that abstract mathematical objects do exist and that mathematical theories are descriptions of such objects. Balaguer does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are justifiable views. Introducing a form of platonism, called "full-blooded platonism," that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks-most notably the Quine-Putnam indispensability attack. He concludes by arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good arguments for or against platonism but that we could never have such an argument. This lucid and accessible book breaks new ground in its area of engagement and makes vital reading for both specialists and all those intrigued by the philosophy of mathematics, or metaphysics in general.

Sixteen original essays exploring recent developments in the philosophy of mathematics, written in a way mathematicians will understand.

Most philosophers of mathematics treat it as isolated, timeless, ahistorical, inhuman. Reuben Hersh argues the contrary, that mathematics must be understood as a human activity, a social phenomenon, part of human culture, historically evolved, and intelligible only in a social context. Hersh pulls the screen back to reveal mathematics as seen by professionals, debunking many mathematical myths, and demonstrating how the "humanist" idea of the nature of mathematics more closely resembles how mathematicians actually work. At the heart of his book is a fascinating historical account of the mainstream of philosophy--ranging from Pythagoras, Descartes, and Spinoza, to Bertrand Russell, David Hilbert, and Rudolph Carnap--followed by the mavericks who saw mathematics as a human artifact, including Aristotle, Locke, Hume, Mill, and Lakatos. What is Mathematics, Really? reflects an insider's view of mathematical life, and will be hotly debated by anyone with an interest in mathematics or the philosophy of science.

What are the objects of science? Are they just the things in our scientific experiments that are located in space and time? Or does science also require that there be additional things that are not located in space and time? Using clear examples, these are just some of the questions that Scott Berman explores as he shows why alternative theories such as Nominalism, Contemporary Aristotelianism, Constructivism, and Classical Aristotelianism, fall short. He demonstrates why the objects of scientific knowledge need to be not located in space or time if they are to do the explanatory work scientists need them to do. The result is a contemporary version of Platonism that provides us with the best way to explain what the objects of scientific understanding are, and how those non-spatiotemporal things relate to the spatiotemporal things of scientific experiments, as well as everything around us, including even ourselves.

Mathematical platonism is the view that mathematical statements are true of real mathematical objects like numbers, shapes, and sets. One central problem with platonism is that numbers, shapes, sets, and the like are not perceivable by our senses. In contemporary philosophy, the most common defense of platonism uses what is known as the indispensability argument. According to the indispensabilist, we can know about mathematics because mathematics is essential to science. Platonism is among the most persistent philosophical views. Our mathematical beliefs are among our most entrenched. They have survived the demise of millennia of failed scientific theories. Once established, mathematical theories are rarely rejected, and never for reasons of their inapplicability to empirical science. Autonomy Platonism and the Indispensability Argument is a defense of an alternative to indispensability platonism. The autonomy platonist believes that mathematics is independent of empirical science: there is purely mathematical evidence for purely mathematical theories which are even more compelling to believe than empirical science. Russell Marcus begins by contrasting autonomy platonism and indispensability platonism. He then argues against a variety of indispensability arguments in the first half of the book. In the latter half, he defends a new approach to a traditional platonistic view, one which includes appeals to a priori but fallible methods of belief acquisition, including mathematical intuition, and a natural adoption of ordinary mathematical methods. In the end, Marcus defends his intuition-based autonomy platonism against charges that the autonomy of mathematics is viciously circular. This book will be useful to researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates with interests in the philosophy of mathematics or in the connection between science and mathematics.