This volume is a window on a period of rich and illuminating philosophical activity that has been rendered generally inaccessible by the supposed "revolution" attributed to "Analytic Philosophy" so-called. Careful exposition and critique is given to every serious alternative account of number and number relations available at the time.

Do numbers, sets, and so forth, exist? What do mathematical statements mean? Are they literally true or false, or do they lack truth values altogether? Addressing questions that have attracted lively debate in recent years, Stewart Shapiro contends that standard realist and antirealist accounts of mathematics are both problematic. As Benacerraf first noted, we are confronted with the following powerful dilemma. The desired continuity between mathematical and, say, scientific language suggests realism, but realism in this context suggests seemingly intractable epistemic problems. As a way out of this dilemma, Shapiro articulates a structuralist approach. On this view, the subject matter of arithmetic, for example, is not a fixed domain of numbers independent of each other, but rather is the natural number structure, the pattern common to any system of objects that has an initial object and successor relation satisfying the induction principle. Using this framework, realism in mathematics can be preserved without troublesome epistemic consequences. Shapiro concludes by showing how a structuralist approach can be applied to wider philosophical questions such as the nature of an "object" and the Quinean nature of ontological commitment. Clear, compelling, and tautly argued, Shapiro's work, noteworthy both in its attempt to develop a full-length structuralist approach to mathematics and to trace its emergence in the history of mathematics, will be of deep interest to both philosophers and mathematicians.

A survey of Euclid's Elements, this text provides an understanding of the classical Greek conception of mathematics. It offers a well-rounded perspective, examining similarities to modern views as well as differences. Rather than focusing strictly on historical and mathematical issues, the book examines philosophical, foundational, and logical questions. Although comprehensive in its treatment, this study represents a less cumbersome, more streamlined approach than the classic three-volume reference by Sir Thomas L. Heath (also available from Dover Publications). To make reading easier and to facilitate access to individual analyses and discussions, the author has included helpful appendixes. These list special symbols and additional propositions, along with all of the assumptions and propositions of the Elements and notations of their discussion within this volume.

This volume documents a lively exchange between five philosophers of mathematics. It also introduces a new voice in one central debate in the philosophy of mathematics. Non-realism, i.e., the view supported by Hugly and Sayward in their monograph, is an original position distinct from the widely known realism and anti-realism. Non-realism is characterized by the rejection of a central assumption shared by many realists and anti-realists, i.e., the assumption that mathematical statements purport to refer to objects. The defense of their main argument for the thesis that arithmetic lacks ontology brings the authors to discuss also the controversial contrast between pure and empirical arithmetical discourse. Colin Cheyne, Sanford Shieh, and Jean Paul Van Bendegem, each coming from a different perspective, test the genuine originality of non-realism and raise objections to it. Novel interpretations of well-known arguments, e.g., the indispensability argument, and historical views, e.g. Frege, are interwoven with the development of the authors' account. The discussion of the often neglected views of Wittgenstein and Prior provide an interesting and much needed contribution to the current debate in the philosophy of mathematics.

Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction provides a critical analysis of the major philosophical issues and viewpoints in the concepts and methods of mathematics - from antiquity to the modern era. Offers beginning readers a critical appraisal of philosophical viewpoints throughout history Gives a separate chapter to predicativism, which is often (but wrongly) treated as if it were a part of logicism Provides readers with a non-partisan discussion until the final chapter, which gives the author's personal opinion on where the truth lies Designed to be accessible to both undergraduates and graduate students, and at the same time to be of interest to professionals

A philosophical discussion of the concept of number In the book, The Foundations of Arithmetic: A Logico-Mathematical Enquiry into the Concept of Number, Gottlob Frege explains the central notions of his philosophy and analyzes the perspectives of predecessors and contemporaries. The book is the first philosophically relevant discussion of the concept of number in Western civilization. The work went on to significantly influence philosophy and mathematics. Frege was a German mathematician and philosopher who published the text in 1884, which seeks to define the concept of a number. It was later translated into English. This is the revised second edition.

Wittgenstein's role was vital in establishing mathematics as one of this century's principal areas of philosophic inquiry. In this book, the three phases of Wittgenstein's reflections on mathematics are viewed as a progressive whole, rather than as separate entities. Frascolla builds up a systematic construction of Wittgenstein's representation of the role of arithmetic in the theory of logical operations. He also presents a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations - the `community view of internal relations'.