It is often said that there is no "philosophy of science", but only the philosophies of certain scientists. But in so far as we recognize an authoritative body of opinion which decides what is and what is not accepted as present-day physics, there is an ascertainable present-day philosophy of physical science. It is the philosophy to which those who follow the accepted practice of science stand committed by their practice. This book contains the substance of the course of lectures which the author Eddington delivered as Tarner Lecturer of Trinity College Cambridge in the Easter Term 1938. The lectures have afforded him an opportunity of developing more fully than in his earlier books the principles of philosophic thought associated with the modern advances of physical science.

This classic work, first published in 1912, has never been supplanted as an approachable introduction to the theory of philosophical enquiry. It gives Russell's views on such subjects as the distinction between appearance and reality, the existence and nature of matter, idealism, knowledge by acquaintance and by description, induction, truth and falsehood, the distinction between knowledge, error and probable opinion, and the limits and value of philosophical knowledge.

Lawrence Sklar offers a comprehensive, non-technical introduction to statistical mechanics and attempts to understand its foundational elements.

This book contains a selection of original conference papers covering all major fields in the philosophy of science, that have been organized into themes. The first section of this volume begins with the formal philosophy of science, moves on to idealization, representation and explanation and then finishes with realism, anti-realism and special science laws. The second section covers the philosophy of the physical sciences, looking at quantum mechanics, spontaneous symmetry breaking, the philosophy of space and time, linking physics and metaphysics and the philosophy of chemistry. Further themed sections cover the philosophies of the life sciences, the cognitive sciences and the social sciences. Readers will find that this volume provides an excellent overview of the state of the art in the philosophy of science, as practiced in different European countries. ​

This book analyzes the different ways mathematics is applicable in the physical sciences, and presents a startling thesis--the success of mathematical physics appears to assign the human mind a special place in the cosmos. Mark Steiner distinguishes among the semantic problems that arise from the use of mathematics in logical deduction; the metaphysical problems that arise from the alleged gap between mathematical objects and the physical world; the descriptive problems that arise from the use of mathematics to describe nature; and the epistemological problems that arise from the use of mathematics to discover those very descriptions. The epistemological problems lead to the thesis about the mind. It is frequently claimed that the universe is indifferent to human goals and values, and therefore, Locke and Peirce, for example, doubted science's ability to discover the laws governing the humanly unobservable. Steiner argues that, on the contrary, these laws were discovered, using manmade mathematical analogies, resulting in an anthropocentric picture of the universe as "user friendly" to human cognition--a challenge to the entrenched dogma of naturalism.