The International Court of Justice at The Hague is the principal judicial organ of the UN, and the successor of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1923–1946), which was the first real permanent court of justice at the international level. This 2005 book analyses the groundbreaking contribution of the Permanent Court to international law, both in terms of judicial technique and the development of legal principle. The book draws on archival material left by judges and other persons involved in the work of the Permanent Court, giving fascinating insights into many of its most important decisions and the individuals who made them (Huber, Anzilotti, Moore, Hammerskjöld and others). At the same time it examines international legal argument in the Permanent Court, basing its approach on a developed model of international legal argument that stresses the intimate relationships between international and national lawyers and between international and national law.

'Legacies of the Permanent Court of International Justice' assesses the continuing relevance of the first 'world court' and shows how, for better or worse, it has shaped our thinking about binding legal dispute resolution.

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and epitomizes the very notion of international judicial institution. Yet, it decides inter-State disputes only with the parties’ consent. This makes it more similar to international arbitral tribunals than other international courts. However, the permanent nature of the Court, the predetermination of procedural rules by the Statute and the Rules of Court, the public character of proceedings, the opportunity for third States to intervene in a case under Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute and the Court's role as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations mark a structural difference between the ICJ and non-institutionalized international arbitral tribunals. This book analyses if and to what extent these features have influenced the approach of the ICJ (and of the PCIJ before it) to its own judicial function and have led it to depart from the principles established in international arbitration.