On 22 June 1941 Hilter unleashed his forces on the Soviet Union. Spearheaded by four powerful Panzer groups and protected by an impenetrable curtain of air support, the seemingly invincible Wehrmacht advanced from the Soviet Union's western borders to the immediate outskirts of Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov in the shockingly brief period of less than six months. The sudden, deep, relentless German advance virtually destroyed the entire peacetime Red Army and captured almost 40 percent of European Russia before expiring inexplicably at the gates of Moscow and Leningrad. An invasion designed to achieve victory in three to six weeks failed and, four years later, resulted in unprecendented and total German defeat. David Glantz challenges the time-honoured explanation that poor weather, bad terrain and Hitler's faulty strategic judgement produced German defeat, and reveals how the Red Army thwarted the German Army's dramatic and apparently inexorable invasion before it achieved its ambitious goals.

This book is an important reassessment of the failure of Germany's 1941 campaign against the Soviet Union.

Based on primary Russian and German sources, the author investigates Soviet strategy and tactics involved in the June 22, 1941 defense of their frontier against the Wehrmacht

Hitler's decision to renege on his alliance with Stalin and invade Russia in June 1941 was to have the most far reaching consequences for the world. Indeed, if there was one critical turning point in the Second World War, it would have to be this. The latest book in the Images of War series uses over 300 rare contemporary photographs to capture the scale, intensity and brutality of the fighting that was unleashed on 22 June 1941. No less than 4.5 million men of the Axis Power advanced on a 2,900 kilometer front. We see how the apparently unstoppable German led assaults crushed the Soviet resistance. But not for the first time Russian determination aided by the terrible winter conditions and over extended lines of communication checked the Nazi onslaught. In the annals of warfare there has never arguably been such a bitter and costly campaign.

Volume IIB is the second volume relating to (and completing) the Wehrmacht, and the German mobilisation and war-economy, from June to December 1941. It includes the most detailed Orders of Battle ever published on the German Heer, Luftwaffe, Waffen SS and Kriegsmarine, in all areas of the Reich, between 22nd June and 4th July 1941. Even small and obscure units are included, such as: flak companies, artillery HQs, observation battalions, bridging columns, Landesschutzen battalions, MP battalions, railroad companies, and Luftwaffe Kurierstaffeln, Verbindungsstaffeln and Sanitatsflugbereitschaften. The Luftwaffe OOBs also include details on aircraft types and strengths in each air unit.

This book purports that, given Operation Barbarossa’s concept and scope, it would have been impossible without Nazi ideology, that we cannot understand it in the absence of its reference to the Holocaust. It asks and attempts to answer whether we can describe ideology without reference to ethics and speak about genocide while ignoring philosophy.