Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.

James Friedman provides a thorough survey of oligopoly theory using numerical examples and careful verbal explanations to make the ideas clear and accessible. While the earlier ideas of Cournot, Hotelling, and Chamberlin are presented, the larger part of the book is devoted to the modern work on oligopoly that has resulted from the application of dynamic techniques and game theory to this area of economics. The book begins with static oligopoly theory. Cournot's model and its more recent elaborations are covered in the first substantive chapter. Then the Chamberlinian analysis of product differentiation, spatial competition, and characteristics space is set out. The subsequent chapters on modern work deal with reaction functions, advertising, oligopoly with capital, entry, and oligopoly using noncooperative game theory. A large bibliography is provided.

This book develops a theory that radically reconceptualizes the economic forces producing regional change and tests it empirically for a set of fifteen sectors in the U.S. It offers a pioneering approach which should enable planners and managers to better cope with baffling changes in the current economic viability of regions. The dramatic shifts in heartland regional economies in the U.S. and other advanced industrial countries have thrown into question the ability of capitalist development to produce permanent growth, economic well being, and balanced regional development. This book develops a theory that radically reconceptualizes the economic forces producing regional change and tests it empirically for a set of fifteen sectors in the U.S. It offers a pioneering approach which should enable planners and managers to better cope with baffling changes in the current economic viability of regions. Traditional theories of regional development have failed to account for innovation and longrun structural change. They have ignored the role of corporate strategy and the existence of market power. Markusen's profit-cycle theory provides a key to understanding how, why, and when a region's leading industries undergo major changes. The theory is synthetic, building upon Schumpeterian and Marxist work on innovation and capitalist dynamics, upon the product cycle theories of business economists, and upon theories of oligopolistic behavior. Markusen argues that changing sources of profitability along an industry's evolutionary path will first concentrate and later disperse production geographically, setting in motion a methodically destabilizing process for regional economies. The profit-cycle theory is tested in depth against the steel sector's experience over a century, and against the experiences of sectors in different stages of development, ranging from innovative ones like semiconductors and computers, to mature and troubled sectors like automobiles, textiles, and lumber. The temporal and crosssectional data drawn from the census of manufactures support the theory and its spatial hypotheses. In a final chapter Markusen explores the implications of the research for regional development.

Industrial production and consumption patterns rely heavily on the intensive use of both renewable and non-renewable resources and the consequences for the environment can be serious. Following a long period of time where the profit incentives of firms have prevailed over preservation of the environment and the world’s natural resources, a new consensus has emerged concerning the need to regulate firm behaviour, aimed at ensuring the sustainability of the economic system in the long run. This book offers an exhaustive overview of current economic debate about these topics, taking modern oligopoly theory as a benchmark. The first part of the book covers static models dealing with incentives for green research and development, Pigovian taxation, cartels, environmental quality and international trade, as well as the role of corporate social responsibility, public firms and consumer environmental awareness as endogenous regulatory instruments. Then, the author moves on to examine the role of time while drawing from optimal control and differential game theory. This opens the way to the discussion of fair discount rates to ensure the welfare of future generations, as well as the long run sustainability of production and consumption patterns.

Fudenberg and Tirole use the game-theoretic issues of information, commitment and timing to provide a realistic approach to oligopoly.

"Any practitioner, policymaker, or academic, in the field of competition law could hardly ask for a more thoroughly documented work. EC and US antitrust law is examined, and dozens of court decisions are quoted, with complete citations throughout. The books is a gold mine for anyone interested in the important task of extending the reach of competition law and antitrust law in this era of globalization."--BOOK JACKET.