In the face of conflicting claims about some treatments, behaviors, and policies, the question arises: What is the most scientifically rigorous way to draw conclusions about cause and effect in the study of humans? In this introduction to causal inference, Paul Rosenbaum explains key concepts and methods through real-world examples.

These original contributions by philosophers and historians of science discuss a range of issues pertaining to the testing of hypotheses in modern physics by observation and experiment. Chapters by Lawrence Sklar, Dudley Shapere, Richard Boyd, R. C. Jeffrey, Peter Achinstein, and Ronald Laymon explore general philosophical themes with applications to modern physics and astrophysics. The themes include the nature of the hypothetico-deductive method, the concept of observation and the validity of the theoretical-observation distinction, the probabilistic basis of confirmation, and the testing of idealizations and approximations. The remaining four chapters focus on the history of particular twentieth-century experiments, the instruments and techniques utilized, and the hypotheses they were designed to test. Peter Galison reviews the development of the bubble chamber; Roger Stuewer recounts a sharp dispute between physicists in Cambridge and Vienna over the interpretation of artificial disintegration experiments; John Rigden provides a history of the magnetic resonance method; and Geoffrey Joseph suggests a statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics that can be used to interpret the Stern-Gerlach and double-slit experiments. This book inaugurates the series, Studies from the Johns Hopkins Center for the History and Philosophy of Science, directed by Peter Achinstein and Owen Hannaway. A Bradford Book.

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Reading Options -- List of Examples -- Part I. Randomized Experiments -- 1. A Randomized Trial -- 2. Structure -- 3. Causal Inference in Randomized Experiments -- 4. Irrationality and Polio -- Part II. Observational Studies -- 5. Between Observational Studies and Experiments -- 6. Natural Experiments -- 7. Elaborate Theories -- 8. Quasi-experimental Devices -- 9. Sensitivity to Bias -- 10. Design Sensitivity -- 11. Matching Techniques -- 12. Biases from General Dispositions -- 13. Instruments -- 14. Conclusion -- Appendix: Bibliographic Remarks -- Notes -- Glossary: Notation and Technical Terms -- Suggestions for Further Reading -- Acknowledgments -- Index

. . . the topic of 'meaning' is the one topic discussed in philosophy in which there is literally nothing but 'theory' - literally nothing that can be labelled or even ridiculed as the 'common sense view'. Putnam, 'The Meaning of Meaning' This book explores some truths behind the truism that experimentation is a hallmark of scientific activity. Scientists' descriptions of nature result from two sorts of encounter: they interact with each other and with nature. Philosophy of science has, by and large, failed to give an account of either sort of interaction. Philosophers typically imagine that scientists observe, theorize and experiment in order to produce general knowledge of natural laws, knowledge which can be applied to generate new theories and technologies. This view bifurcates the scientist's world into an empirical world of pre-articulate experience and know how and another world of talk, thought and argument. Most received philosophies of science focus so exclusively on the literary world of representations that they cannot begin to address the philosophical problems arising from the interaction of these worlds: empirical access as a source of knowledge, meaning and reference, and of course, realism. This has placed the epistemological burden entirely on the predictive role of experiment because, it is argued, testing predictions is all that could show that scientists' theorizing is constrained by nature. Here a purely literary approach contributes to its own demise. The epistemological significance of experiment turns out to be a theoretical matter: cruciality depends on argument, not experiment.

This volume is a contribution to the ongoing debate on the distinction between a ‘context of justification’ and a ‘context of discovery’. It is meant for researchers and advanced students in philosophy of science, and for natural and social scientists interested in foundational topics. Spanning a wide range of disciplines, it combines the viewpoint of philosophers and scientists and casts a new interdisciplinary perspective on the problem of observation and experimentation.

This collection focuses on different expeditions and their role in the process of knowledge acquisition from the eighteenth century onwards. It investigates various forms of scientific practice conducted during, after and before expeditions, and it places this discussion into the scientific context of experiments. In treating expeditions as experiments in a heuristic sense, we also propose that the expedition is a variation on the laboratory in which different practices can be conducted and where the transformation of uncertain into certain knowledge is tested. The experimental positioning of the expedition brings together an ensemble of techniques, strategies, material agents and social actors, and illuminates the steps leading from observation to facts and documentation. The chapters show the variety of scientific interests that motivated expeditions with their focus on natural history, geology, ichthyology, botany, zoology, helminthology, speleology, physical anthropology, oceanography, meteorology and magnetism.