Do citizens of a nation such as the United States have a moral duty to obey the law? Do officials, when interpreting the Constitution, have an obligation to follow what that text meant when ratified? To follow precedent? To follow what the Supreme Court today says the Constitution means?These are questions of political obligation (for citizens) and interpretive obligation (for anyone interpreting the Constitution, often officials). Abner Greene argues that such obligations do not exist. Although citizens should obey some laws entirely, and other laws in some instances, no one has put forth a successful argument that citizens should obey all laws all the time. Greene's case is not only "against" obligation. It is also "for" an approach he calls "permeable sovereignty": all of our norms are on equal footing with the state's laws. Accordingly, the state should accommodate religious, philosophical, family, or tribal norms whenever possible. Greene shows that questions of interpretive obligation share many qualities with those of political obligation. In rejecting the view that constitutional interpreters must follow either prior or higher sources of constitutional meaning, Greene confronts and turns aside arguments similar to those offered for a moral duty of citizens to obey the law.

Obligations: New Trajectories in Law provides a critical analysis of the role of obligations in contemporary legal and social practices. As rights have become the preeminent feature of modern political and legal discourse, the work of obligations has been overshadowed. Questioning and correcting this dominant image of our time, this book brings obligations back into view in a way that fits better with the realities of contemporary social life. Following a historical account of the changing place and priorities of obligations in modernity, the book analyses how obligations and practices of obedience are core to understanding how law sustains conditions of inequality. But it also explores the enduring role obligations play in furthering individual and collective well-being, highlighting their significance in practices that prioritize human and environmental needs, common goods, and solidarity. In doing so, it also offers an alternative and cogent assessment of the force, and the potential, of obligations in contemporary societies. This original jurisprudential contribution will appeal to an academic and student readership in law, politics, and the social sciences.

"The Obligation" is a modern parable about a young Capitol Hill staffer who discovers that the seasoned congressman he works for is guarding an ancient secret. An obsession over a mysterious inscription launches his introduction to a worldview that will challenge everything he thought he knew about space, evolution and humanity. Under the guidance of the congressman, the young man is propelled on a journey of mind and spirit that takes him from Washington to California to Arizona and back to the floor of the House of Representatives. Along the way, he meets six extraordinary individuals who help him understand the secret of the Obligation. The journey is filled with emotions, ideas and insights that lead the young aide to not only understand the reason why we yearn to explore outer space, but also see the larger responsibility we have to each other and to the planet that gave us life.

The principal aim of this book is to develop and defend an analysis of the concept of moral obligation. What it seeks to do is generate new solutions to a range of philosophical problems concerning obligation and its application. Amongst these problems are deontic paradoxes, the supersession of obligation, conditional obligation, actualism and possibilism, dilemmas, supererogation, and cooperation. By virtue of its normative neutrality, the analysis provides a theoretical framework within which competing theories of obligation can be developed and assessed.

'The added value of this book is in both the unusually rich teaching experience which inspires its design - the author has for many years risen to the challenge of making the common law comprehensible to students formed within the civilian tradition - and the remarkable depth of his interdisciplinary and comparative research in the field of legal method and epistemology, which underlies its content.'-Horatia Muir-Watt, Sciences-po, Paris, France --

This is a standalone by an author who believes in love at first sight.[ob-li-gey-shuh n]An obligation is a course of action that someone is required to take, whether legal or moral.At six years old, Myla was sent to a family her father and mother had chosen for her when they knew their time on earth was almost up. What they were unaware of was what they thought would be her safe haven would become her living hell.Kai has been watching Myla from afar since he took over the family business from his father and inherited the responsibility of keeping her safe. When word gets back to Kai that Myla is not only in danger, but that his assets are being compromised, he immediately jumps into action and does the only thing that can be done at the time by marrying her.Neither Myla nor Kai would have thought that something that started off as a farce would become the most important thing either of them could've ever done.Please be aware that the content of this book may be difficult for some readers.(18 and over due to sexual content and language.)

In many histories of modern ethics, Kant is supposed to have ushered in an anti-realist or constructivist turn by holding that unless we ourselves 'author' or lay down moral norms and values for ourselves, our autonomy as agents will be threatened. In this book, Robert Stern challenges the cogency of this 'argument from autonomy', and claims that Kant never subscribed to it. Rather, it is not value realism but the apparent obligatoriness of morality that really poses a challenge to our autonomy: how can this be accounted for without taking away our freedom? The debate the book focuses on therefore concerns whether this obligatoriness should be located in ourselves (Kant), in others (Hegel) or in God (Kierkegaard). Stern traces the historical dialectic that drove the development of these respective theories, and clearly and sympathetically considers their merits and disadvantages; he concludes by arguing that the choice between them remains open.