Stuart Goldman convincingly argues that a little-known, but intense Soviet-Japanese conflict along the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier at Nomonhan influenced the outbreak of World War II and shaped the course of the war. The author draws on Japanese, Soviet, and western sources to put the seemingly obscure conflict—actually a small undeclared war— into its proper global geo-strategic perspective. The book describes how the Soviets, in response to a border conflict provoked by Japan, launched an offensive in August 1939 that wiped out the Japanese forces at Nomonhan. At the same time, Stalin signed the German—Soviet Nonaggression Pact, allowing Hitler to invade Poland. The timing of these military and diplomatic strikes was not coincidental, according to the author. In forming an alliance with Hitler that left Tokyo diplomatically isolated, Stalin succeeded in avoiding a two-front war. He saw the pact with the Nazis as a way to pit Germany against Britain and France, leaving the Soviet Union on the sidelines to eventually pick up the spoils from the European conflict, while at the same time giving him a free hand to smash the Japanese at Nomonhan. Goldman not only demonstrates the linkage between the Nomonhan conflict, the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, and the outbreak of World War II , but also shows how Nomonhan influenced Japan’s decision to go to war with the United States and thus change the course of history. The book details Gen. Georgy Zhukov’s brilliant victory at Nomonhan that led to his command of the Red Army in 1941 and his success in stopping the Germans at Moscow with reinforcements from the Soviet Far East. Such a strategy was possible, the author contends, only because of Japan’s decision not to attack the Soviet Far East but to seize the oil-rich Dutch East Indies and attack Pearl Harbor instead. Goldman credits Tsuji Masanobu, an influential Japanese officer who instigated the Nomonhan conflict and survived the debacle, with urging his superiors not to take on the Soviets again in 1941, but instead to go to war with the United States.

"Nomonhan" was a strong beginning for the Combat Studies Institute's publishing program. Author Drea's mastery of the Japanese-language source material, his interviews, his thorough use of U.S. archival material all make this a superb study that stands the test of time. Goldman and Coox have written on Nomonhan sice this volume was released, however neither does what Drea does here: render a complete, battalion-level account of the battles from the Japanese perspective. This is tactical level combat explained at its best. Previously available only in hard-to read html and Acrobat files, this completely redesigned book includes 19 maps, dozens of tables and pictures (including combat photographs), appendices, notes, and a bibliography. About the author: Dr. Edward J. Drea was a research fellow with the Combat Studies Institute. He received his masters degree in history from Sophia University, Tokyo and his PhD from the University of Kansas. He lived and studied in Japan for six years.

An account of the little-known battle between Russia and Japan just before the outbreak of the Second World War.

From May to September 1939 Japan and the Soviet Union fought a fierce, large-scale undeclared war on the Mongolian plains that ended with a decisive Soviet victory with two important results: Japan reoriented its strategic emphasis towards the south, leading to war with the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands; and Russia freed itself from the fear of fighting on two fronts, thus vitally affecting the course of the war with Germany.

Before World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) developed an offensive tactical doctrine designed to allow its infantry forces to fight successfully against a superior foe, the Soviet Union. A battle test of that doctrine's effectiveness occurred from June through August 1939 along the Outer Mongolian-Manchurian border, This essay follows the daily combat operations of the lJA's 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, for a two-month period. During that time, the 2/28th Infantry was in constant contact with Soviet combined arms forces. In July the battalion participated in offensive operations against Soviet units commanded by General Georgi K. Zhukov. When Japanese tactical doctrine failed against a Soviet combined arms force, the Japanese went on the defensive. Japanese officers, however, regarded defensive doctrine as transitional in nature and adopted it only to gain time to prepare for a counterattack. Defensive doctrine dictated that terrain be held until the resumption of offensive operations that would destroy the enemy.

The battles of Khalkhyn Gol was the decisive engagement of the undeclared Soviet-Japanese Border Wars fought between the Soviet Union, Mongolia and the Empire of Japan in 1939. This book looks at the impact and retaliation from the Soviet perspective.