This book analyses the expansion of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the post-Soviet space after the end of the Cold War. Based on an extensive analysis of the literature and government documents, including doctrines, statements and speeches by the most influential decision-makers and other actors, it sheds new light on the geopolitical and geostrategic context of the expansion of the military alliance, and assesses its impact on international security relations in Europe. The first chapter introduces readers to the neo-realist approach and develops the methodological basis of the book. The following chapters provide a historical overview of the causes and consequences of two waves of eastward NATO enlargement. Special attention is paid to the annexation of the Crimea and to Russian hybrid-asymmetric warfare. Finally, thirty years after the end of the Cold War, the book notes a disturbing return to militarization in international security relations. To counter this process, the author calls for a reduction of current international tensions and a new policy of détente.

This book analyses the expansion of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the post-Soviet space after the end of the Cold War. Based on an extensive analysis of the literature and government documents, including doctrines, statements and speeches by the most influential decision-makers and other actors, it sheds new light on the geopolitical and geostrategic context of the expansion of the military alliance, and assesses its impact on international security relations in Europe. The first chapter introduces readers to the neo-realist approach and develops the methodological basis of the book. The following chapters provide a historical overview of the causes and consequences of two waves of eastward NATO enlargement. Special attention is paid to the annexation of the Crimea and to Russian hybrid-asymmetric warfare. Finally, thirty years after the end of the Cold War, the book notes a disturbing return to militarization in international security relations. To counter this process, the author calls for a reduction of current international tensions and a new policy of détente.

This work evaluates the pros and cons of NATO enlargement. It explains why NATO offered membership to three of its Cold War adversaries and makes recommendations about which countries, if any, should be offered membership in the future.

Mobilizing an interdisciplinary group of scholars and practitioners, this book reviews the history and consequences of NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe. It offers a nuanced discussion of the merits and drawbacks of NATO enlargement across the different actors involved and compares the results of the policy against potential alternatives that were not chosen. Particular attention is given to NATO enlargement’s influence on the course of U.S. foreign policy, democracy and security in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO’s own development as a political and military institution, and relations with China and Russia (including the 2022 Russia-Ukraine War). Written for an engaged audience, the book is designed to appeal to students, researchers, and policymakers alike while offering both policy insights and avenues for future scholarship.

The decision to expand NATO eastward is a fateful venture that has received surprisingly little public attention. Advocates of enlargement insist that the step will foster cooperation, consolidate democracy, and promote stability throughout Europe. But the contributors to this volume conclude that an expanded NATO is a dubious, potentially disastrous idea. Instead of healing the wounds of the Cold War, it threatens to create a new division of Europe and undermine friendly relations with Russia. Even worse, it will establish expensive, dangerous, and probably unsustainable security obligations for the United States.

How did Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic become the newest members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? Based on interviews conducted with more than 75 individuals—from Cabinet officials to desk officers—James M. Goldgeier tells the inside story of this controversial Clinton administration initiative. Analyzing the earliest internal deliberations, as well as administration discussions with allies, the Russians, and the United States Senate, Goldgeier demonstrates how a handful of committed policymakers outmaneuvered overwhelming bureaucratic opposition. He shows the role of domestic politics in shaping the evolution of this policy and dissects the national campaign waged by the administration's specially created NATO enlargement ratification office and its outside supporters. Weaving together insights about bureaucratic politics, policy entrepreneurship, and domestic politics, this book provides fresh insights into the American foreign policymaking process.

In this new Brookings Marshall Paper, Michael O'Hanlon argues that now is the time for Western nations to negotiate a new security architecture for neutral countries in eastern Europe to stabilize the region and reduce the risks of war with Russia. He believes NATO expansion has gone far enough. The core concept of this new security architecture would be one of permanent neutrality. The countries in question collectively make a broken-up arc, from Europe's far north to its south: Finland and Sweden; Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and finally Cyprus plus Serbia, as well as possibly several other Balkan states. Discussion on the new framework should begin within NATO, followed by deliberation with the neutral countries themselves, and then formal negotiations with Russia. The new security architecture would require that Russia, like NATO, commit to help uphold the security of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other states in the region. Russia would have to withdraw its troops from those countries in a verifiable manner; after that, corresponding sanctions on Russia would be lifted. The neutral countries would retain their rights to participate in multilateral security operations on a scale comparable to what has been the case in the past, including even those operations that might be led by NATO. They could think of and describe themselves as Western states (or anything else, for that matter). If the European Union and they so wished in the future, they could join the EU. They would have complete sovereignty and self-determination in every sense of the word. But NATO would decide not to invite them into the alliance as members. Ideally, these nations would endorse and promote this concept themselves as a more practical way to ensure their security than the current situation or any other plausible alternative.