Oxford Political Theory presents the best new work in contemporary political theory. It is intended to be broad in scope, including original contributions to political philosophy, and also work in applied political theory. The series will contain works of outstanding quality with no restriction as to approach or subject matter. Series Editors: Will Kymlicka, David Miller, and Alan Ryan. This book presents a non-cosmopolitan theory of global justice. In contrast to theories that seek to extend principles of social justice, such as equality of opportunity or resources, to the world as a whole, it argues that in a world made up of self-determining national communities, a different conception is needed. The book presents and defends an account of national responsibility which entails that nations may justifiably claim the benefits that their decisions and policies produce, while also being held liable for harms that they inflict on other peoples. Such collective responsibility extends to responsibility for the national past, so the present generation may owe redress to those who have been harmed by the actions of their predecessors. Global justice, therefore, must be understood not in terms of equality, but in terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere. Where these rights are being violated or threatened, remedial responsibility may fall on outsiders. The book considers how this responsibility should be allocated, and how far citizens of democratic societies must limit their pursuit of domestic objectives in order to discharge their global obligations. The book presents a systematic challenge to existing theories of global justice without retreating to a narrow nationalism that denies that we have any responsibilities to the world's poor. It combines discussion of practical questions such as immigration and foreign aid with philosophical exploration of, for instance, the different senses of responsibility, and the grounds of human rights.

Steering a middle course between cosmopolitanism and a narrow nationalism, the book develops an original theory of global justice that also addresses controversial topics such as immigration and reparations for historic wrongdoing.

When the noted political philosopher Iris Marion Young died in 2006, her death was mourned as the passing of "one of the most important political philosophers of the past quarter-century" (Cass Sunstein) and as an important and innovative thinker working at the conjunction of a number of important topics: global justice; democracy and difference; continental political theory; ethics and international affairs; and gender, race and public policy. In her long-awaited Responsibility for Justice, Young discusses our responsibilities to address "structural" injustices in which we among many are implicated (but for which we not to blame), often by virtue of participating in a market, such as buying goods produced in sweatshops, or participating in booming housing markets that leave many homeless. Young argues that addressing these structural injustices requires a new model of responsibility, which she calls the "social connection" model. She develops this idea by clarifying the nature of structural injustice; developing the notion of political responsibility for injustice and how it differs from older ideas of blame and guilt; and finally how we can then use this model to describe our responsibilities to others no matter who we are and where we live. With a foreward by Martha C. Nussbaum, this last statement by a revered and highly influential thinker will be of great interest to political theorists and philosophers, ethicists, and feminist and political philosophers.

Previously published as a special issue of the Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy, this collection brings together some of the most influential political contemporary philosophers to present a critical review of David Miller’s co-national priority thesis and give a state-of-the-art overview of the prevailing positions on nationalism and global justice within political philosophy today. The redistribution schemes of our democratic societies drastically prioritize the needs of co-nationals above those of other human beings. Is this common practice legitimate or is it a form of collective egoism? Answering this question brings us to the heart of two of the most significant debates in contemporary political philosophy: those on nationalism and global justice. Within contemporary political philosophy, Miller is one of the few political theorists who occupies a prominent place in both debates. His central argument is that national boundaries cannot be upheld at the cost of the basic rights of others, but that they do have ethical significance and therefore entitle us to prioritize the preferences of our co-nationals. This volume will be of interest to students and scholars studying philosophy, politics, international relations and law.

Previously published as a special issue of the Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy, this collection brings together some of the most influential political contemporary philosophers to present a critical review of David Miller’s co-national priority thesis and give a state-of-the-art overview of the prevailing positions on nationalism and global justice within political philosophy today. The redistribution schemes of our democratic societies drastically prioritize the needs of co-nationals above those of other human beings. Is this common practice legitimate or is it a form of collective egoism? Answering this question brings us to the heart of two of the most significant debates in contemporary political philosophy: those on nationalism and global justice. Within contemporary political philosophy, Miller is one of the few political theorists who occupies a prominent place in both debates. His central argument is that national boundaries cannot be upheld at the cost of the basic rights of others, but that they do have ethical significance and therefore entitle us to prioritize the preferences of our co-nationals. This volume will be of interest to students and scholars studying philosophy, politics, international relations and law.

David Miller explores what justice means for real people and challenges philosophical theories that ignore the facts of human life.

Debates about global justice have traditionally fallen into two camps. Statists believe that principles of justice can only be held among those who share a state. Those who fall outside this realm are merely owed charity. Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, believe that justice applies equally among all human beings. On Global Justice shifts the terms of this debate and shows how both views are unsatisfactory. Stressing humanity's collective ownership of the earth, Mathias Risse offers a new theory of global distributive justice--what he calls pluralist internationalism--where in different contexts, different principles of justice apply. Arguing that statists and cosmopolitans seek overarching answers to problems that vary too widely for one single justice relationship, Risse explores who should have how much of what we all need and care about, ranging from income and rights to spaces and resources of the earth. He acknowledges that especially demanding redistributive principles apply among those who share a country, but those who share a country also have obligations of justice to those who do not because of a universal humanity, common political and economic orders, and a linked global trading system. Risse's inquiries about ownership of the earth give insights into immigration, obligations to future generations, and obligations arising from climate change. He considers issues such as fairness in trade, responsibilities of the WTO, intellectual property rights, labor rights, whether there ought to be states at all, and global inequality, and he develops a new foundational theory of human rights.