The creators of the Vichy regime did not intend merely to shield France from the worst effects of military defeat and occupation; rather the leaders of Vichy were inspired by a will to regenerate France, to establish an authoritarian new order that would repair the degenerative effects of parliamentary democracy and liberal society. Their plan to effect this change took the form of a far-reaching programme they called the National Revolution. This is the first study of the National Revolution as the expression of Vichy's ideology and aims. It reveals the variety and complexity of both right wing and other strands of French thought in the context of the turbulent years of the 1930s - when Vichy's history really begins - and under the Occupation, when internal rivalries and divisions, as well as the pressures of war, doomed Vichy's programme of national regeneration. The book is structured around a consideration of the rhetoric of right-wing ideology and such key catchwords as 'decadence', 'action', 'order', 'realism' and 'new man', and shows how these phrases only served to mask the political and ideological incoherence of the Vichy government.

This thesis analyses plans for national regeneration in Vichy France through ideals that inspired them and the forces that shaped them during the 1930s and under the German Occupation. The thesis argues that Vichy's National Revolution was a complex mixture of reform agendas that cannot be understood as a single programme or coherent philosophy. Neverthless, the National Revolution had ambitious aims to build a new political culture, reshape economic and power structures, change the pattern of social order and redefine French national identity; aims that reveal important continuities in French political and intellectual history. The thesis shows that, both before and after the defeat of 1940, the language of regeneration was a unifying force for the right and gave the impression of consensus, especially in times of crisis.

The creators of the Vichy regime did not intend merely to shield France from the worst effects of military defeat and occupation; rather the leaders of Vichy were inspired by a will to regenerate France, to establish an authoritarian new order that would repair the degenerative effects of parliamentary democracy and liberal society. Their plan to effect this change took the form of a far-reaching programme they called the National Revolution. This is the first study of the National Revolution as the expression of Vichy's ideology and aims. It reveals the variety and complexity of both right wing and other strands of French thought in the context of the turbulent years of the 1930s - when Vichy's history really begins - and under the Occupation, when internal rivalries and divisions, as well as the pressures of war, doomed Vichy's programme of national regeneration. The book is structured around a consideration of the rhetoric of right-wing ideology and such key catchwords as 'decadence', 'action', 'order', 'realism' and 'new man', and shows how these phrases only served to mask the political and ideological incoherence of the Vichy government.

France fell to Nazi Germany in June 1940. Vichy, the collaborationist, right-wing regime that arose following France's capitulation, believed defeat resulted from a decadent social and political culture, whose origins resided in the republican values of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Headed by Marshal Philippe Petain, the Vichy regime rejected republicanism and pursued a utopian vision to fundamentally remake France, beginning with French men. While some historians have explored Vichy's hopes of making a so-called New Man, relatively few have considered the means by which Vichy strove to make its New Man a living, breathing reality. This thesis draws upon school textbooks published by the Vichy regime to show how national regeneration and historical revisionism in French education worked hand in hand to bring Vichy's New Man to life, one child at a time.

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This book explores the contours of civic identity in the town of Vichy, France. Over the course of its history, Vichy has been known for three things: its thermal spa resort; its products (especially Vichy water and Vichy cosmetics); and its role in hosting the État Français, France’s collaborationist government in the Second World War. This last association has become an obsession for the residents of Vichy, who feel stigmatized and victimized by the widespread habit of referring to France’s wartime government as the 'Vichy regime'. This book argues that the stigma, victimhood, and decline suffered by Vichyssois are best understood by placing Vichy’s politics of identity in a broader historical context that considers corporate, as well as social and cultural, history.

In this revisionist account of France’s crushing defeat in 1940, a world authority on French history argues that the nation’s downfall has long been misunderstood. Philip Nord assesses France’s diplomatic and military preparations for war with Germany, its conduct of the war once the fighting began, and the political consequences of defeat on the battlefield. He also tracks attitudes among French leaders once defeat seemed a likelihood, identifying who among them took advantage of the nation’s misfortunes to sabotage democratic institutions and plot an authoritarian way forward. Nord finds that the longstanding view that France’s collapse was due to military unpreparedeness and a decadent national character is unsupported by fact. Instead, he reveals that the Third Republic was no worse prepared and its military failings no less dramatic than those of the United States and other Allies in the early years of the war. What was unique in France was the betrayal by military and political elites who abandoned the Republic and supported the reprehensible Vichy takeover. Why then have historians and politicians ever since interpreted the defeat as a judgment on the nation as a whole? Why has the focus been on the failings of the Third Republic and not on elite betrayal? The author examines these questions in a fascinating conclusion.