This book investigates the connection between tightening mobilization constraints and the use of PMSCs in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Drawing on neoclassical realism and institutionalist theory, it conceptualizes democracies’ use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) as an attempt to circumvent the tightening constraints on the mobilization of military power. The use of private military contractors is less subjected to parliamentary restrictions and less visible to public opinion than the deployment of soldiers. Rather than cheaper in financial terms, PMSCs are therefore politically cost-effective, as they enable decision-makers to minimize the institutional obstacles on conducting military operations and the electoral costs attached thereto. The need to reduce the ex ante hurdles and the ex post costs of military deployments fills the blind spots of alternative explanations for the use of PMSCs based on effectiveness, ideology, and organizational interests.

The increasing provision of military support functions such as logistics and armed security by private military and security companies (PMSCs) is often conceptualized as a functional response to new operational, financial and technological imperatives. The tendency to privatize military support functions, however, is also driven by domestic political factors. Drawing on neoclassical realism, I conceptualize the use of PMSCs as a strategy dictated by the need to circumvent the tightening hurdles to the conversion of societal resources into military power. Other things being equal, I argue that the tighter the constraints on the extraction and mobilization of societal resources, the higher the propensity to rely on the market as a complementary source of military power. I provide evidence for this theoretical connection by drawing a comparative analysis between military privatization in the U.S. and in the U.K. Specifically, I investigate in detail the tendency to resort to private military contractors during U.S. military operations in Iraq and U.K. military operations in Afghanistan. In both cases, the privatization of military support functions provided decision-makers with the possibility to circumvent existing constraints over the recruitment and deployment of active duty and reserve military forces. I then assess the explanatory power of my neoclassical realist explanation of military privatization against other theoretical perspectives, developing two competing explanations based on neorealism and organization theory. Although these theoretical perspectives offer valuable insights on the use of PMSCS, I show that due to its emphasis on domestic political constraints neoclassical realism proves better capable of shedding light on the privatization of military support and its variations across countries and over time.

Recent decades have seen an increasing reliance on private military contractors (PMCs) to provide logistical services, training, maintenance, and combat troops. In Outsourcing War, Amy E. Eckert examines the ethical implications involved in the widespread use of PMCs, and in particular questions whether they can fit within customary ways of understanding the ethical prosecution of warfare. Her concern is with the ius in bello (right conduct in war) strand of just war theory.Just war theorizing is generally built on the assumption that states, and states alone, wield a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Who holds responsibility for the actions of PMCs? What ethical standards might they be required to observe? How might deviations from such standards be punished? The privatization of warfare poses significant challenges because of its reliance on a statist view of the world. Eckert argues that the tradition of just war theory—which predates the international system of states—can evolve to apply to this changing world order. With an eye toward the practical problems of military command, Eckert delves into particular cases where PMCs have played an active role in armed conflict and derives from those cases the modifications necessary to apply just principles to new agents in the landscape of war.

Ever since the French Revolution and the rise of the rise of national armies, the mercenary has been viewed as a maligned and marginalized actor in international relations. The Mercenary challenges this view, suggesting instead that while delegated to the periphery of Great Power politics, the mercenary remained a coercive instrument of state power who was willing to discretely promote the client's foreign policy when called upon to do so. Never has this been more evident than today. This book offers fresh insight into the future of the mercenary as an instrument of state coercion and explains why there is a mercenary renaissance in the 21st century. The start of the 21st century has seen renewed interest in the mercenary from across the political spectrum. The growing reliance by the US, Russia, and China on military and security contractors suggests that the mercenary remains a key player in International Politics, now emerging from the shadows to help expand state influence on the world stage by serving as an important actor in the conduct of conflict and the winning of small wars. Far from being marginalized, the future of the mercenary is set to be increasingly active.

This compelling account charts the historical emergence of vicarious warfare and its contemporary prominence. It contrasts its tactical advantages with its hidden costs and potential to cause significant strategic harm.