US Special Forces in Vietnam created the Civilian Irregular Defence Group (CIDG), a large paramilitary organization designed to protect the local population from Viet Cong incursions, whilst conducting border surveillance, raids and combat patrols in the local area. Their camps were often overrun and having no spare manpower the US Special Forces created dedicated reaction units which could act in a responsive and flexible manner Mobile Strike (MIKE) Forces. This book examines the MIKE Force units, which were formed from the CIDG, the parachute and airmobile training they were given, and the operations that they undertook, from relieving friendly camps to independent offensive operations, providing the first organizational history of the MIKE forces in combat.

US Special Forces in Vietnam created the Civilian Irregular Defence Group (CIDG), a large paramilitary organization designed to protect the local population from Viet Cong incursions, whilst conducting border surveillance, raids and combat patrols in the local area. Their camps were often overrun and having no spare manpower the US Special Forces created dedicated reaction units which could act in a responsive and flexible manner Mobile Strike (MIKE) Forces. This book examines the MIKE Force units, which were formed from the CIDG, the parachute and airmobile training they were given, and the operations that they undertook, from relieving friendly camps to independent offensive operations, providing the first organizational history of the MIKE forces in combat.

US Special Forces in Vietnam created and trained the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, a large paramilitary organization designed to operate out of fortified camps in remote areas and protect the local population from Viet Cong incursions, whilst conducting border surveillance, raids and combat patrols in the local area. Their fortified camps were often overrun by the Viet Cong and, having no spare manpower, the US Special Forces created dedicated reaction units which could act in a responsive and flexible manner - Mobile Strike (MIKE) Forces. This book examines the MIKE units, which were formed from the CIDG, the parachute and airmobile training they were given, and the operations that they undertook, from relieving friendly camps to large-scale independent offensive operations. Written by Gordon L. Rottman, a former US Special Forces soldier in Vietnam, this title provides the first organizational history of the MIKE forces in this conflict.

In 1961 US Special Forces units began entering remote areas of Vietnam dominated by the Viet Cong. Their task was to organize local defense and strike forces aimed at stopping the enemy from gaining further control of such areas. The Green Berets set up fortified camps from which indigenous troops defended local villages and attacked and harassed the enemy. How these camps were constructed, developed, and defended is documented here for the first time. This book also covers the weapons, barriers, and obstacles used in these camps, providing specific examples of camp design, and details how they withstood the test of battle against a determined and resourceful enemy.

In 1961 US Special Forces units began entering remote areas of Vietnam dominated by the Viet Cong. Their task was to organize local defense and strike forces aimed at stopping the enemy from gaining further control of such areas. The Green Berets set up fortified camps from which indigenous troops defended local villages and attacked and harassed the enemy. How these camps were constructed, developed, and defended is documented here for the first time. This book also covers the weapons, barriers, and obstacles used in these camps, providing specific examples of camp design, and details how they withstood the test of battle against a determined and resourceful enemy.

In 1957 58 Vietnamese soldiers were given military training by Special Forces troops. Ten years later green berets were assisting over 40,000 paramilitary troops, along with another 40,000 Regional Forces and Popular Forces soldiers. This monograph traces the development and notes the progress, problems, successes, and failures of a unique program undertaken by the U.S. Army for the first time in its history. With the withdrawal of the Special Forces from Vietnam in 1971, the Army could lay unique claim to the employment of a paramilitary force in sustained combat against a determined enemy. About the author: In 1960, Col. Kelly chaired the committee which produced the U.S. Army's first definitive approach to counterinsurgency, "The Role of the U.S. Army in the Cold War." For two years he commanded the 1st SFG, which provided multiple teams for combat in Vietnam. From 6/66 to 6/67, he commanded the 5th SFG in Vietnam. He led the Combat Development Command, Institute for Strategic and Stability Operations.