This book describes the rise of independent mass media in Russia, from the loosening of censorship under Gorbachev's policy of glasnost to the proliferation of independent newspapers and the rise of media barons during the Yeltsin years. The role of the Internet, the impact of the 1998 financial crisis, the succession of Putin, and the effort to reimpose central power over privately controlled media empires mark the end of the first decade of a Russian free press. Throughout the book, there is a focus on the close intermingling of political power and media power, as the propaganda function of the press in fact never disappeared, but rather has been harnessed to multiple and conflicting ideological interests. More than a guide to the volatile Russian media scene and its players, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia poses questions of importance and relevance in any functioning democracy.

This book explores developments in the Russian mass media since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Complementing and building upon its companion volume, Television and Culture in Putin's Russia: Remote Control, it traces the tensions resulting from the effective return to state-control under Putin of a mass media privatised and accorded its first, limited, taste of independence in the Yeltsin period. It surveys the key developments in Russian media since 1991, including the printed press, television and new media, and investigates the contradictions of the post-Soviet media market that have affected the development of the media sector in recent years. It analyses the impact of the Putin presidency, including the ways in which the media have constructed Putin’s image in order to consolidate his power and their role in securing his election victories in 2000 and 2004. It goes on to consider the status and function of journalism in post-Soviet Russia, discussing the conflict between market needs and those of censorship, the gulf that has arisen separating journalists from their audiences. The relationship between television and politics is examined, and also the role of television as entertainment, as well as its role in nation building and the projection of a national identity. Finally, it appraises the increasingly important role of new media and the internet. Overall, this book is a detailed investigation of the development of mass media in Russia since the end of Communism and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

This collection covers the major trends of the media environment of the post-Communist world and their recent development, with special focus on Russia and the post-Soviet space. The term "media environment" covers not just traditional print and electronic media, but new media as well, and ranges from the political to entertainment and various artistic spheres. What role do market forces play in the process of media democratization, and how do state structures regulate, suppress, or use capitalism toward their own gain? What degree of informational pluralism has been achieved in the newly independent republics? What are the prospects for transparency and the participation of civil society in Russian and Eurasian media? To what degree do trends in post-Communist media reflect global trends? Is there a worldwide convergence with regard to both media formats and political messaging? Western observers usually pay their keenest attention to the role of media in Russia and Eurasia during national elections. While this is a valid focus, the present volume, with contributions by Luca Anceschi, Jonathan Becker, Lee B. Becker, Michael Cecire, Marta Dyczok, Nicola Ying Fry, Navbahor Imamova, Azamat Junisbai, Barbara Junisbai, Kornely Kakachia, Maria Lipman, Oleg Manaev, Marintha Miles, Olena Nikolayenko, Sarah Oates, Tamara Pataraia, Elisabeth Schimpfossl, Abdulfattoh Shafiev, Jack Snyder, Tudor Vlad, and Ilya Yablokov, aims at understanding the deeper overall media philosophies that characterize post-Soviet media systems and environments, and the type of identity formation that they are promoting.

The end of communist rule in the Soviet Union brought with it a brave new world of media and commerce. Formerly state-owned enterprises were transformed, often through private ownership, and new corporations sprung up overnight to take advantage of the new atmosphere of freedom. Until now, most research on media and news production in Russia has focused on the scope of government control and comparisons with the communist era. However, extra-governmental controls and the challenges of operating in a newly capitalist environment have been just as important – if not more so – in the formation of the new media climate. Filling the gap in the literature, this book examines the various agents who ‘make’ the news, and discusses the fierce struggle among the various agents of power involved. Drawing on existing theories and scholarship, the book provides a wealth of detail on the actual daily practices of news production in Russia. Original research is combined with compelling first-hand accounts of news production and dissemination to provide an incisive look at the issues and power structures Russian journalists face on a daily basis.

Conspiracy theories are not just outlandish ideas. They can also be political weapons.Conspiracy theories have come to play an increasingly prominent role in political systems around the world. In Revealing Schemes, Scott Radnitz moves beyond psychological explanations for why people believe conspiracy theories to explore the politics surrounding them and places two questions at thecenter of his account: What leads regimes to promote conspiracy claims? And what are their effects? Using a new database of over 1,500 conspiracy claims collected from 12 post-Soviet states - a region of the world where such theories have long thrived-he shows that purveyors of conspiracy tend toenter the fray in moments of uncertainty and chaos. Conspiracy claims flow most freely where there is serious political competition rather than unbridled autocracy; and in response to destabilizing events that challenge a regime's ability to continue ruling. Leaders who anticipate future challengescan disseminate conspiracy narratives proactively as an insurance policy. But if conspiracy becomes overused, it can also backfire. Radnitz shows that individuals who are exposed to a greater amount of intrigue are more cynical and generally more conspiratorial. Yet, conspiracists are alsosuspicious of the motives of authority figures who tout conspiratorial ideas. The upshot is that conspiracism as a political strategy may become less effective over time. At a time of heightened distrust in democratic institutions and rising populism, understanding how conspiracy theories are usedin a region where democracy came late-or never arrived - can be instructive for concerned citizens everywhere.

Seminar paper from the year 2009 in the subject Communications - Mass Media, grade: 64%, Coventry University, course: Global Media and Communications (within the MA Global Journalism), language: English, abstract: This essay analyses the Russian media system on the basis of the concept of comparing media systems developed by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini in 2004. Therefore a brief sketch about the Russian media system is given in the second section of this essay. Section three contains an overview about Hallin and Mancini's approach of comparing media systems, which also will be discussed briefly. The advantages and drawbacks of using this concept on Russia will also be pointed out. In section four the tool mentioned above will be used to analyse the Russian media system. In section five it is discussed whether the Russian media system could fit in one of the three models approached by Hallin and Mancini. Concluding this essay suggests the development of a new fourth model to describe the specifics of Post-Soviet countries.