An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
Title | An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design PDF eBook |
Author | Tilman Borgers |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Total Pages | 288 |
Release | 2015-05-01 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 0190244682 |
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Mechanism Design
Title | Mechanism Design PDF eBook |
Author | Rakesh V. Vohra |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | 185 |
Release | 2011-05-09 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 1139499173 |
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
Introduction to Mechanism Design
Title | Introduction to Mechanism Design PDF eBook |
Author | Eric Constans |
Publisher | CRC Press |
Total Pages | 760 |
Release | 2018-07-20 |
Genre | Technology & Engineering |
ISBN | 1351727621 |
Introduction to Mechanism Design: with Computer Applications provides an updated approach to undergraduate Mechanism Design and Kinematics courses/modules for engineering students. The use of web-based simulations, solid modeling, and software such as MATLAB and Excel is employed to link the design process with the latest software tools for the design and analysis of mechanisms and machines. While a mechanical engineer might brainstorm with a pencil and sketch pad, the final result is developed and communicated through CAD and computational visualizations. This modern approach to mechanical design processes has not been fully integrated in most books, as it is in this new text.
Mechanism Design
Title | Mechanism Design PDF eBook |
Author | Samuel Molian |
Publisher | Pergamon |
Total Pages | 248 |
Release | 1997 |
Genre | Technology & Engineering |
ISBN |
Hardbound. Mechanism Design is written for mechanical engineers working in industry or, after some practical experience, following a post-graduate course of study. It is unique among modern books on mechanisms in its choice and treatment of topics and in its emphasis on design techniques that can be used within the time and cost constraints that actually occur in industry.This Second Edition contains much new material and reflects the far-reaching developments that have taken place in machine design and new computational methods since the book's first publication in 1982.
Mechanism Design
Title | Mechanism Design PDF eBook |
Author | Kevin Russell |
Publisher | CRC Press |
Total Pages | 369 |
Release | 2013-12-02 |
Genre | Technology & Engineering |
ISBN | 1466570180 |
In the field of mechanism design, kinematic synthesis is a creative means to produce mechanism solutions. Combined with the emergence of powerful personal computers, mathematical analysis software and the development of quantitative methods for kinematic synthesis, there is an endless variety of possible mechanism solutions that users are free to e
Foundations of Ultra-Precision Mechanism Design
Title | Foundations of Ultra-Precision Mechanism Design PDF eBook |
Author | Stuart T. Smith |
Publisher | CRC Press |
Total Pages | 365 |
Release | 2017-07-12 |
Genre | Technology & Engineering |
ISBN | 1351989049 |
The realm of ultra precision mechanisms, for example in controlling motion to small fractions of a micrometer, is encroaching into many fields of technology. This book aims to provide a bridge for those moving from either an engineering or physics background towards the challenges offered by ultraprecision mechanisms. Using case study examples, this book provides a guide to basic techniques and gives technical, analytical and practical information.
Designing Economic Mechanisms
Title | Designing Economic Mechanisms PDF eBook |
Author | Leonid Hurwicz |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Total Pages | 321 |
Release | 2006-05-22 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 113945434X |
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.