Provides a formal theory of nonmarket failure, analyzing such problems as redundant costs, monopoly, frequency of unanticipated externalities, and bureaucracy in such nonmarket institutions as foundations, universities, and government. A theory of market failures is well established in economics, but the same has not been true for the study of nonmarket failures. Markets or Governments remedies this situation by providing a formal theory of nonmarket failure, analyzing such problems as redundant costs, monopoly, frequency of unanticipated externalities, and bureaucracy in such nonmarket institutions as foundations, universities, and government. This new edition updates the data and results contained in the first edition and includes references and applications of the theory to the ongoing process of system transformation in Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe. The discussion of earlier literature that is relevant to the theory of nonmarket failure has been expanded.

In his first book, the former New York governor and current CNN cohost offers a manifesto on the economy and the public interest. As New York State Attorney General from 1998 to 2006, Eliot Spitzer successfully pursued corporate crime, including stock price inflation, securities fraud, and predatory lending practices. Drawing on those experiences, in this book Spitzer considers when and how the government should intervene in the workings of the market. The 2009 American bank bailout, he argues, was the wrong way: it understandably turned government intervention into a flashpoint for public disgust because it socialized risk, privatized benefit, and left standing institutions too big to fail, incompetent regulators, and deficient corporate governance. That's unfortunate, because good regulatory policy, he claims, can make markets and firms work efficiently, equitably, and in service of fundamental public values. Spitzer lays out the right reasons for government intervention in the market: to guarantee transparency, to overcome market failures, and to guard our core values against the market's unfair biases such as racism. With specific proposals to serve those ends—from improving corporate governance to making firms responsible for their own risky behavior—he offers a much-needed blueprint for the proper role of government in the market. Finally, taking account of regulatory changes since the crash of 2008, he suggests how to rebuild public trust in government so real change is possible. Responses to Spitzer by Sarah Binder, Andrew Gelman, and John Sides, Dean Baker, and Robert Johnson, raise issues of politics, ideology, and policy.

Modern-day markets do not arise spontaneously or evolve naturally. Rather they are crafted by individuals, firms, and most of all, by governments. Thus "marketcraft" represents a core function of government comparable to statecraft and requires considerable artistry to govern markets effectively. Just as real-world statecraft can be masterful or muddled, so it is with marketcraft. In Marketcraft, Steven Vogel builds his argument upon the recognition that all markets are crafted then systematically explores the implications for analysis and policy. In modern societies, there is no such thing as a free market. Markets are institutions, and contemporary markets are all heavily regulated. The "free market revolution" that began in the 1980s did not see a deregulation of markets, but rather a re-regulation. Vogel looks at a wide range of policy issues to support this concept, focusing in particular on the US and Japan. He examines how the US, the "freest" market economy, is actually among the most heavily regulated advanced economies, while Japan's effort to liberalize its economy counterintuitively expanded the government's role in practice. Marketcraft demonstrates that market institutions need government to function, and in increasingly complex economies, governance itself must feature equally complex policy tools if it is to meet the task. In our era-and despite what anti-government ideologues contend-governmental officials, regardless of party affiliation, should be trained in marketcraft just as much as in statecraft.

Economic studies historically have either extolled the virtues of perfect markets or decried the market's shortcomings, proposing that governments correct market failure. This book proposes as a counterweight to these views a theory of nonmarket failure, and examines in great detail the shortcomings of government efforts to replace or to regulate markets. It is an unusually thorough analysis that can be used to make more systematic comparisons between markets and governments and to arrive at more intelligent choices between them.After reviewing the existing theory of market shortcomings, Wolf develops a parallel framework for analyzing the shortcomings of government, elaborating the inherent characteristics of government operations and the problems they present. He then considers how these predictable types of nonmarket failure can be taken into account in improving the formulation of public policy. And he compares market and nonmarket alternatives, both in their theoretical and empirical aspects.Wolf concludes that, while both markets and governments have inherent shortcomings, and the choice between them is never a pure one (real-world situations always involve some combination of the two alternatives), markets do a better job than governments. They are more efficient according to both static and dynamic criteria. With respect to equity and other non-efficiency considerations, however, both markets and governments have strengths and weaknesses. Finally, Wolf points out that government can play an important role in improving and extending the functioning of markets. And, perhaps most controversially, he argues that market forces themselves can play an important role in improving thefunctioning of government. They can reduce the incidence of nonmarket failure by injecting market incentives into government operations.Charles Wolf, Jr. is Dean of the RAND Graduate School of Policy Studies and director of the RAND Corporation's Research Program in International Economic Policy. He was chairman of RAND's Economics Department for 12 years, and has written widely in the fields of economics, defense policy, and foreign policy. A RAND Corporation Research Study.

The old discussion of 'Market or State' is obsolete. There will always have to be a mix of market and state. The only relevant question is what that mix should look like. How far do we have to let the market go its own way in order to create as much welfare as possible for everyone? What is the responsibility of the government in creating welfare? These are difficult questions. But they are also interesting questions and Paul De Grauwe analyses them in this book. The desired mix of market and state is anything but easy to bring about. It is a difficult and sometimes destructive process that is constantly in motion. There are periods in history in which the market gains in importance. During other periods the opposite occurs and government is more dominant. The turning points in this pendulum swing typically seem to coincide with disruptive events that test the limits of market and state. Why we experience this dynamic is an important theme in the book. Will the market, which today is afforded a greater and greater role due to globalization, run up against its limits? Or do the financial crisis and growing income inequality show that we have already reached those limits? Do we have to brace ourselves for a rejection of the capitalist system? Are we returning to an economy in which the government is running the show?

Federalism is at once a set of institutions -- the division of public authority between two or more constitutionally defined orders of government -- and a set of ideas which underpin such institutions. As an idea, federalism points us to issues such as shared and divided sovereignty, multiple loyalties and identities, and governance through multi-level institutions. Seen in this more complex way, federalism is deeply relevant to a wide range of issues facing contemporary societies. Global forces -- economic and social -- are forcing a rethinking of the role of the central state, with power and authority diffusing both downwards to local and state institutions and upwards to supranational bodies. Economic restructuring is altering relationships within countries, as well as the relationships of countries with each other. At a societal level, the recent growth of ethnic and regional nationalisms -- most dramatically in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but also in many other countries in western Europe and North America -- is forcing a rethinking of the relationship between state and nation, and of the meaning and content of 'citizenship.' Rethinking Federalism explores the power and relevance of federalism in the contemporary world, and provides a wide-ranging assessment of its strengths, weaknesses, and potential in a variety of contexts. Interdisciplinary in its approach, it brings together leading scholars from law, economics, sociology, and political science, many of whom draw on their own extensive involvement in the public policy process. Among the contributors, each writing with the authority of experience, are Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa and Jacques Pelkmans on the European Union, Paul Chartrand on Aboriginal rights, Samuel Beer on North American federalism, Alan Cairns on identity, and Vsevolod Vasiliev on citizenship after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The themes refracted through these different disciplines and political perspectives include nationalism, minority protection, representation, and economic integration. The message throughout this volume is that federalism is not enough -- rights protection and representation are also of fundamental importance in designing multi-level governments.

Government and Markets is the first book to tackle systematically and in a multidisciplinary fashion the role of democratic governments during and after the transition from plan to market. The role of governments during the transformation is important for eliminating the obstacles and putting into place the conditions for the emergence of a viable market economy. Moreover, governments need to play a key role in establishing a political-legal order that promotes political liberties and economic freedom. In contrast to other literature on the transformation process in formerly planned systems, this volume focuses also on the creation of autonomous and accountable governments as part of the liberal economic order. Finally, the volume analyzes the role of the legal state in creating a competitive market economy. Government and Markets addresses itself to scholars, politicians policy makers interested in the establishment of a democratic, competitive order in formerly planned political economic systems.