As the scope and size of the U.S. government has expanded, the importance of good management to the success of a presidency has also increased. Although good management cannot guarantee political or policy success, poor management can certainly undermine good policy and political efforts. In this second edition of The Managerial Presidency James P. Pfiffner brings together both classic analyses and more recent treatments of managerial issues that affect the presidency. Some of the foremost presidency scholars have contributed to this volume, including Richard Neustadt, Charles O. Jones, Hugh Heclo, George Edwards, and Louis Fisher. This second edition includes more recent scholarship by Roger Porter, Steven Kelman, Peri Arnold, and Ronald Moe. The focus of this collection is the extent to which presidents can exercise control over the executive branch bureaucracies and whether it is wise for them to exert that control. Part one deals with the question of how to organize the White House staff. If this organizational problem is not resolved, solving the broader problems of organization and policy will be that much more difficult. Part two addresses the question of how much control presidents should exert over the departments and agencies of the executive branch and how the White House staff and other political appointees relate to career civil servants. The final section examines presidential managerial reform efforts and the congressional role in managing the government. Although the contributors to this collection do not all agree on how the presidency should be managed, there is surprising consensus on which questions ought to be asked. The analyses addressing those questions will be of interest to students and scholars of the modern presidency as well as those interested in executive leadership and public administration.

Examines the political history of administrative reform undertaken by 20th-century presidents. Attempting to explain the growth of modern bureaucracy within an 18th-century framework and the expansion of presidential control over administrative powers, the author explores the relationship between administrative theory and the dilemmas posed for a developing administrative state by the separation of powers. He also looks at and compares successive cases of presidentially initiated comprehensive reform planning, in order to understand the implications for the president's institutional role. Paper edition (unseen), $25.00. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

The Description for this book, Making the Managerial Presidency: Comprehensive Reorganization Planning, 1905-1980, will be forthcoming.

Managerial Discretion In Government Decision Making: Beyond The Street Level Provides A Comprehensive Discussion Of Managerial And Executive Discretion At All Levels Of Government. Beginning With A Discussion Of Moving Beyond Street-Level Discourse, This Book Sets The Stage For Studying Managerial Discretion. It Examines Aspects Of Expertise In Discretionary Decision Making At The Federal Level, Including Several Case Examples To Account For The Wide Usage Of Executive Orders In Managerial Positions, And Examines The Formal Roles Of Managers At State Government Levels, While Highlighting The Variations Among State Managers In Their Usage Of Discretion, With Examples Of State Managers With Too Much Discretion. Next The Book Identifies Key Aspects Of Managerial Discretion In Local Governments, Including Information On The Applicability Of Discretion In School Districts And Its Implications In Decision Making, Discusses The Myriad Ways In Which Managers In Local Jurisdictions Either Individually Or Collectively Make Decisions Within The Parameters Of State Laws, Board Regulations, And/Or Council Ordinances, And Concludes With A Discussion Of How Much Discretion Managers Should Have And Dangers Inherent In Providing Managers With Too Much Discretion, And Reinforces The Discourses On Accountability In Public Organizations.

The classic book on the way American government agencies work and how they can be made to work better -- the "masterwork" of political scientist James Q. Wilson (The Economist) In Bureaucracy, the distinguished scholar James Q. Wilson examines a wide range of bureaucracies, including the US Army, the FBI, the CIA, the FCC, and the Social Security Administration, providing the first comprehensive, in-depth analysis of what government agencies do, why they operate the way they do, and how they might become more responsible and effective. It is the essential guide to understanding how American government works.

The first book to explore the tension between presidents and federal agencies from the perspective of careerists in the executive branch. Winner of the Herbert A. Simon Book Award of the American Political Science Association Why do presidents face so many seemingly avoidable bureaucratic conflicts? And why do these clashes usually intensify toward the end of presidential administrations, when a commander-in-chief’s administrative goals tend to be more explicit and better aligned with their appointed leadership’s prerogatives? In Rethinking the Administrative Presidency, William G. Resh considers these complicated questions from an empirical perspective. Relying on data drawn from surveys and interviews, Resh rigorously analyzes the argument that presidents typically start from a premise of distrust when they attempt to control federal agencies. Focusing specifically on the George W. Bush administration, Resh explains how a lack of trust can lead to harmful agency failure. He explores the extent to which the Bush administration was able to increase the reliability—and reduce the cost—of information to achieve its policy goals through administrative means during its second term. Arguing that President Bush's use of the administrative presidency hindered trust between appointees and career executives to deter knowledge sharing throughout respective agencies, Resh also demonstrates that functional relationships between careerists and appointees help to advance robust policy. He employs a “joists vs. jigsaws” metaphor to stress his main point: that mutual support based on optimistic trust is a more effective managerial strategy than fragmentation founded on unsubstantiated distrust.