This book showcases Ian Hacking's early ideas on the central issues surrounding statistical reasoning. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and with a specially commissioned new preface, this influential work is now available for a new generation of readers in statistics, philosophy of science and philosophy of maths.

Everyone knows it is easy to lie with statistics. It is important then to be able to tell a statistical lie from a valid statistical inference. It is a relatively widely accepted commonplace that our scientific knowledge is not certain and incorrigible, but merely probable, subject to refinement, modifi cation, and even overthrow. The rankest beginner at a gambling table understands that his decisions must be based on mathematical ex pectations - that is, on utilities weighted by probabilities. It is widely held that the same principles apply almost all the time in the game of life. If we turn to philosophers, or to mathematical statisticians, or to probability theorists for criteria of validity in statistical inference, for the general principles that distinguish well grounded from ill grounded generalizations and laws, or for the interpretation of that probability we must, like the gambler, take as our guide in life, we find disagreement, confusion, and frustration. We might be prepared to find disagreements on a philosophical and theoretical level (although we do not find them in the case of deductive logic) but we do not expect, and we may be surprised to find, that these theoretical disagreements lead to differences in the conclusions that are regarded as 'acceptable' in the practice of science and public affairs, and in the conduct of business.

This book provides a systematic, self-sufficient and yet short presentation of the mainstream topics on introductory Probability Theory with some selected topics from Mathematical Statistics. It is suitable for a 10- to 14-week course for second- or third-year undergraduate students in Science, Mathematics, Statistics, Finance, or Economics, who have completed some introductory course in Calculus. There is a sufficient number of problems and solutions to cover weekly tutorials.

Mounting failures of replication in social and biological sciences give a new urgency to critically appraising proposed reforms. This book pulls back the cover on disagreements between experts charged with restoring integrity to science. It denies two pervasive views of the role of probability in inference: to assign degrees of belief, and to control error rates in a long run. If statistical consumers are unaware of assumptions behind rival evidence reforms, they can't scrutinize the consequences that affect them (in personalized medicine, psychology, etc.). The book sets sail with a simple tool: if little has been done to rule out flaws in inferring a claim, then it has not passed a severe test. Many methods advocated by data experts do not stand up to severe scrutiny and are in tension with successful strategies for blocking or accounting for cherry picking and selective reporting. Through a series of excursions and exhibits, the philosophy and history of inductive inference come alive. Philosophical tools are put to work to solve problems about science and pseudoscience, induction and falsification.

This book proposes and explores the idea that the forced union of the aleatory and epistemic aspects of probability is a sterile hybrid, inspired and nourished for 300 years by a false hope of formalizing inductive reasoning, making uncertainty the object of precise calculation. Because this is not really a possible goal, statistical inference is not, cannot be, doing for us today what we imagine it is doing for us. It is for these reasons that statistical inference can be characterized as a myth. The book is aimed primarily at social scientists, for whom statistics and statistical inference are a common concern and frustration. Because the historical development given here is not merely anecdotal, but makes clear the guiding ideas and ambitions that motivated the formulation of particular methods, this book offers an understanding of statistical inference which has not hitherto been available. It will also serve as a supplement to the standard statistics texts. Finally, general readers will find here an interesting study with implications far beyond statistics. The development of statistical inference, to its present position of prominence in the social sciences, epitomizes a number of trends in Western intellectual history of the last three centuries, and the 11th chapter, considering the function of statistical inference in light of our needs for structure, rules, authority, and consensus in general, develops some provocative parallels, especially between epistemology and politics.

Covering all aspects of gambling, The Theory of Gambling and Statistical Logic is mathematically sophisticated, but can be read for what it says about the games and strategies, skipping the technicalities. The material is fascinating and detailed, and the analysis is masterful.