The scope of affirmative obligation is a point of contention among liberals. Some see affirmative obligations required by social justice as incompatible with a strong commitment to individual freedom. The task before the moderate liberal is then to consider what a consistently liberal view of affirmative obligation would have to be in order to accommodate liberal commitments to freedom and justice and also account for long-standing institutions that are central to liberal democratic society. In this book, Patricia Smith argues that this can be achieved by reconstructing the liberal doctrine of positive and negative duty. She offers a careful consideration of these elements of liberal principles as they relate to affirmative obligation. Through an innovative analysis of the institutions of family and contract, Smith develops the idea of duties of membership as preferable to natural duties (to explain family obligation) and as needed to supplement contractual duties (to explain professional obligation). This idea is then applied to the problem of justifying political obligation. She argues that membership obligations, implied in cooperative endeavor, must supplement obligations of consent that are central to liberal theory. This is deftly illustrated through a state of nature theory that includes community membership, eliminating atomistic individualism while maintaining consonance with what Smith calls cooperative individualism. The resulting view of liberal individualism is consistent, complete, and capable of handling long-standing liberal institutions, while taking seriously the demands of affirmative obligations. Smiths clear articulation of a liberal view of affirmative obligation finds a middle ground on this polarized topic, with compelling and reasoned implications for liberal political philosophy. Her discussion will interest students and scholars of legal and political philosophy and political science.

The policy of affirmative action, today, more so than in the Civil Rights era, is under severe scrutiny. Nicholas Capaldi's Out of Order typifies the present-day criticism of affirmative action and shows how we have shifted from equality of opportunity and individual merit to the concept of group entitlement and statistical quality of result. Capaldi contends that affirmative action has not solved the problem of equal opportunity for which it was presumably designed, it has instead created a new moral dilemma in the form of reverse discrimination. Out of Order highlights key affirmative action issues from the time of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through the Bakke decision, the Weber case of 1979, and beyond. Capaldi illuminates not only the historical/judicial complexion of affirmative action policies but also their philosophical and social implications. Capaldi questions the necessity of affirmative action, whether its creation was based upon a valid definition of the nature and extent of discrimination, and whether it is a suitable policy for dealing with discrimination. Capaldi maintains that the creation of affirmative action evolved more out of social theory than social reality. By carefully documenting the legislative and judicial history of the Civil Rights Act, the author argues that affirmative action is a bureaucratic fabrication, that it is not a solution to a problem but a policy in search of problems. The crux of Capaldi's thesis boldly claims that affirmative action is perpetuated by the self-interest of "modern liberals" who "guide and control the system from their superior vantage point." Moreover, affirmative action is centered on education and has its roots in doctrinaire liberalism. Since that social philosophy attaches a crucial role to education, and since the conflicting demands made upon the modern American university have exposed its inability to generate coherent policies, doctrinaire liberalism has undergone a crisis of confidence.

Offers a revised liberal political philosophy, arguing that group-based policies are discriminatory and proposing individual-oriented policies in their place.

His examination of the liberal ideology and tradition in American politics reveals not only the nation's liberal identity, but also the conservative tendency to label liberalism "un-American" as a means to circumvent discussion of social problems. Garry defines liberalism, through historical examples and the beliefs and leadership of prominent Americans, namely Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and John Kennedy. He then applies these principles of liberalism to a discussion of current politics and the problems of crime, poverty, and national defense. Although arguing that the conservative attack during the 1980s greatly misrepresented the American liberal tradition, Garry also acknowledges that changes within accepted liberal doctrines during the 1960s and 1970s led to a deviation of contemporary liberalism from its roots.

Drawing on Kant, Rousseau, and Habermas, Stilz argues that we owe civic obligations to the state if it is sufficiently just, and that constitutionally enshrined principles of justice in themselves are grounds for obedience to our particular state and for democratic solidarity with our fellow citizens.

A liberal society seeks not to impose a single way of life, but to leave its citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and ends. It therefore must govern by principles of justice that do not presuppose any particular vision of the good life. But can any such principles be found? And if not, what are the consequences for justice as a moral and political ideal? These are the questions Michael Sandel takes up in this penetrating critique of contemporary liberalism. Sandel locates modern liberalism in the tradition of Kant, and focuses on its most influential recent expression in the work of John Rawls. In the most important challenge yet to Rawls' theory of justice, Sandel traces the limits of liberalism to the conception of the person that underlies it, and argues for a deeper understanding of community than liberalism allows.