Evolutionary theory belongs to the rare species of theories that are simultaneously fundamental and over-arching, implicating as it does numerous life contexts as well as an array of scholarly disciplines. Armed with a profound grasp of evolutionary theory and its implications to social research, Professors Zumbansen and Calliess have mobilized an appropriately diverse and truly stellar group of academics to investigate how this theory may provide new insights about law, economics, and their inter-relations. Cast against an especially broad intellectual backdrop set by the editors, this volume is sure to become a standard reference in literature. Amir N. Licht, Radzyner School of Law, Israel Zumbansen and Calliess have done a wonderful job in assembling papers from the leading scholars in the field, who draw on evolutionary approaches for explaining developments in both economics and the law. Anybody interested in issues of institutional change will be inspired by the wealth of ideas and the diversity of perspectives. Stefan Voigt, University of Hamburg, Germany Law and economics has arguably become one of the most influential theories in contemporary legal theory and adjudication. The essays in this volume, authored by both legal scholars and economists, constitute lively and critical engagements between law and economics and new institutional economics from the perspectives of legal and evolutionary theory. The result is a fresh look at core concepts in law and economics such as institutions , institutional change and market failure that offer new perspectives on the relationship between economic and legal governance. The increasingly transnational dimension of regulatory governance presents lawyers, economists and social scientists with an unprecedented number of complex analytical and conceptual questions. The contributions to this volume engage with legal theory, new institutional economics, economic sociology and evolutionary economics in an interdisciplinary assessment of the capacities and limits of the state, markets and institutions. Drawing as well upon legal sociology and the philosophy of law, the authors expand and transform the known terrain of law and economics by applying evolutionary theory to both law and economics from a domestic and transnational perspective. Legal scholars, evolutionary and regulatory theorists, economists, economic sociologists, economic historians and political scientists will find this cutting-edge volume both challenging and engaging.

This paper is the introduction essay to an edited collection entitled “Law, Economics, and Evolutionary Theory”, forthcoming with Edward Elgar. The volume brings together work by legal scholars, economists, historians and sociologists and aims at a critical investigation of the parallel and often competing theoretical architectures of legal and economic governance from an evolutionary perspective. By reconstructing discussions in law over the relationship between legal realism, law & society, and law & economics, and in economics over the merits and prospects of institutional and neo-institutional economics from an evolutionary perspective, the introduction argues that a theory of governance must today build on and incorporate the developments in both of these regulatory disciplines. Contributions from evolutionary theory and sociology, in particular in the important field of economic sociology, provide a fresh perspective on the particular dynamics of disciplinary development. Authors to the volume include Marc Amstutz, Amitai Aviram, Bruce Benson, Gralf-Peter Calliess, Fabio Carvalho, Paul David, Simon Deakin, Bart Du Laing, Martina Eckardt, Thráinn Eggertsson, Jörg Freiling, Wolfgang Kerber, Richard McAdams, Joel Mokyr, Eric Posner, Moritz Renner, Erich Schanze, Jan Smits and Mauro Zamboni.

This book contains the most sustained and serious attack on mainstream, neoclassical economics in more than forty years. Nelson and Winter focus their critique on the basic question of how firms and industries change overtime. They marshal significant objections to the fundamental neoclassical assumptions of profit maximization and market equilibrium, which they find ineffective in the analysis of technological innovation and the dynamics of competition among firms. To replace these assumptions, they borrow from biology the concept of natural selection to construct a precise and detailed evolutionary theory of business behavior. They grant that films are motivated by profit and engage in search for ways of improving profits, but they do not consider them to be profit maximizing. Likewise, they emphasize the tendency for the more profitable firms to drive the less profitable ones out of business, but they do not focus their analysis on hypothetical states of industry equilibrium. The results of their new paradigm and analytical framework are impressive. Not only have they been able to develop more coherent and powerful models of competitive firm dynamics under conditions of growth and technological change, but their approach is compatible with findings in psychology and other social sciences. Finally, their work has important implications for welfare economics and for government policy toward industry.

This book uses game theory to explain conflict between individual self-interested behavior and cooperation in economic markets, lawsuits, and legislative bodies. It demonstrates the need for social regulation in addition to free markets and judicial decisions in common law cases.

Law and economics are interdependent. Using a historical case analysis approach, this book demonstrates how the legal process relates to and is affected by economic circumstances. Glen Atkinson and Stephen P. Paschall examine this co-evolution in the context of the economic development that occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as the impact of the law on that development. Specifically, the authors explore the development of a national market, the transformation of the corporation, and the conflict between state and federal control over businesses. Their focus on dynamic, integrated systems presents an alternative to mainstream law and economics.

'The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 was a wake-up call to all who study and practice in the field of law and economics: traditional approaches are simply inadequate for understanding the co-evolution of the economic and legal systems, and that inadequacy can result in missed opportunities to warn of impending social harm. Atkinson and Paschall demonstrate the value of an alternative approach - law and economics from an evolutionary perspective - that builds on the work of John R. Commons, a leading figure in the field nearly a century ago. In the process, they offer an eye-opening historical account of the role of the state in the economy and provide a vital starting point for future policy discussions.' - Charles J. Whalen, author of Financial Instability and Economic Security after the Great Recession 'An indispensable history of business law and regulation, alongside a powerful theory of law and the courts. Glen Atkinson and Stephen P. Paschall give us an evolutionary casebook for the twenty-first century, deeply rooted in the ideas of Veblen, Commons, and other masters of the tradition.' - James K. Galbraith, The University of Texas at Austin 'The language of court documents is notably difficult to understand for people with no legal training. The present volume, a product of fruitful collaboration between a university professor and a lawyer, offers valuable assistance in translating US Supreme Court decisions made in the span of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with respect to economic disputes into the language spoken by evolutionary and institutional economists. As the authors persuasively show, law and economics co-evolve. A much-needed follow-up to and development of John Commons's Legal Foundations of Capitalism! - Anton Oleinik, Memorial University of Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada and the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Russia Law and economics are interdependent. Using a historical case analysis approach, this book demonstrates how the legal process relates to and is affected by economic circumstances. Glen Atkinson and Stephen P. Paschall examine this co-evolution in the context of the economic development that occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as the impact of the law on that development. Specifically, the authors explore the development of a national market, the transformation of the corporation, and the conflict between state and federal control over businesses. Their focus on dynamic, integrated systems presents an alternative to mainstream law and economics. The authors apply John R. Commons's approach to three main law and economics issues: the changing relationship between corporations and the State, the application of the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to state and federal regulation of business, and the relationship of antitrust law to industrialization. They provide a valuable linking of law with changing economic circumstances, such as antitrust policy changes and the development of the corporate form. This analytical approach to the practice of law and economics will be of interest to researchers, students, and faculty in law and economics, economic history, constitutional law, economic regulation, public policy, and the sociology of law. Business students and researchers will also find value in this book's presentation of court decisions and exploration of economic development.

This unique book presents various ways in which evolutionary theory can contribute to the analysis of key legal-philosophical problems. Wojciech Zaluski explores three central questions; the ontological question - what is the nature of law?; the teleological-axiological question - what are the main values to be realized by law?; the normativity question, which has two aspects; normative: what explains the fact that legal norms provide reasons for action?, and motivational: what explains the fact that humans can be motivated by legal norms? It is argued that evolutionary theory suggests non-trivial answers to these questions, and that these answers can become the building blocks of a new - evolutionary - paradigm in legal philosophy. Being the first study entirely devoted to the analysis of fundamental legal-philosophical problems from the standpoint of evolutionary theory, this book is a must-read for graduate and postgraduate students, practitioners and philosophers in the field of legal philosophy.