A wide-ranging and original interpretation of Kant's Critique of Judgment.

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant argues that feeling is part of the system of the mind. Judgments of taste based on feeling are a unique kind of judgment, and the feeling that is their foundation forms an independent third power of the mind. Feeling has a special role within this system in that it also provides a transition between the other two powers of the mind, cognition and desire. Matthews argues that feeling, our experience of beauty, provides a transition because it orients humans in a sensible world. Judgments of taste help overcome the difficulties that arise when rational cognitive and moral ends must be pursued in a sensible world. Matthews demonstrates how feeling, disassociated from rational activities in Kant's earlier works, is now central in reaching rational ends and understanding humans as unified rational beings. Audience: This book would be of interest to research libraries and university libraries, philosophers, historians and aestheticians.

Why read Kant's Critique of Judgment? For most readers, the importance of the work lies in its contributions to aesthetics and, to a lesser extent, the philosophy of biology. Hannah Ginsborg, by contrast, sees the Critique of Judgment as a central contribution to the understanding of human cognition generally. The fourteen essays collected here advance a common interpretive project: that of bringing out the philosophical significance of the notion of judgment which figures in the third Critique and showing its importance both to Kant's own theoretical philosophy and to contemporary views of human thought and cognition. For us to possess the capacity of judgment, on the interpretation defended here, is for our natural perceptual and imaginative responses to involve a claim to their own normativity with respect to the objects which cause them. It is in virtue of this capacity that we are able not merely to respond discriminatively to objects, as animals do, but to bring objects under concepts. The Critique of Judgment, on this reading, rejects the traditional dichotomy between the natural and the normative: our natural psychological responses to the spatio-temporal objects which affect our senses are both causally determined by those objects, and normatively appropriate to them. The essays in this book aim collectively to develop and illuminate this understanding of judgment in its own right, and to use it to address specific interpretive issues in Kant's aesthetics, theory of knowledge, and philosophy of biology; they are also concerned to bring out the relevance of this conception of judgment to contemporary debates regarding concept-acquisition, the content of perception, and skepticism about rules and meaning.

This book introduces the reader to the literary work and to an understanding of its cultural background and its specific features, presenting basic topics and ideas in their historical context and development in Western culture.

The Critique of Judgment, also translated as the Critique of the Power of Judgment and more commonly referred to as the third Critique, is a philosophical work by Immanuel Kant. Critique of Judgment completes the Critical project begun in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason (the first and second Critiques, respectively). The book is divided into two main sections: the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and the Critique of Teleological Judgment, and also includes a large overview of the entirety of Kant's Critical system, arranged in its final form. The end result of Kant's Critical Project is that there are certain fundamental antinomies in human Reason, most particularly that there is a complete inability to favor on the one hand the argument that all behavior and thought is determined by external causes, and on the other that there is an actual "spontaneous" causal principle at work in human behavior. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a German philosopher, who, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is "the central figure of modern philosophy." Kant argued that fundamental concepts of the human mind structure human experience, that reason is the source of morality, that aesthetics arises from a faculty of disinterested judgment, that space and time are forms of our understanding, and that the world as it is "in-itself" is unknowable. Kant took himself to have effected a Copernican revolution in philosophy, akin to Copernicus' reversal of the age-old belief that the sun revolved around the earth.

The most neglected sector of Kant's Critical Philosophy is his collec tion of remarks about biological phenomena in the second part of the Critique of Judgment, the Critique of Teleological Judgment. The reasons for this are numerous, but since in Kant, everything comes in threes, a three-fold collection will suffice. The Critique of Teleological Judgment itself is one reason. More than most of his writings, this segment of the Critical corpus suffers from what can most charitably be termed "mistakes of exposition. " In this part of the third Critique, it is commonplace to find sub-arguments in Kant's general position somewhere other than their logical niche. The result is that the general theme behind his remarks about living phenomena is obscured. This difficulty has done much to discourage even the most enthusiastic of Kant admirers from investing their time on this work. Secondly, in this century, until very recently, there has been little interest in philosophical questions about biology. Twenty-one out of thirty-one sections of the Critique of Teleological Judgment (sections #61 and 63-83) deal either directly or indirectly with issues of interest in the philosophy of biology. Finally, the Critique of Teleological Judgment has been placed among the last on that list "of writings thought to formulate Kant's Critical system. This is not merely because of its temporal position.

A collection of essays investigating key historical and scientific questions relating to the concept of natural purpose in Kant's philosophy of biology. Understanding Purpose is an exploration of the central concept of natural purpose [Naturzweck] in Kant's philosophy of biology. Kant's work in this area is marked by a strong teleological concern: living organisms, in his view, are qualitatively different from mechanistic devices, and as a result they cannot be understood by means of the same principles. At the same time, Kant's own use of the concept of purpose does not presuppose any theological commitments, and is merely "regulative"; that is, it is employed as a heuristic device. The contributors to this volume also investigate the following key historical questions relating to Kant's philosophy of biology: How does it relate to European work in the life sciences that was done before Kant arrived on the scene? How did Kant's unique approach to the philosophy of biology in turn influence later work in this area? The issues explored in this volume are as pertinent to the history of philosophy as they are to the history of science -- it is precisely the blurred boundaries between these two disciplines that allows for new perspectives on Kantianism and early nineteenth-century German biology to emerge. Contributors: Jean-Claude Dupont, Mark Fisher, Philippe Huneman, Robert J. Richards, Phillip R. Sloan, Stéphane Schmitt, and John Zammito. Philippe Huneman is researcher at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique Unit of the Université Paris.