Corey W. Dyck presents a new account of Kant's criticism of the rational investigation of the soul in the 'Critique of Pure Reason', in light of its 18th-century German context. He reinterprets the aims and results of the Paralogisms, and illuminates Kant's discussion of the soul's substantiality, simplicity, personality, and existence.

Corey W. Dyck presents a new account of Kant's criticism of the rational investigation of the soul in his monumental Critique of Pure Reason, in light of its eighteenth-century German context. When characterizing the rational psychology that is Kant's target in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason chapter of the Critique commentators typically only refer to an approach to, and an account of, the soul found principally in the thought of Descartes and Leibniz. But Dyck argues that to do so is to overlook the distinctive rational psychology developed by Christian Wolff, which emphasized the empirical foundation of any rational cognition of the soul, and which was widely influential among eighteenth-century German philosophers, including Kant. In this book, Dyck reveals how the received conception of the aim and results of Kant's Paralogisms must be revised in light of a proper understanding of the rational psychology that is the most proximate target of Kant's attack. In particular, he contends that Kant's criticism hinges upon exposing the illusory basis of the rational psychologist's claims inasmuch as he falls prey to the appearance of the soul as being given in inner experience. Moreover, Dyck demonstrates that significant light can be shed on Kant's discussion of the soul's substantiality, simplicity, personality, and existence by considering the Paralogisms in this historical context.

Immanuel Kant is strict about the limits of self-knowledge: our inner sense gives us only appearances, never the reality, of ourselves. Kant may seem to begin his inquiries with an uncritical conception of cognitive limits, but in Kant and the Subject of Critique, Avery Goldman argues that, even for Kant, a reflective act must take place before any judgment occurs. Building on Kant's metaphysics, which uses the soul, the world, and God as regulative principles, Goldman demonstrates how Kant can open doors to reflection, analysis, language, sensibility, and understanding. By establishing a regulative self, Goldman offers a way to bring unity to the subject through Kant's seemingly circular reasoning, allowing for critique and, ultimately, knowledge.

Julian Wuerth offers a radically new interpretation of Kant's theories of mind, action, and ethics. As the author of a Copernican turn in philosophy, Kant places the mind at the center of his philosophy, and yet his theory of the mind remains an enigma. Wuerth begins with a revolutionary new interpretation of this theory of mind. This new interpretation considers a far wider range of Kant's recorded thought from across his philosophical corpus than previous interpretations and advances in tandem with an interpretation of the foundations of Kant's transcendental idealism and his metaphysics of substance. Against traditional empiricist approaches, Wuerth demonstrates that Kant argues that we are conscious of our own noumenal substantiality and simplicity. But against rational psychologists, Kant draws on the teachings of his transcendental idealism to strip the conclusions of our noumenal substantiality and simplicity of their "usefulness." In the Paralogisms and elsewhere, Kant thus argues that we are not licensed to conclude our substantiality and simplicity in a sense that entails our permanence, our incorruptibility, or our immortality. Wuerth goes on to undertake a ground-breaking study of Kant's notoriously vast, complex, and opaque account of the mind's powers, and argues that Kant structures his system of philosophy on this system of the mind's powers. He next confronts the persisting stumbling block of interpretations of Kant's ethics--Kant's theory of action--and shows that Kant rejects intellectualist theories of action that reduce practical agents to pure reason. He argues that Kant's practical agent is shown to exercise a power of choice, or Willkur, subject to two irreducible conative currencies: moral motives and sensible incentives. While our intellectual nature provides us with insight into morality and in turn with moral motives, our sensible nature provides us with distinct-in-kind sensible incentives. Immoral choices at odds with the former can thus nonetheless be coherent choices in harmony with the latter. Finally, Wuerth applies these new findings about Kant's theory of mind and action to an analysis of the foundations of Kant's ethics. He rejects the dominant constructivist interpretation in favor of a moral realist one. At the heart of Kant's Enlightenment ethics is his insistence that the authority of a moral law rests in our recognition of its truth, not in an alleged commitment unfettered by truth. Kant guides us to clarity regarding the moral law, across his writings and across his various formulations of the moral law, using a single elimination of sensibility process that rejects the pretences of sensibility to isolate reason and its insights into moral right and wrong. Because moral authority issues from the cognition of pure practical reason and because sensibility can present coherent alternatives to moral choice, moral virtue requires more than mere clarity in cognition. Kant instead recognizes the centrality to moral living of the ongoing cultivation of our capacities more broadly, including our capacities for cognition, feeling, desire, and character.

This is the first English-language book to examine Kant's empirical psychology, applying it throughout Kant's philosophy and to contemporary philosophical issues.

Corey W. Dyck presents a new account of Kant's criticism of the rational investigation of the soul in the 'Critique of Pure Reason', in light of its 18th-century German context. He reinterprets the aims and results of the Paralogisms, and illuminates Kant's discussion of the soul's substantiality, simplicity, personality, and existence.

Kant's Thinker examines the Critique of Pure Reason's account of the relation between cognition and self-consciousness. It shows how the theory that cognizers must understand their mental states as standing in relations of rational connection has implications for theories of the self-ascription of belief, consciousness and knowledge of other subjects.