A chronological overview from the end of World War II to 1990. This work gives a broad analysis of the major changes, strategies, and situations that helped shape diplomatic and economic relations between the two nations.

This study compares the strategies of France and Japan in trying to win economic and political influence in the newly emerging Vietnam. With the end of the Cold War, the fight for power in the world has changed from the political-military field to a race for economic power. Nations worldwide are associating themselves with Asian countries in order to profit from the growth in the region. Vietnam opened to the international community only recently after the Vietnamese Communist Party had started economic reforms in 1986. These reforms are aimed at transforming the country's centrally planned economy into a government-controlled market economy and at opening Vietnam to foreign capital, technology, and know-how. This setting provides a unique opportunity for comparing the strategies of two nations from different continents in conducting their economic relations with Vietnam. Considering Japan's success in other parts of Southeast Asia, it is clearly interesting to analyse Japan's strategies in Vietnam. France was chosen for its long-standing relations with Vietnam and the massive efforts it is undertaking to re-establish its influence in Vietnam.

This detailed and lucid volume is an essential resource for students of Asian Studies and International Politics.

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent outbreak of the Cambodian conflict brought Southeast Asia into instability and deteriorated relations between Vietnam and the subsequently established Vietnam-backed government in Cambodia on the one hand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries on the other. As a result of the conflict, the Soviet Union established a foothold in Southeast Asia while China, through its support of the anti-Vietnam Cambodian resistance, improved relations with Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand. Japan's Fukuda Doctrine - it’s declared priorities of promoting cooperative and friendly relations between Communist Indochinese nations and non-Communist ASEAN countries – became increas¬ingly at odds with Japan’s role as a member of the Free World in the broader Cold War confrontation. Tokyo had to steer a path between Washington’s hard-line policy of isolating Vietnam and its own desire to prevent regional destabilization. Against this background, this book addresses the following questions: what was Japan’s response to the challenges to its objectives and interests in Southeast Asia and to the Fukuda Doctrine? What role did Japan play for the settlement of the conflict in Cambodia? How did Japan’s diplomacy on the Cambodian problem affect the Japanese role in the region? It argues that Japan’s contribution was more active than has widely been recognized.

The Historical Dictionary of United States-Japan Relations traces this one hundred and fifty year relationship through a chronology, an introduction, appendixes, a bibliography, and cross-referenced dictionary entries on key persons, places, events, institutions, and organizations. Covering everything from Walt Whitman's poem, A Broadway Pageant, commemorating the visit of the Shogun's Embassy to the U.S. in 1860, to zaibatsu, this ready reference is an excellent starting point for the study of Japan's dealings with the U.S.

Japan, the reigning economic giant of East Asia, and Vietnam, an industrializing socialist country in Southeast Asia with strong links to China, occupy worlds that seem not to intersect. Yet historical connections between the two countries date back at least to the fourteenth century, when a Japanese merchant community flourished in the city of Hoi An.

According to the final declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference regarding Vietnam, general elections were to be held in July 1956 that would lead to the reunification of North and South Vietnam. The Geneva Agreement, however, was doomed from the start, as the South Vietnamese leaders did not suscribe to it and the leaders of the Communist North saw its value as primarily a propaganda tool. By 1956 it was obvious to all that reunification in accordance with the agreement was impossible, and the North Vietnamese looked to China for advice and assistance. Based on Vietnamese, Chinese, American and British sources--many only recently made available--this work examines Sino-Vietnamese relations in the early stages of the second Indochina conflict. The progression of the Vietnamese Communists' goals from primarily political to essentially military is traced. The book shows that the Hanoi government was remarkably in control of its own decision-making.