The purpose of this monograph is to determine the ideal practices for militias and irregular forces in counterinsurgency operations. This study specifically addresses those groups organized by a legitimate sponsor such as the Host Nation or one of its partners and takes note to exclude criminal organizations that seek to terrorize the government or its population to gain concessions. As part of its study, this paper provides a basic outline of the goals of insurgent and counterinsurgent doctrine. It uses Mao Tse-tung as a source for universal insurgent goals and Revolutionary Insurgencies and David Galula for Nationalist Insurgencies (Galula refers to them as Bourgeois-Nationalist). Galula's differentiation is unique because it attempts to identify situations and expected insurgents actions for each type of insurgency though insurgencies may include characteristics of both models. This study also refers to US doctrine to provide an understanding of how the US expects to fight insurgencies. This monograph then establishes a baseline of criteria for militia tasks and considerations that it subsequently investigates using historical examples of three conflicts: The Malayan Emergency, The US in the Vietnam War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. As in any military operation, commanders must balance a myriad of criteria that weigh on possible alternative solutions. In the employment of irregular forces, a leader must consider how using locally hired indigenous forces affect operations. He should be aware of how the roles of such unconventional forces affect the militias themselves, how the Host Nation or its defense forces react to them, and possible US government and popular reactions. While verifying that militias are effective in counterinsurgent operations for basic security and defense related tasks, providing intelligence, population control, and permit for conventional forces to direct actions against the insurgents, this paper revealed that irregulars have the potential for additional contributions. With training and supervision, surrogates can engage in short duration offensive operations. Militias also provide a means for the government to garner local support against the insurgency through inclusion. They can facilitate reconciliation with disaffected groups and provide a unifying force for these groups in politics. In the course of researching applicable doctrine, there is a noticeable gap in the use of irregular forces in counterinsurgency operations. The author attributes this gap to the residual effects of the Vietnam War and the criminal militia operating in Operation Iraqi Freedom, which made US forces resistant to employing irregular forces. In the conclusion, the author calls for a revision of current US doctrine to expand the use of irregular forces in Counterinsurgency Operations. This calling is not so much based on the author's own opinion but reflects the reality that since most potential enemies, unable to match the combat power of the US, will continue to use asymmetric methods, including exploiting and operating among the local population. Irregular forces provide a feasible solution to this problem that can provide an advantage in future US operations.

What is Counterinsurgency Counterinsurgency is "the totality of actions aimed at defeating irregular forces". The Oxford English Dictionary defines counterinsurgency as any "military or political action taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries" and can be considered war by a state against a non-state adversary. Insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns have been waged since ancient history. However, modern thinking on counterinsurgency was developed during decolonization. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Counterinsurgency Chapter 2: Guerrilla warfare Chapter 3: Asymmetric warfare Chapter 4: Malayan Emergency Chapter 5: Low-intensity conflict Chapter 6: Insurgency Chapter 7: Robert Grainger Ker Thompson Chapter 8: Phoenix Program Chapter 9: Jungle warfare Chapter 10: Modern warfare (II) Answering the public top questions about counterinsurgency. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Counterinsurgency.

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941, is the first of a two-volume study on the U.S. Army's experience in "small war" situations and the development of low-intensity conflict doctrine. Focusing on the suppression of insurgent or other irregular forces during overseas constabulary and contingency operations from the Civil War years up to America's entry into World War II, Andrew J. Birtle has filled an important omission in military historiography by writing about the underlying theories, concepts, and methods employed in the conduct of myriad unconventional missions with soldiers serving as governors, constables, judges, diplomats, explorers, colonizers, educators, administrators, and engineers. Even though official, codified, written doctrine for counterguerrilla, pacification, and nation-building activities prior to World War II has long been viewed as nonexistent, Birtle uncovers through his meticulous research an evidentiary thread of continuity in the Army's performance and thus maintains that some of the central principles governing such operations were indeed incorporated into official Army doctrinal literature. The events discussed unquestionably occurred long ago, but many of the issues raised by Birtle have enduring relevance for today's Army. People, places, and events may change, yet the fundamental questions involved in suppressing insurrections, fighting irregulars, administering civilian populations, and conducting foreign intervention remain surprisingly constant in this unpredictable world of ethnic tensions and turmoil. By studying how soldiers dealt with these complex issues in the past, Birtle's well-written account offers valuable insights to guide current and future soldiers when called upon to conduct similar operations. Miliatary starategists, historians, and civilians interested in America's early history may find this resource appealing and offer a better understanding of Army doctrine from a historical perspective. Related products: Mexican Expedition, 1916-1917 is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00600-6 Commerce Raiding is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-046-00282-7 From Transformation to Combat: The First Stryker Brigade at Warcan be purchased here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00459-3 United States Army in World War II, War in the Pacific, Triumph in the Philippines --Print Paperback format -- is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00503-4 Other products produced by the U.S. Army, Center of Military History can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/1061 "

This textbook offers an accessible introduction to counterinsurgency operations, a key aspect of modern warfare. Featuring essays by some of the world’s leading experts on unconventional conflict, both scholars and practitioners, the book discusses how modern regular armed forces react, and should react, to irregular warfare. The volume is divided into three main sections: Doctrinal Origins: analysing the intellectual and historical roots of modern Western theory and practice Operational Aspects: examining the specific role of various military services in counterinsurgency, but also special forces, intelligence, and local security forces Challenges: looking at wider issues, such as governance, culture, ethics, civil-military cooperation, information operations, and time. Understanding Counterinsurgency is the first comprehensive textbook on counterinsurgency, and will be essential reading for all students of small wars, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, strategic studies and security studies, both in graduate and undergraduate courses as well as in professional military schools.

United States counterterrorism (CT) forces have been employed in Afghanistan since October 18, 2001. Over the last decade, the CT force profile and method of operating has evolved. Historically, the CT force was a secretive organization that did little to directly assist conventional battle space owners (BSO) operating in a shared counterinsurgency (COIN) environment; today, the CT force overtly supports the BSO from the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) to the many dispersed battalion commanders operating throughout Afghanistan. The CT force's evolution was born of necessity. As the battle space became more complex and conventional forces controlled large tracts of land, ensuring operations were mutually supporting aided if not guaranteed the CT force's freedom of action (FOA); conversely, operations that were not fully coordinated routinely inhibited the CT force's FOA. In January 2009, the CT force aggressively revamped its method of operating in Afghanistan in order to provide unprecedented support to BSO and consequently guarantee FOA for the CT force. This study will seek to ensure the unclassified lessons amassed are captured and ideally learned, trained, rehearsed, and implemented.

"Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. It is likely that U.S. forces will face similar, irregular warfare tactics from future enemies that are unwilling to engage in conventional combat with U.S. forces. This monograph examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat and provides insights on using operational analysis techniques to support intelligence operations in counterinsurgencies. The authors examine the stages of an insurgency and discuss the kinds of intelligence that are needed at each stage. A number of techniques -- pattern discernment and predictive analysis, for example -- appear to show promise of being useful to intelligence analysis. The authors also explore two closely connected methods in depth to examine the interactions between friendly and enemy forces: game theory and change detection." -- p. [4] of cover.

What is Irregular Warfare Irregular warfare (IW) is defined in United States joint doctrine as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations." In practice, control of institutions and infrastructure is also important. Concepts associated with irregular warfare are older than the term itself. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Irregular warfare Chapter 2: Guerrilla warfare Chapter 3: Information warfare Chapter 4: Unconventional warfare Chapter 5: Insurgency Chapter 6: Irregular military Chapter 7: Counterinsurgency Chapter 8: Directorate of Operations (CIA) Chapter 9: Colombia-United States relations Chapter 10: Partisan Ranger Act (II) Answering the public top questions about irregular warfare. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Irregular Warfare.