"The report assesses the initiatives for information exchange among firms and their consequences for welfare with a view towards the design of competition policy in this domain. To this end the report surveys critically the academic literature on static and dynamic models of competition in their relation to information exchange and examines the main antitrust legislation and cases in Europe and the US."--Page i.

Assesses the incentives for information exchange among firms & their consequences for welfare with a view towards the design of competition policy in this domain. The report critically surveys the academic literature on static dynamic models of competition in their relation to information exchange & examines the main antitrust legislation & cases in Europe & the U.S. The literature provides 2 different sets of reasons for competition policy to be concerned with information exchange. Charts & tables.

Information Exchange Between Competitors in EU Competition Law Martin Gassler Competing firms often exchange information in order to make more informed market decisions which can help to overcome market inefficiencies. However, an abundance of legal and economic research as well as case law has shown that information exchange may also enable firms to engage in collusion more readily and sustain it longer. This book is the first to concentrate on this challenging topic of EU competition law in such depth. It focuses on ‘pure’ information exchanges – exchanges that are not ancillary to a wider pro-competitive or anticompetitive conduct – and thoroughly explains the characteristics of such information exchanges, their pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects and discusses all the relevant legal aspects for their assessment. The author provides a robust analytical framework for assessing information exchanges under Article 101 TFEU, focusing on the risk of collusive outcomes and what types of information exchange are particularly harmful. With detailed attention to the leading cases on information exchange, the analysis examines the most important aspects for assessing information exchange between competitors, in particular: the concept of a concerted practice; the concepts of a restriction by object and effect, including their similarities and differences; the importance of evidentiary issues; the issue of signalling via advance public announcements; factors that facilitate collusion; efficiencies of information exchange, including market transparency; the legal challenges of tackling mere parallel conduct; facilitative practices in the Commission Guidelines, including the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines; and safe harbours for certain types of information exchange. The book offers clear guidance on how to identify and thus distinguish information exchange that restricts competition by its object and information exchange that restricts competition (only) by its effects. It offers practical solutions to some of the perceived issues when assessing information exchanges. With its wealth of analysis not available from other sources, this concise yet comprehensive review of a much-debated topic in competition law offers clear guidance for practitioners in assessing the issues surrounding information exchange. The book will also be welcomed by competition law academics, competition lawyers and competition authority officials throughout Europe.

"Any practitioner, policymaker, or academic, in the field of competition law could hardly ask for a more thoroughly documented work. EC and US antitrust law is examined, and dozens of court decisions are quoted, with complete citations throughout. The books is a gold mine for anyone interested in the important task of extending the reach of competition law and antitrust law in this era of globalization."--BOOK JACKET.

This book provides a methodology for the analysis of oligopolistic markets from an equilibrium viewpoint, considering competition within and between groups of firms. It proposes a well-founded measure of competitive toughness that can be used in empirically relevant applications. This measure reflects the weight put by each firm on competition for market share relative to competition for market size – two dimensions of competition involving conflicting and convergent interests, respectively. It further explores several applications, such as the effect of tougher competition on innovation and of output market power on the emergence of involuntary unemployment, as well as the importance of strategic interactions for investment decisions. Relative to the dominant model of monopolistic competition, The Economics of Competition, Collusion and In-between aims to explore an alternative tractable model of firm competition opening the application of oligopoly theory to many fields in economics where general equilibrium features are crucial. It will be relevant to those interested in applied industrial organization, trade, macroeconomics (in particular macrodynamics) and quantitative economics.

This book provides the reader with a comprehensive analysis of US Federal Antitrust and EC Competition Law. It is encyclopaedic in coverage: examining every constituent element of the law and landmark decisions from the perspectives of economics and policy goals, explaining their implications for commercial operations and advocating policy reforms where necessary.

Drawing together a variety of perspectives, this accessible yet comprehensive Research Handbook provides an in-depth analysis of the most significant issues pertaining to the legal regulation of cartels. An interdisciplinary team of respected experts explores the theoretical, legal, economic, political, and comparative discourse surrounding cartel regulation.