Use of information is basic to economic theory in two ways. As a basis for optimization, it is central to all normative hypotheses used in eco nomics, but in decision-making situations it has stochastic and evolution ary aspects that are more dynamic and hence more fundamental. This book provides an illustrative survey of the use of information in econom ics and other decision sciences. Since this area is one of the most active fields of research in modern times, it is not possible to be definitive on all aspects of the issues involved. However questions that appear to be most important in this author's view are emphasized in many cases, without drawing any definite conclusions. It is hoped that these questions would provoke new interest for those beginning researchers in the field who are currently most active. Various classifications of information structures and their relevance for optimal decision-making in a stochastic environment are analyzed in some detail. Specifically the following areas are illustrated in its analytic aspects: 1. Stochastic optimization in linear economic models, 2. Stochastic models in dynamic economics with problems of time-inc- sistency, causality and estimation, 3. Optimal output-inventory decisions in stochastic markets, 4. Minimax policies in portfolio theory, 5. Methods of stochastic control and differential games, and 6. Adaptive information structures in decision models in economics and the theory of economic policy.

Over the past several years there has been an awareness that mar kets, contractual arrangements, and hierarchical organizations can be uti lized as alternative modes of coordinating resource utilization in the con text of the firm. In most practical situations mixed forms of organization are more frequent. That is, non-market coordination mechanisms are being utilized even in predominantly market oriented economies. The reasons for the use of one of these organizational modes over the others are still being examined extensively. Very often, asset specificity and bilateral monopoly, risk sharing under uncertainty, transaction cost considerations, and/or technological externalities (economies of scope) have been considered as the major reasons for preferring one of these modes over the others. However, the ultimate effect on the performance of the firm, of any of these aspects which result in the adoption of any specific organizational pattern, has to be through the cost curve and/or the demand curve. The neoclassical welfare concepts, which have been developed to examine the efficiency in the functioning of markets, are well known. The sources of inefficiency in the performance of the firm under different mar ket structures are also well documented. However, there is as yet no well established set of concepts to examine the economic efficiency of the other organizational forms. It is not clear that the neoclassical welfare concepts are not relevant even under the new organizational setting. Studies of this nature are a relatively new area of economic research.

Econometrics as an applied discipline attempts to use information in a most efficient manner, yet the information theory and entropy approach developed by Shannon and others has not played much of a role in applied econometrics. Econometrics of Information and Efficiency bridges the gap. Broadly viewed, information theory analyzes the uncertainty of a given set of data and its probabilistic characteristics. Whereas the economic theory of information emphasizes the value of information to agents in a market, the entropy theory stresses the various aspects of imprecision of data and their interactions with the subjective decision processes. The tools of information theory, such as the maximum entropy principle, mutual information and the minimum discrepancy are useful in several areas of statistical inference, e.g., Bayesian estimation, expected maximum likelihood principle, the fuzzy statistical regression. This volume analyzes the applications of these tools of information theory to the most commonly used models in econometrics. The outstanding features of Econometrics of Information and Efficiency are: A critical survey of the uses of information theory in economics and econometrics; An integration of applied information theory and economic efficiency analysis; The development of a new economic hypothesis relating information theory to economic growth models; New lines of research are emphasized.

Economic analysis of law is an interesting and challenging attempt to employ the concepts and reasoning methods of modern economic theory so as to gain a deeper understanding of legal problems. According to Richard A. Posner it is the role of the law to encourage market competition and, where the market fails because transaction costs are too high, to simulate the result of competitive markets. This would maximize economic efficiency and social wealth. In this work, the lawyer and economist Klaus Mathis critically appraises Posner’s normative justification of the efficiency paradigm from the perspective of the philosophy of law. Posner acknowledges the influences of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, whom he views as the founders of normative economics. He subscribes to Smith’s faith in the market as an ideal allocation model, and to Bentham’s ethical consequentialism. Finally, aligning himself with John Rawls’s contract theory, he seeks to legitimize his concept of wealth maximization with a consensus theory approach. In his interdisciplinary study, the author points out the possibilities as well as the limits of economic analysis of law. It provides a method of analysing the law which, while very helpful, is also rather specific. The efficiency arguments therefore need to be incorporated into a process for resolving value conflicts. In a democracy this must take place within the political decision-making process. In this clearly written work, Klaus Mathis succeeds in making even non-economists more aware of the economic aspects of the law.

The problems arising from the existence of asymmetric information in public decision making have been widely explored by economists. Most of the traditional analysis of public sector activities has been reviewed to take accountofthe possible distortions arising from an asymmetric distribution of relevant information among the actors of the public decision-making process. A normative approach has been developed to design incentive schemes which tackle adverse selection and moral hazard problems within public organisations: our understanding of these problems is now much better, and some of the mechanisms designed have had important practical implications. While this analysis is still under way in many fields of public economics, as the papers by Jones and Zanola, and Trimarchi witness, a debate is ongoing on the possible theoretical limitations ofthis approach and on its actual relevance for public sector activities. This book encompasses different contributions to these issues, on both theoretical and practical areas, which were firstly presented at a conference in Catania. The innermost problem in the current discussion arises from the fact that this normative analysis is firmly rooted in the complete contracting framework, with the consequence that, despite the analytical complexities of most models, their results rely on very simplified assumptions. Most complexities of the organisation of public sector, and more generally, of writing "contracts", are therefore swept away.