without a properly developed inconsistent calculus based on infinitesimals, then in consistent claims from the history of the calculus might well simply be symptoms of confusion. This is addressed in Chapter 5. It is further argued that mathematics has a certain primacy over logic, in that paraconsistent or relevant logics have to be based on inconsistent mathematics. If the latter turns out to be reasonably rich then paraconsistentism is vindicated; while if inconsistent mathematics has seri ous restriytions then the case for being interested in inconsistency-tolerant logics is weakened. (On such restrictions, see this chapter, section 3. ) It must be conceded that fault-tolerant computer programming (e. g. Chapter 8) finds a substantial and important use for paraconsistent logics, albeit with an epistemological motivation (see this chapter, section 3). But even here it should be noted that if inconsistent mathematics turned out to be functionally impoverished then so would inconsistent databases. 2. Summary In Chapter 2, Meyer's results on relevant arithmetic are set out, and his view that they have a bearing on G8del's incompleteness theorems is discussed. Model theory for nonclassical logics is also set out so as to be able to show that the inconsistency of inconsistent theories can be controlled or limited, but in this book model theory is kept in the background as much as possible. This is then used to study the functional properties of various equational number theories.

Logical paradoxes – like the Liar, Russell's, and the Sorites – are notorious. But in Paradoxes and Inconsistent Mathematics, it is argued that they are only the noisiest of many. Contradictions arise in the everyday, from the smallest points to the widest boundaries. In this book, Zach Weber uses “dialetheic paraconsistency” – a formal framework where some contradictions can be true without absurdity – as the basis for developing this idea rigorously, from mathematical foundations up. In doing so, Weber directly addresses a longstanding open question: how much standard mathematics can paraconsistency capture? The guiding focus is on a more basic question, of why there are paradoxes. Details underscore a simple philosophical claim: that paradoxes are found in the ordinary, and that is what makes them so extraordinary.

Why are there paradoxes? This book uses paraconsistent logic to develop the mathematics to find out.

"To celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications (IMA), this book is designed to showcase the beauty of mathematics - including images inspired by mathematical problems - together with its unreasonable effectiveness and applicability, without frying your brain"--Provided by publisher.

The Theory of Inconsistency has a long lineage, stretching back to Herakleitos, Hegel and Marx. In the late twentieth-century, it was placed on a rigorous footing with the discovery of paraconsistent logic and inconsistent mathematics. Paraconsistent logics, many of which are now known, are "inconsistency tolerant," that is, they lack the rule of Boolean logic that a contradiction implies every proposition. When this constricting rule was seen to be arbitrary, inconsistent mathematical structures were free to be described. This book continues the development of inconsistent mathematics by taking up inconsistent geometry, hitherto largely undeveloped. It has two main goals. First, various geometrical structures are shown to deliver models for paraconsistent logics. Second, the "impossible pictures" of Reutersvaard, Escher, the Penroses and others are addressed. The idea is to derive inconsistent mathematical descriptions of the content of impossible pictures, so as to explain rigorously how they can be impossible and yet classifiable into several basic types. The book will be of interest to logicians, mathematicians, philosophers, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and artists interested in impossible images. It contains a gallery of previously-unseen coloured images, which illustrates the possibilities available in representing impossible geometrical shapes. Chris Mortensen is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide. He is the author of Inconsistent Mathrmatics (Kluwer 1995), and many articles in the Theory of Inconsistency.

This is the first Supplementary volume to Kluwer's highly acclaimed Encyclopaedia of Mathematics. This additional volume contains nearly 600 new entries written by experts and covers developments and topics not included in the already published 10-volume set. These entries have been arranged alphabetically throughout. A detailed index is included in the book. This Supplementary volume enhances the existing 10-volume set. Together, these eleven volumes represent the most authoritative, comprehensive up-to-date Encyclopaedia of Mathematics available.

A fascinating journey through intriguing mathematical and philosophical territory - a lively introduction to this contemporary topic.