Why do states similar in size, resources and capabilities significantly differ in their basic orientations and actions across major domains in foreign policy, security and defense? This book addresses this important question by analyzing the major differences between the foreign policies of France and Germany over extended periods of time.

Part I. The era of frustration (1945-1958) -- France's difficult entry into the Cold War -- French powerlessness -- Part II. Challenging the status quo (1958-1969) -- Re-establishing France's "rank"--Challenging the established order -- The apogee of de Gaulle's grand policy -- Part III. Imanaging de Gaulle's legacy (1969-1981) -- Opting for continuity -- The education of a president -- Part IV. The end of the Cold War (1981-1995) -- New Cold War, new detente -- The end of "Yalta" -- Part V. France and globalization (1995-2015) -- In search of a multipolar world -- Charts

This book examines external perceptions of the Franco-German relationship, both from a historical perspective and as a driving force for regional integration. By providing various country and regional studies, it analyses the various types of perception and self-perception in several regions around the globe. Here, Franco-German cooperation serves as a mirror in which third-party countries view their own situation, today and in the future. The contributions address the questions of if and how the Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation is perceived as a role model for other regions, especially for the reconciliation of other inter-state and international conflicts. A concluding chapter highlights the divergences and convergences between the respective conflicts, and proposes recommendations for actors involved in diplomacy and international relations. The book is intended to provide scientific support for the implementation of the Franco-German Aachen Treaty of January 2019. It will appeal to scholars in political science and cultural studies, and to anyone interested in learning more about the Franco-German relationship and on external perspectives on it.

Since World War II, Germany has confronted its own history to earn acceptance in the family of nations. Lily Gardner Feldman draws on the literature of religion, philosophy, social psychology, law and political science, and history to understand Germany's foreign policy with its moral and pragmatic motivations and to develop the concept of international reconciliation. Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation traces Germany's path from enmity to amity by focusing on the behavior of individual leaders, governments, and non-governmental actors. The book demonstrates that, at least in the cases of France, Israel, Poland, and Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, Germany has gone far beyond banishing war with its former enemies; it has institutionalized active friendship. The German experience is now a model of its own, offering lessons for other cases of international reconciliation. Gardner Feldman concludes with an initial application of German reconciliation insights to the other principal post-World War II pariah, as Japan expands its relations with China and South Korea.

This book explores the role of France in the events leading up to the end of the Cold War and German unification. --from publisher description.

Using documents only recently available, this pioneering book explores the interaction of German, British, French, and American policy at a time when the great depression and the growing political power of the Nazis had created a European crisis--the only such crisis between 1910 and 1941 in which the United States played a leading role. The author uses contemporary records to rectify the later accounts of such participants as Herbert Hoover, Julius Curtius, and Paul Schmidt. He describes the negotiations of the major powers arising out of the Austro-German plans for a customs union, and relates this problem to the question of terminating reparations and war debts. He shows how the Governor of the Bank of England directed British foreign policy into bitter opposition to France and how the German government sought to exploit the German private debt to Wall Street. Edward Bennett comes to the conclusion that the Br ning government, contrary to widely held opinion, received fully as much help as it deserved, while the Western powers were already showing the disunity and irresponsibility which proved so disastrous in later years. Although primarily a diplomatic history, this book also offers fresh information on pre-Hitler Germany, MacDonald's Britain, the Hoover administration, and the early career of Pierre Laval.