Things that don't exist -- Fictional object nominalism -- Fictional object realism -- Meinongianism -- God's existence and nonexistence -- Contingency and nonexistence -- Perfection and divine existence -- Nonexistence and creatures -- Ex nihilo and nonexistence -- Infinite existence and countless nonexistents -- Providence and freedom -- Nonexistents and middle knowledge -- Evil as nonexistence

God and fictional objects are central topics within philosophy, but rarely do the respective discussions overlap. Until now the two fields have remained independent. Applying the debate about fictional objects to issues of theology for the first time, John-Mark L. Miravalle bridges these two fields and presents a new approach to notions of God, creatures, and existence. Miravalle explains why meinongianism, which holds that certain things can serve as intentional objects with properties, even though they do not exist, can facilitate talk of nonexistence better than other metaphysical viewpoints, such as platonism, modal realism and pretense-theory. He identifies points of connection between theology and nonexistents and uses meinongianism to buttress the cosmological and ontological arguments for God's existence. As a result he is able to explore fresh solutions to problems of classical theism, from the necessary existence of God and creation ex nihilo to free will and the problem of evil. By revealing how a particular account of fictional objects is especially harmonious with and supportive of the major claims of traditional theism, Miravalle makes a major contribution to theistic metaphysics.

Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion is an annual volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this longstanding area of philosophy that has seen an explosive growth of interest over the past half century. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board, it publishes exemplary papers in any area of philosophy of religion.

Is it possible for reality as a whole to be part of itself? Can the world appear within itself without thereby undermining the consistency of our thought and knowledge-claims concerning more local matters of fact? This is a question on which Markus Gabriel and Graham Priest disagree. Gabriel argues that the world cannot exist precisely because it is understood to be an absolutely totality. Priest responds by developing a special form of mereology according to which reality is a single all-encompassing whole, everything, which counts itself among its denizens. Their disagreement results in a debate about everything and nothing: Gabriel argues that we experience nothingness once we overcome our urge to contain reality in an all-encompassing thought, whereas Priest develops an account of nothing according to which it is the ground of absolutely everything. A debate about everything and nothing, but also a reflection on the very possibility of metaphysics.

From the author of The Mind-Body Problem: a witty and intoxicating novel of ideas that plunges into the great debate between faith and reason. At the center is Cass Seltzer, a professor of psychology whose book, The Varieties of Religious Illusion, has become a surprise best seller. Dubbed “the atheist with a soul,” he wins over the stunning Lucinda Mandelbaum—“the goddess of game theory.” But he is haunted by reminders of two people who ignited his passion to understand religion: his teacher Jonas Elijah Klapper, a renowned literary scholar with a suspicious obsession with messianism, and an angelic six-year-old mathematical genius, heir to the leadership of an exotic Hasidic sect. Hilarious, heartbreaking, and intellectually captivating, 36 Arguments explores the rapture and torments of religious experience in all its variety.

This profound exploration of one of the core notions of philosophy—the concept of existence itself—reviews, then counters (via Meinongian theory), the mainstream philosophical view running from Hume to Frege, Russell, and Quine, summarized thus by Kant: “Existence is not a predicate.” The initial section of the book presents a comprehensive introduction to, and critical evaluation of, this mainstream view. The author moves on to provide the first systematic survey of all the main Meinongian theories of existence, which, by contrast, reckon existence to be a real, full-fledged property of objects that some things possess, and others lack. As an influential addition to the research literature, the third part develops the most up-to-date neo-Meinongian theory called Modal Meinongianism, applies it to specific fields such as the ontology of fictional objects, and discusses its open problems, laying the groundwork for further research. In accordance with the latest trends in analytic ontology, the author prioritizes a meta-ontological viewpoint, adopting a dual definition of meta-ontology as the discourse on the meaning of being, and as the discourse on the tools and methods of ontological enquiry. This allows a balanced assessment of philosophical views on a cost-benefit basis, following multiple criteria for theory evaluation. Compelling and revealing, this new publication is a vital addition to contemporary philosophical ontology.

Paul Ricoeur is one of the most influential philosophers alive today. This book draws primarily on his hermeneutic insights to address the fundamental question of how reference, truth, and meaning are related in the discourse of theology. Fodor defends the view that theological truth claims cannot be sustained without some appeal to the referential, or in Rocoeur's terminology "refigurative," potential intrinsic to our linguistic practices. By bringing the philosophical work of Ricoeur into mutually critical conversation with theology, particularly that of Hans Frei, the book underscores the importance of reference in assessing theological claims.