This book integrates the fundamentals, methodology, and major application fields of noncooperative and cooperative games including conflict resolution. The topics addressed in the book are discrete and continuous games including games represented by finite trees; matrix and bimatrix games as well as oligopolies; cooperative solution concepts; games under uncertainty; dynamic games and conflict resolution. The methodology is illustrated by carefully chosen examples, applications and case studies which are selected from economics, social sciences, engineering, the military and homeland security. This book is highly recommended to readers who are interested in the in-depth and up-to-date integration of the theory and ever-expanding application areas of game theory.

The mathematical study of games is an intriguing endeavor with implications and applications that reach far beyond tic-tac-toe, chess, and poker to economics, business, and even biology and politics. Most texts on the subject, however, are written at the graduate level for those with strong mathematics, economics, or business backgrounds. In

Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction focuses on the development of game theory, taking into consideration empirical research, theoretical formulations, and research procedures involved. The book proceeds with a discussion on the theory of one-person games. The individual decision that a player makes in these kinds of games is noted as influential as to the outcome of these games. This discussion is followed by a presentation of pure coordination games and minimal situation. The ability of players to anticipate the choices of others to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome is emphasized. A favorable social situation is also influential in these kinds of games. The text moves forward by presenting studies on various kinds of competitive games. The research studies presented are coupled with empirical evidence and discussion designed to support the claims that are pointed out. The book also discusses several kinds of approaches in the study of games. Voting as a way to resolve multi-person games is also emphasized, including voting procedures, the preferences of voters, and voting strategies. The book is a valuable source of data for readers and scholars who are interested in the exploration of game theories.

This text opens with the theory of 2-person zero-sum games, 2-person non-zero sum games, and n-person games, at a level between non-mathematical introductory books and technical mathematical game theory books. Includes introductory explanations of gaming and meta games. Includes numerous exercises anbd problems with solutions and over 30 illustrations. 1986 edition.

This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes

This classic text, originally from the noted logician Elliot Mendelson, is intended to be an easy-to-read introduction to the basic ideas and techniques of game theory. It can be used as a class textbook or for self-study. Introducing Game Theory and its Applications, Second Edition presents an easy-to-read introduction to the basic ideas and techniques of game theory. After a brief introduction, the authors begin with a chapter devoted to combinatorial games--a topic neglected or treated minimally in most other texts. The focus then shifts to two-person zero-sum games and their solutions. Here the authors present the simplex method based on linear programming for solving these games and develop within this presentation the required background. The final chapter presents some of the fundamental ideas and tools of non-zero-sum games and games with more than two players, including an introduction to cooperative game theory. The book is suitable for a first undergraduate course in game theory, or a graduate course for students with limited previous exposure. It is useful for students who need to learn some game theory for a related subject (e.g., microeconomics) and have a limited mathematical background. It also prepares its readers for more advanced study of game theory's applications in economics, business, and the physical, biological, and social sciences. The authors hope this book breeds curiosity about the subject as its design is meant to to satisfy the readers. The book will prepare readers for deeper study of game theory applications in many fields of study.