The U.S. Supreme Court is a public policy battleground in which organized interests attempt to etch their economic, legal, and political preferences into law through the filing of amicus curiae ("friend of the court") briefs. In Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making, Paul M. Collins, Jr. explores how organized interests influence the justices' decision making, including how the justices vote and whether they choose to author concurrences and dissents. Collins presents theories of judicial choice derived from disciplines as diverse as law, marketing, political science, and social psychology. This theoretically rich and empirically rigorous treatment of decision-making on the nation's highest court, which represents the most comprehensive examination ever undertaken of the influence of U.S. Supreme Court amicus briefs, provides clear evidence that interest groups play a significant role in shaping the justices' choices.

Applying strategic approaches to both interest groups as amici curiae and state supreme court justices, Comparato investigates the influence of judicial retention methods and the ballot initiative on their behaivor. The results demonstrate that they behave strategically, attempting to achieve their goals within the confines of the institutional setting. What impact do state-level institutions have on the behavior of state supreme court justices and interest groups participating as amici curiae in those courts? Specifically, is the information provided by interest groups conditioned on the judicial retention system, or whether the state uses the ballot initiative, and does that information impact the decision-making process of the justices? Comparato answers these questions by employing strategic theories of judicial and group behavior, with groups motivated by the attainment of policy and group maintenance, and state supreme court justices motivated by policy and the continued maintenance of their position on the court. He argues that the information provided in amicus curiae briefs allows both groups and state supreme court justices to achieve their respective goals. In order to answer these questions, Comparto analyzes litigant and amicus curiae briefs as well as judicial decisions from seven state supreme courts to evaluate the effects of state-level institutions on the types of information provided to state supreme court justices, and how those justices respond to that information. The results suggest that interest groups do behave strategically, providing information to justices that they believe will be useful in helping the justices retain their seats on the court and achieve their desired policy outcomes. There is also support for the expectation that the information provided by litigants and amici, as well as the retention method, have a direct impact on the decision-making of justices.

Once largely ignored, judicial elections in the states have become increasingly controversial over the past two decades. Legal organizations, prominent law professors, and a retired Supreme Court justice have advocated the elimination of elections as a means to choose judges. One of their primary concerns is interest group involvement in elections to state supreme courts, which they see as having negative effects on both the courts themselves and public perceptions of these judicial bodies. In The Battle for the Court, Lawrence Baum, David Klein, and Matthew Streb present a systematic investigation into the effects of interest group involvement in the election of judges. Focusing on personal-injury law, the issue that has played the most substantial role in spurring interest group activity in judicial elections, the authors detail how interest groups mobilize in response to unfavorable rulings by state supreme courts, how their efforts influence the outcomes of supreme court elections, and how those outcomes in turn effectively reshape public policies. The authors employ several decades’ worth of new data on campaign activity, voter behavior, and judicial policy-making in one particularly colorful, important, and representative state—Ohio—to explore these connections among interest groups, elections, and judicial policy in a way that has not been possible until now.

In the first book-length study of interest group litigation in Canada, Friends of the Court traces the Canadian Supreme Court's ever-changing relationship with interest groups since the 1970s. After explaining how the Court was pressured to welcome more interest groups in the late 1980s, Brodie introduces a new theory of political status describing how the Court privileges certain groups over others. By uncovering the role of the state in encouraging and facilitating litigation, this book challenges the idea that interest group litigation in Canada is a grassroots phenomenon.

This book demonstrates that the hearings to confirm Supreme Court nominees are in fact a democratic forum for the discussion and ratification of constitutional change.

What influences decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court? For decades social scientists focused on the ideology of individual justices. Supreme Court Decision Making moves beyond this focus by exploring how justices are influenced by the distinctive features of courts as institutions and their place in the political system. Drawing on interpretive-historical institutionalism as well as rational choice theory, a group of leading scholars consider such factors as the influence of jurisprudence, the unique characteristics of supreme courts, the dynamics of coalition building, and the effects of social movements. The volume's distinguished contributors and broad range make it essential reading for those interested either in the Supreme Court or the nature of institutional politics. Original essays contributed by Lawrence Baum, Paul Brace, Elizabeth Bussiere, Cornell Clayton, Sue Davis, Charles Epp, Lee Epstein, Howard Gillman, Melinda Gann Hall, Ronald Kahn, Jack Knight, Forrest Maltzman, David O'Brien, Jeffrey Segal, Charles Sheldon, James Spriggs II, and Paul Wahlbeck.