Contains more than 20 maps, diagrams and illustrations The movement and details of the Union offensive plan at Fredericksburg seemed to be understood by all senior commanders; the North had a preponderance of manpower and artillery; a bridgehead was established on the enemy side of the river and initial objectives secured. Why did Burnside decide to withdraw his army back across the river to its original position? That question cannot be answered without viewing the pontoon crossing sites, the Union approach routes, the infamous "stonewall," and the other Confederate defensive positions. Accordingly, the purpose of a Fredericksburg staff ride is to visit these and other locations on the battlefield and analyze the battle through the eyes of the men who were there, both leaders and rank and file soldiers.

Contains more than 20 maps, diagrams and illustrations If neither General Meade nor General Lee planned to fight at Gettysburg, how did it happen that the first three days of July 1863 were to become arguably the most important span in the Civil War? That question cannot be fully answered without viewing McPherson's Ridge or Oak Hill, nor can one really understand the urgency of Chamberlain's bayonet charge nor the audacity of Pickett's division at the Angle without visiting those places. Accordingly, the purpose of a Gettysburg staff ride is to visit these and other locations on the battlefield and analyze the battle through the eyes of the men who were there, both leaders and rank and file soldiers. Hopefully, by understanding the actions, inactions and reactions of commanders and their troops in real situations we may gain insights into the human condition under stress and decision making during combat.

Contains more than 20 maps, diagrams and illustrations Although "Fighting Joe" Hooker skillfully executes a well-conceived plan and out-flanks his adversary, months of offensive planning are shelved as he suddenly orders his army on the defensive. Lee seizes the initiative and achieves what has often been called his most brilliant victory. How could this happen when Hooker's army outnumbers that of Lee 2 to 1 and is far superior in artillery and logistics? Answers to these and other questions concerning leadership, communications, use of terrain, and the psychology of men in battle, are often found by personal reconnaissance of the battlefield. This book offers a staff ride briefing of Chancellorsville. Since 1906 staff rides have been used to in the education of U.S. Army officers to narrow the gap between peacetime training and war.

What went wrong? The movement and details of the Union offensive plan at Fredericksburg seemed to be understood by all senior commanders; the Union force had a preponderance of manpower and artillery; a bridgehead was established on the enemy side of the river and initial objectives secured. Then why did the Union commander decide to withdraw his army back across the river to its original position? That question cannot be fully answered without viewing the pontoon crossing sites, the Union approach routes, the infamous "stonewall," and the other Confederate defensive positions. Accordingly, the purpose of a Fredericksburg staff ride is to visit these and other locations on the battlefield and analyze the battle through the eyes of the men who were there, both leaders and rank and file soldiers. Hopefully, by understanding the actions, inactions, and reactions of commanders and their troops in real situations we may gain insights into the human condition under stress and decision making during combat. The staff ride is a training method which commanders can use for the professional development of their subordinates and to enliven the unit's esprit de corps - constant objectives of all commanders in peacetime. Includes maps, orders of battle, illustrations and appendices. (Facsimile reprint originally published by the Army's Center for Military History; typography less dark than the original)

Contains more than 20 maps, diagrams and illustrations Jackson’s march into the rear of Pope’s army opened the Battle of Second Manassas. a battle which has many lessons worthy of study; the deep strike, unity of command, intelligence, logistics and importance of terrain, just to name a few. Accordingly, the purpose of the Manassas staff ride is to learn lessons of the past by analyzing this battle through the eyes of the men who were there, both leaders and rank and file soldiers. Hopefully, the actions or inactions of certain Civil War commanders and the reactions of their troops will allow us to gain insights into decision-making and the human condition during battle.

The Battle of the Wilderness began Lt. Gen Ulysses S. Grant’s 1864 Overland Campaign against the Confederate army of Northern Virginia that ultimately, after many weeks and horrendous casualties, forced Gen. Robert E. Lee’s men back to the defenses at Richmond. The fighting took place in an area of Virginia where tangled underbrush and trees had grown up in long-abandoned farmland, near the old Chancellorsville battlefield. Close-quarters fighting among the dense woods created high casualties, but the battle proved inconclusive for both sides. It produced an important strategic event, however; whereas before Union commanders had withdrawn their armies after failing to achieve victory south of the Rappahannock River, Grant did not retreat. Instead, he attempted to outflank Lee by moving to the left, setting the stage for the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse. In this briefing book the battle and its environs are discussed and described in detail.

Contains more than 100 maps, diagrams and illustrations The Staff Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, 4 May to 15 June 1864, is the tenth study in the Combat Studies Institute’s (CSI) Staff Ride Handbook series. This handbook analyzes Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant’s 1864 Overland Campaign from the crossing of the Rapidan River on 4 May to the initiation of the crossing of the James River on 15 June. Unlike many of CSI’s previous handbooks, this handbook focuses on the operational level of war. Even so, it provides a heavy dose of tactical analysis, thereby making this ride a superb tool for developing Army leaders at almost all levels. Designed to be completed in three days, this staff ride is flexible enough to allow units to conduct a one-day or two-day ride that will still enable soldiers to gain a full range of insights offered by the study of this important campaign. In developing their plan for conducting an Overland Campaign staff ride, unit commanders are encouraged to consider analyzing the wide range of military problems associated with warfighting that this study offers. This campaign provides a host of issues to be examined, to include logistics, intelligence, psychological operations, use of reconnaissance (or lack thereof), deception, leadership, engineering, campaign planning, soldier initiative, and many other areas relevant to the modern military professional. Each of these issues, and others also analyzed herein, are as germane to us today as they were 150 years ago.