Fratricide, or 'Friendly Fire', is a persistent and unwelcome feature in war. Can it be avoided? How can it be properly understood? Beginning with a historical analysis, Fratricide in Battle examines all aspects of the problem, covering both human and technical factors, before looking at a range of measures currently in use to tackle the issue. Charles Kirke brings together an international group of experts in the field, from both military and academic backgrounds, to provide a thorough examination of this crucial subject. Taken together, their contributions offer a comprehensive understanding of fratricide in its historical context and suggest important lessons for future generations.

This collection examines the subject of friendly fire through the eyes of international experts in the field.

Fratricide has been defined as firing on your own forces, when mistaking them for enemy forces, which results in injury or death. Rates of fratricide incidence have been steadily increasing and the complexity of the contemporary operating environment may lead to a continuation of this trend. Although the majority of research into fratricide has focused on the development of technological decision aids, recent explorations highlight the need to emphasise the social aspects within a socio-technical framework. This book presents and validates, via the use of case studies, a model of teamwork and decision-making factors that are associated with incidents of fratricide. In summary, it offers a review and evaluation of contemporary theoretical perspectives on teamwork and fratricide, as well as a range of accident analysis approaches. A novel theory of fratricide is then presented followed by a new methodology for assessing fratricide. Naturalistic case studies of teams are undertaken in the military domain. These studies illustrate the approach and offer early validation evidence. In closing, the book presents a series of principles designed to reduce the likelihood of fratricide in the future.

In the aftermath of the euphoria brought on by our military victory in the Persian Gulf War, is the realization that we still have much to learn. The Persian Gulf War appears to have validated the quality of U.S. doctrine, leadership and military prowess. It showcased the technical superiority of our equipment, and confirmed under fire the courage and competence of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Yet, even in an overwhelming victory there are painfully hard lessons to be learned, or in the case of fratricide, relearned. Perhaps no other aspect of our failures strike the military psyche harder than fratricide. This study will suggest that we do not have to accept the fratricide statistics of the past, however factual, as inevitable of future U.S. conflicts. It will propose that the facts of fratricide should be gathered not as a casualty prediction planning tool, but as a focus to design training and operational procedures, which in conjunction with advanced technology will work towards the significant reduction if not the elimination of fratricide from attack helicopter fires.

On Feb. 7, 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, a Bradley and an M113 were destroyed by 2 Hellfire missiles fired from an Apache helicopter. Two U.S. soldiers were killed, and 6 others were wounded in the incident. This report provides a detailed discussion of the incident, including related events and factors that contributed to it, and an analysis of the U.S. Army's investigation of the incident. It addresses: whether equipment failure caused the incident, the Apaches' performance, and whether the name of the Apache gunner was improperly released to the press.

Friendly fire incidents often disrupt the close and continuous combined arms cooperation so essential to success in modern combat, especially when that combat is conducted against a well armed, well trained, and numerically superior opponent. This study, by presenting selected examples in their historical settings, is intended only to explain a few of the most obvious types of friendly fire incidents and some of the causative factors associated with them. By directing the attention of commanders and staff officers responsible for the development, training, and employment of combat forces to the hitherto little explored problem of friendly fire incidents, this study is intended to generate interest in and solutions for the problems outlined. The scope of this study is limited to incidents involving US forces in World War II and Vietnam, although some evidence is available from other conflicts in the twentieth century has also been considered. In sum, this study can claim to be no more than a narrative exposition of selected examples. Although its conclusions must be considered highly speculative and tentative in nature, this study can be of substantial value to an understanding of the problem of friendly fire in modern war. Chapters one through 5 of this report discuss: Artillery Amicicide; Air Amicicide; Antiaircraft Amicicide; Ground Amicicide.