With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European bloc, the reunification of Germany was a major episode in the history of modern Europe - and one widely held to have been opposed by that country's centuries-old enemy, France. But while it has been previously believed that French President François Mitterrand played a negative role in events leading up to reunification, this book shows that Mitterrand's main concern was not the potential threat of an old nemesis but rather that a reunified Germany be firmly anchored in a unified Europe. Updated with a new introduction and other materials, the book blends primary research and interviews with key actors in France and Germany to take readers behind the scenes of world governments as a new Europe was formed. Tilo Schabert had unprecedented, exclusive access to French presidential archives and here focuses on French diplomacy not only to dispel the notion that Mitterrand was reluctant to accept reunification but also to show how successful he was in bringing it about. Tilo Schabert is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Erlangen, Germany. He also taught at the Universities of Munich, Stanford, Bochum, Trier and Dresden, and was Research Fellow at Stanford, Harvard and the Australian National University, as well as Senior Heisenberg Research Fellow at the German Research Council. Schabert was Visiting Professor in Lisbon, Perpignan, Paris, Rennes, Salerno, Naples and Beijing.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European bloc, the reunification of Germany was a major episode in the history of modern Europe — and one widely held to have been opposed by that country's centuries-old enemy, France. But while it has been previously believed that French President François Mitterrand played a negative role in events leading up to reunification, this book shows that Mitterrand's main concern was not the potential threat of an old nemesis but rather that a reunified Germany be firmly anchored in a unified Europe. Updated with a new introduction and other materials, the book blends primary research and interviews with key actors in France and Germany to take readers behind the scenes of world governments as a new Europe was formed. Tilo Schabert had unprecedented, exclusive access to French presidential archives and here focuses on French diplomacy not only to dispel the notion that Mitterrand was reluctant to accept reunification but also to show how successful he was in bringing it about.

"Dispelling the notion that François Mitterrand was reluctant to accept the reunification of Germany, Schabert focuses on French diplomacy, re-creating cabinet meetings and quoting communications between Mitterrand and other world leaders, to show that Mitterrand's main concern was that a reunified Germany be firmly anchored in a unified Europe"--Provided by publisher.

This book explores the role of France in the events leading up to the end of the Cold War and German unification. --from publisher description.

This book provides a multinational history of German reunification based on empirical work by leading scholars. The reunification of Germany in 1989-90 was one of the most unexpected and momentous events of the twentieth century. Embedded within the wider process of the end of the Cold War, it contributed decisively to the dramatic changes that followed: the end of the division of Europe, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the origins of NATO’s eastward expansion and, not least, the creation of the European Union. Based on the wealth of evidence that has become available from many countries involved, and relying on the most recent historiography, this collection takes into account the complex interaction of multinational processes that were instrumental in shaping German reunification in the pivotal years 1989-90. The volume brings together renowned international scholars whose recent works, based on their research in multiple languages and sources, have contributed significantly to the history of the end of the Cold War and of German reunification. The resulting volume represents an important contribution to our knowledge and understanding of a significant chapter in recent history. This book will be of much interest to students of German politics, Cold war history, international and multinational history and IR in general.

When the Wall Came Down provides a wide-ranging compendium of responses in Germany and other countries to the events of 1989-90, and includes essays by Henry Kissinger, Vaclav Havel, Ralf Dahrendorf and Timothy Garton Ash.

Throughout the postwar era a special relationship between France and Germany has often been the catalyst for European integration. The two countries have achieved jointly the leadership that neither could sustain alone. However, the Soviet collapse has presented them with a new agenda of problems. German unification has resurrected old geopolitical fears and has had disruptive economic consequences. Central European states are struggling to transform themselves into liberal democracies with market economies and clamoring to join the European Union, posing a formidable challenge to its practical cohesion, organizational patterns, and economic resources. Events in the former Yugoslavia have lent urgency to the need for decisive action on enlargement and exposed the fragility of Europe's capacity for collective military action. The Franco-German response has been to "deepen" the EU, while proceeding slowly on enlarging to the east. The partners have pursued their monetary goal with extraordinary fortitude and most observers believe they will achieve it in 1999. However, opinion is deeply divided over the wisdom or sustainability of such a course. This book explores how these issues are currently understood by French and German elites who have generated the current policies and are carrying them out. The essays--by three French, three German, and two American authors--reveal an impressive consensus, as well as widely differing views. They analyze the broad diplomatic, security, and economic dimensions of the bilateral relationship. The contributors are Gilles Andr?ani. Klaus-Peter Klaiber, Fran?ois Heisbourg, Michael St?rmer, Jean-Pierre Landau, Ernst Welteke, and Patrick McCarthy. SAIS European Studies