Beskriver udviklingen af den amerikanske hærs doktriner efter Vietnam-krigen.

ADP 3-0, Operations, constitutes the Army's view of how to conduct prompt and sustained operations across multiple domains, and it sets the foundation for developing other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications. It articulates the Army's operational doctrine for unified land operations. ADP 3-0 accounts for the uncertainty of operations and recognizes that a military operation is a human undertaking. Additionally, this publication is the foundation for training and Army education system curricula related to unified land operations. The principal audience for ADP 3-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force (JTF) or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will use this publication as well.

The single most important origin of today's AirLand Battle doctrine was the establishment of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 and the writing of a wholly new Field Manual (FM) 100-5, "Operations," under the supervision of the first TRADOC commander, General William E. DePuy. Between 1973 and the manual's publication in 1976, DePuy gave the Army a mighty shove that rolled it out of its preoccupation with the Vietnam War and on the road to the 21st century. The 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was unlike any of its several predecessors. First, it represented a new role for military doctrine as a key integrating medium for an increasingly complex military bureaucracy. The manual attempted to present an over-arching concept of warfare that would rationalize everything the Army did, from training recruits to designing tanks, in terms of how the Army intended to fight. Central to this attempt was the hope that the manual would provide the convincing arguments the Army needed to preserve its investment in new weapons systems. Second, FM 100-5 heralded dramatic changes within the Army. Its authors intended that it play a major role in expunging the bitter Vietnam War experience; shift the Army's attention away from the problems inherent in establishing a volunteer army and onto the battlefield; address the twin issues of a renewed threat to NATO Europe and the increased lethality brought on by the spread of advanced weapons systems; and change the Army's focus from dismounted infantry operations to armored operations. Third, FM 100-5 was an attempt to demystify doctrine. It discarded the abstractions of earlier manuals in favor of specifics on "how to fight." Fourth, the manual was the personal project of General DePuy and his subordinate generals. But despite its importance and high-level authorship, FM 100-5 caused a controversy within the Army that quickly led to the manual's displacement, an event DePuy neither anticipated nor intended.