Fire Support Bases Vietnam is a meticulous documentation of the construction, location and role of fire support bases during the Vietnam War, compiled by Vietnam veteran Bruce Picken. Often makeshift bases hacked out of primary jungle, these artillery gun areas provided essential support to infantry field units during operations in South Vietnam. In its simplest sense, a fire support base was an often hastily constructed fortified artillery base position, usually sited forward close to the centre of the area of operations in support of task force, battalion or company operations. The role of the fire support base was to bring artillery and mortar fire within range of friendly forces operating in depth. Artillery gun areas were not unique to the Vietnam conflict. In previous wars they were deployed in allied territory to cover the front lines and to support advancing troops. The concept was first applied in Vietnam by US forces and quickly adapted by Australian forces arriving in Phuoc Tuy Province in May 1966 to fight a new kind of war. This conflict was not like its predecessors and the fire support bases were now more usually sited in territory dominated by the enemy to provide much-needed protection for forces operating in bitterly contested areas. Fire Support Bases Vietnam is a detailed account that identifies every fire support base by date, location and role and provides an outline of the operations in which they participated. This is an essential reference book for those with a serious interest in the Vietnam War, and adds valuable detail to the study of a campaign that occupies a unique place in the Australian psyche.

Artillery fire support bases of the Freeworld forces played a critical role in the conduct of operations during the Vietnam War. They served to lay down high-volume fire on enemy firing sites, supported friendly infantry operations, and executed harassing fire missions where exact targets were not known. But the firebases themselves which housed a range of other facilities such as troop shelters, surveillance radars and command centers had to be defended against ground attack, and as a result became significant fortifications in their own right. This book describes the design, development and operational history of the fire support bases throughout the conflict.

A detailed and masterly account of the biggest unit level battle involving Australian soldiers during the Vietnam War. The Battle: For twenty-six days during May and June 1968 the 1st Australian Task Force fought a series of actions around Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral, northeastof Saigon. The Scenario: An overnight switch in war tactics, from patrolling and ambushing to close combat action, where, for the first time in a long while, tanks and artillery support came into their own. The Men: A trained fighting force with more than their share of bravery, whose skills and sacrifice stopped the North Vietnamese in their tracks. Lex McAulay's brilliant account of reconstruction is one of the most important books on the Australian soldiers' involvement in the Vietnam War.

Fire Base Illingworth is an epic, never-before-told true story of a North Vietnamese Army attack and how the men of this nearly overrun Fire Base survived. In the early morning hours of April 1, 1970, more than four hundred North Vietnamese soldiers charged out into the open and tried to over-run FSB Illingworth. The battle went on, mostly in the dark, for hours. Exposed ammunition canisters were hit and blew up, causing a thunderous explosion inside the FSB that left dust so thick it jammed the hand-held weapons of the GIs. Much of the combat was hand-to-hand. In all, twenty-four Americans lost their lives and another fifty-four were wounded. Nearly one hundred enemy bodies were recovered. It was one of the most vicious small unit firefights in the history of U.S. forces in Vietnam. As in his acclaimed book Blackhorse Riders, a finalist for the prestigious Colby Award, Philip Keith uncovers a harrowing true story of bravery and sacrifice by the men who fought valiantly to hold FSB Illingworth-a tale never-before-told and one that will not be soon forgotten.

The stories of war and survival told by the Marines that were there "What shines through from this bare-knuckled, furious battle is the core ethos. It comes though loud and clear when you read chapter after chapter in different voices. These Marines had no battlefield prep, no intelligence, no cohesive leadership. What held them together was the Marine spirit. There was nothing else. Wow! What an epic fight!" - Bing West, author of The Last Platoon and The Village "LZ Sitting Duck shows battle from the bottom up. In personal statements it captures the chaos, bravery, confusion, fear, and fighting spirit of Marines of the First Battalion Fourth Marines who fought a fierce hill battle with regular North Vietnamese Army forces in March of 1969. Readers will learn about combat down in the dirt at the very tip of the spearpoint." - Karl Marlantes, author of Matterhorn and What's It Like To Go To War

By the autumn of 1971 a war-weary American public had endured a steady stream of bad news about the conduct of its soldiers in Vietnam. It included reports of fraggings, massacres, and cover-ups, mutinies, increased racial tensions, and soaring drug abuse. Then six soldiers at Fire Support Base Pace, a besieged U.S. artillery outpost near the Cambodian border, balked at an order to conduct a nighttime ambush patrol. Four days later, twenty soldiers from a second unit objected to patrolling even in daylight. The sensation these events triggered in the media, along with calls for a congressional investigation, reinforced for the American public the image of a dysfunctional military on the edge of collapse. For a time Pace became the face of all that was wrong with American troops during the extended withdrawal from Vietnam. William Shkurti, however, argues that the incidents at Firebase Pace have been misunderstood for four decades. Shkurti, who served as an artillery officer not far from Pace, uses declassified reports, first-person interviews, and other sources to reveal that these incidents were only temporary disputes involving veteran soldiers exercising common sense. Shkurti also uses the Pace incidents to bring an entire war and our withdrawal from it into much sharper focus. He reevaluates the performance and motivation of U.S. ground troops and their commanders during this period, as well as that of their South Vietnamese allies and North Vietnamese adversaries; reassesses the media and its coverage of this phase of the war; and shows how some historians have helped foster misguided notions about what actually happened at Pace. By taking a closer look at what we thought we knew, Shkurti persuasively demonstrates how combat units still in harm's way adapted to the challenges before them and soldiered on in a war everyone else wanted to be over. In doing so, he also suggests a context to better understand the challenges that may lie ahead in the drawdown of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan.

HELL ON A HILL TOP-for four months in 1970, Hell raged on the hill tops of Ripcord, 805, 902 and 1000, all just east of the A Shau Valley. HELL ON A HILL TOP Instead of backing away from the fight, the North Vietnamese mortar, recoilless rifle, heavy machine gun, sapper and regular infantry attacks increased. The last offensive around Ripcord was starting to look like the last stand. Unwilling to keep American soldiers at high risk at this stage of the war; Ripcord was evacuated on 23 July. The battle went unnoticed for 30 years until Keith Nolan's book, RIPCORD, was published. As powerful and gripping as was the story of great leadership and courageous fighting by our soldiers, the magnitude of the enemy force still remained unknown. The author, the 3rd Brigade commander during the siege and evacuation, made trips to Vietnam in 2001 and 2004 and interviewed the 324B Division Commander whose first-ever division sole mission, was to destroy Firebase Ripcord. The full story is now told.