Little empirical investigation exists of the links among capital account liberalization, prudential regulation and supervision, financial crises, and economic development, mainly because of the lack of comparable measures to describe regulatory practices for different countries. This paper examines empirically, albeit in a preliminary manner, these links using new measures of capital controls, prudential regulation, supervision, and depositors’ safety for a sample of 15 developing economies over the period 1990–97. Results confirm the importance of the degree of capital account convertibility and the regulatory and supervisory framework in affecting financial fragility and economic performance.

The present volume articulates a state of concern with the destabilising and the growth retarding effects of current world finance relations. Emphasis laid in this volume on finance is justified, not only in terms of its dominance over real activities in the world economy but also with its influence on the pace of economic reforms in the debt-ridden countries. A large number of essays in this volume deals with the recent pattern of capital flows in the world economy. The latter has been of a high priority in the agenda for research in economics in recent times, especially with tendencies for financial fragility in the major financial markets and the enforcing of the structural adjustment programmes in the developing countries as a part of loan conditionalities. The volume provides a rich analysis of contemporary international finance relations, with individual chapters contributed by reputed economists who have made significant contributions to the literature.

A stable and sound financial system plays a critical role in mediating funds from surplus units to investors, making it a prerequisite for economic development. Financial intermediaries have been vulnerable to adverse changes in the local and global economy and experienced frequent bubble-and-bust episodes historically. Analyses of financial crises reveal that the incentive created by neo-liberal financial principles is inconsistent with stable financial systems, and viable solutions require structuring institutions in a way that incentives are well aligned with the fundamental principles of financial systems. By drawing on the theoretical framework of the financial restraint model, this book analyses financial sectors’ rents or bank rents and their effects on banks’ performance and stability, and presents evidence on the relationship between rent and incentive through case studies of both developed and developing countries.

This paper studies the apparent contradictions between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities. On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns. This paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run effects of financial intermediation.

The study examines empirical relationships between income inequality and three features of finance: depth (financial sector size relative to the economy), inclusion (access to and use of financial services by individuals and firms), and stability (absence of financial distress). Using new data covering a wide range of countries, the analysis finds that the financial sector can play a role in reducing inequality, complementing redistributive fiscal policy. By expanding the provision of financial services to low-income households and small businesses, it can serve as a powerful lever in helping create a more inclusive society but—if not well managed—it can amplify inequalities.

Applied macroeconomists (e.g., Eckstein and Sinai (1986)) have stressed the role of financial variables, such as firm balance sheet positions, in the determination of investment spending and output. Our paper presents a formal analysis of this link. We develop a model of the process of investment finance in which there is asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders about the quality of investment projects and about the borrower's effort. In this model, the cost of external investment finance under the optimal contract is higher, the worse the borrower's balance sheet position (i.e., the lower his net worth). In general equilibrium, the lower is borrower net worth, the further the number of projects initiated and the average quality of undertaken projects will be from the unconstrained first-best. We characterize a "financially fragile" situation as one in which balance sheets are so weak that the economy experiences substantial underinvestment, misallocation of investment resources, and possibly even a complete investment collapse. Our policy analysis suggests that, under some circumstances, government "bailouts" of insolvent debtors may be a reasonable alternative in periods of extreme financial fragility.

An authoritative guide to the new economics of our crisis-filled century. Published in collaboration with the Institute for New Economic Thinking. The 2008 financial crisis was a seismic event that laid bare how financial institutions’ instabilities can have devastating effects on societies and economies. COVID-19 brought similar financial devastation at the beginning of 2020 and once more massive interventions by central banks were needed to heed off the collapse of the financial system. All of which begs the question: why is our financial system so fragile and vulnerable that it needs government support so often? For a generation of economists who have risen to prominence since 2008, these events have defined not only how they view financial instability, but financial markets more broadly. Leveraged brings together these voices to take stock of what we have learned about the costs and causes of financial fragility and to offer a new canonical framework for understanding it. Their message: the origins of financial instability in modern economies run deeper than the technical debates around banking regulation, countercyclical capital buffers, or living wills for financial institutions. Leveraged offers a fundamentally new picture of how financial institutions and societies coexist, for better or worse. The essays here mark a new starting point for research in financial economics. As we muddle through the effects of a second financial crisis in this young century, Leveraged provides a road map and a research agenda for the future.